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Memory in Roman Oratory: Theory and Practice 
Joe Grimwade 
This thesis is a study of the role of memory in Roman rhetorical theory, pedagogic practice, 
and oratorical performance, with a particular focus on the forensic oratory of the late 
Republic. It investigates the various ways in which a speaker’s mnemonic capacity – 
conceptualised as memoria naturalis and/or memoria artificiosa – was understood to enhance 
his oratorical ability. In doing so, the study reconsiders our understanding of how the typical 
Roman speaker ‘trained’ and utilised his memory, inside and outside of the forum.  
Chapter I explains the rationale underlying my reinterpretation of memoria artificiosa 
(a.k.a. the ars memoriae or the ‘method of loci’), in terms of its design, purpose, didactic 
dissemination, and practical application. The evidence is drawn primarily from the 
anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s De oratore; it is supplemented by 
Quintilian’s later discussion of memoria and by experimental studies from modern cognitive 
science. I show that memoria artificiosa was developed not to facilitate the verbatim 
memorisation of written texts, but to enable the encoding and retention of smaller units of 
highly-structured information. The technique was not used by poets, but by speakers who 
memorised the main talking points of their orations and delivered largely improvised 
performances. 
Chapter II reconsiders the historical development of mnemonic techniques. I present 
evidence for a new chronology that removes the poet Simonides of Ceos from his position as 
the inventor of the ars memoriae and questions Aristotle’s involvement in the method’s 
evolution. Instead, I focus on the nexus of philosophers, rhetoricians, and expert mnemonists 
who populated the Sceptical Academy of the second century BCE, positing that it may have 
been here, among numerous variant artes memoriae, where the ars memoriae as we know it 
emerged. 
Chapter III moves on to reappraise memoria as a performative discipline. I examine 
how orators relied upon and utilised their mnemonic skills (natural and artificial) at different 
stages of the ‘forensic process’ – that is to say, as they progressed through the various stages 
of a typical (late-republican) trial, from preparing to delivering a speech. Highlighting the 
role that memoria played at each of these stages helps us interpret references to the content of 
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lost oratorical commentarii and offers novel insights into how some orators might have used 
mnemonic techniques in real time, during a trial while their opponents were speaking. 
Chapter IV examines how our perception of the role of memoria in Roman life has 
been skewed by Cicero’s discourse and influence on the subsequent rhetorical tradition. I 
investigate the surprisingly large group of individuals whom Cicero praises for possessing 
superior mnemonic ability – a group that includes not just orators and intellectuals, but 
several high-profile statesmen and generals. The emphasis Cicero places on memoria can be 
explained partly by his own philosophy of leadership and partly by the importance wider 
Roman society attached to the social practice of nomenclatio. Later sources indicate that 
Cicero’s ‘memory men’ exerted a lasting influence on the portrayal of exemplary mnemonic 





First and foremost, my heartfelt thanks go to Ingo Gildenhard, my principal supervisor, who 
has stuck by me through two research degrees and a global pandemic, celebrating the highs 
and helping to navigate the lows. His timely questions, percipient observations, and pacific 
presence of mind have shaped my research and enhanced it immeasurably. I am enormously 
grateful for his generosity and support. Likewise, Myrto Hatzimichali, my secondary 
supervisor, has been generous with her time and incisive with her input throughout. She has 
helped especially with the interdisciplinary aspects of this thesis, providing sagacious 
guidance on matters philosophical. 
This thesis would not have been possible without the wonderful community of 
scholars in the Cambridge Faculty of Classics. I thank Brian Buckley, the benefactor of the 
Buckley Scholarship that provided the funding for, and enabled me to undertake, my PhD. 
Members of the C Caucus and the A Caucus have offered insight, opportunity, and 
entertainment in equal measure. Notably, Rebecca Flemming supplied valuable feedback on 
the thesis at various stages, for which I thank her. I am also extremely grateful to Rosanna 
Omitowoju, Franco Basso, and Charlie Weiss for supporting me in my own teaching and 
supervising. Finally, my doctoral studies would have been immensely impoverished without 
the rich sense of community fostered by my fellow Cambridge Classics graduates. To name 
one is to miss a dozen. With that in mind, I might mention Sofia Greaves and Nir Stern, with 
whom I relaunched the graduate community’s blog; and Marco Bonaventura, with whom I 
have shared the various ups-and-downs of teaching while trying to finish a thesis. 
Beyond the world of Classics, I may never have embarked upon a university career of 
any kind were it not for Dr Tony Winston. To him, I owe my health, unde omnia.  
A group I shall call the ‘Warwick poets’ (they know who they are) has been an 
enduring constant throughout my university studies. A kinder crowd you will not find, and I 
thank them for the years of intelligent conversation on subjects literary. I give deepest thanks 
also to my wonderful friend Clari Searle, who is currently in the midst of her own PhD. 
Although distance has meant that we have not spent enough time together in recent years, she 
is always at the other end of the phone. 
I owe a great debt of kindness to my family, my sister, cousins, ‘honorary cousins’, 
aunts and uncles, who have stayed close and supported me in so many ways while I have 
been studying. I thank my parents, for their love and support: my father, who has listened to 
5 
 
the various travails of graduate life on countless occasions with ever-patient ear; and my 
mother, who selflessly took on the unenviable task of proofreading this thesis. The 





Abbreviations; List of figures; Note on texts and translations 8 
 
Introduction 9 
1. Rhetoric at Rome in the first century BCE 13 
 
I: Rhetorical memory in theory and practice 18 
1. Rhetorical memoria: between memorisation and improvisation 20 
2. Memoria in Rhetorica ad Herennium: normalisation and differentiation 36 
3. Memoria in De oratore: differentiation from the norm 45 
 
II: Towards a chronology of memoria artificiosa 62 
1. Evidence of philosophical concepts in the MOL 64 
    1.a. The wax tablet 68 
    1.b. The mind’s eye 71 
    1.c. The ars/natura axiom 77 
2. The Aristotelian evidence 80 
3. Memory in the Hellenistic schools of philosophy 88 
    3.a. Epicureanism 89 
    3.b. Stoicism 91 
    3.c. The Sceptical Academy 92 
4. The Sceptical Academy: Where philosophy embraced rhetoric? 97 
    4.a. Charmadas of Athens as mnemonist 102 
    4.b. Metrodorus of Scepsis as mnemonist 106 
5. A new chronology of memoria artificiosa 111 
 
III: Memory in the forensic process 117 
1. The preparation phase 119 
    1.a. How did an orator prepare for his speech? 120 
    1.b. The alternative to the MOL: composing a script 125 
    1.c. Cicero’s exemplary orators and superior mnemonic ability 130 
2. The trial phase 137 
    2.a. The practical application of the MOL 138 




IV: Cicero’s memory men 153 
1. Superior memoria as an exemplary attribute 155 
2. Cicero’s leaders and generals 166 
3. Superior memoria as a topos of imperial praise 179 
 
Concluding remarks 185 
1. On the MOL and oratorical expertise 185 
2. On the application of the MOL in Classics 187 
3. On future research into Roman mnemonic practices 191 
 
Bibliography 195 
Cited editions of ancient works 195 






MOL = ‘method of loci’ 
OCD5 = Whitmarsh, T. (ed.) Oxford Classical Dictionary, 5th edition. Oxford: available at 
https://oxfordre.com/classics  
ORF3 = Malcovati, H. (1966, 3rd ed.) Oratorum Romanorum Fragmenta Liberae Rei 
Publicae. Turin. 
TLL = Thesaurus Linguae Latinae (1900 – ). Munich. 
 
All Greek and Latin texts are abbreviated according to the conventions of the OCD5, which 
can be found here: https://oxfordre.com/classics/page/ocdabbreviations  
If the OCD5 does not list an abbreviation for a given text, it is either abbreviated according to 
the conventions of the TLL, or the title is supplied in full. 
 
 
List of figures 
Fig. 1: ‘Memoria within the subdivisions of rhetoric’, p. 20. 
Fig. 2: ‘Illustration of the ‘mind’s eye’ contemplating loci’, p. 58. 
Fig. 3: ‘The development of memoria artificiosa’, p. 116. 
All figures are my own. The ‘anchor’ and ‘cup’ images in Fig. 2 are in the public domain. 
 
 
Note on texts and translations 
The relevant edition of a quoted Greek or Latin text is generally only cited once, at the point 
when that text is quoted at length for the first time. Thereafter, the reader may refer to the list 
of ‘Cited editions of ancient works’ in the bibliography for the relevant author and text. 





The modern term ‘memory’ is notoriously slippery, used to denote a wealth of interrelated 
but distinct concepts in a plethora of differing settings. Likewise, the Roman term memoria 
was Teflon-coated, its usage and meaning gliding from one context to another, through 
everyday idiom, into history, poetry, philosophy – pervading all areas of life.1 This thesis 
deals with conceptualisations of memoria in rhetoric and oratory, two closely associated 
disciplines in which the individual’s memory, defined as his personal mnemonic capacity, 
took on special importance. The reason is readily apparent: in a forensic environment where 
professional speakers handled dozens of cases, where scripts were anathema and what 
mattered most was “delivery, delivery, delivery”, memory acted as the mediator between a 
speaker’s premeditated ideas and the articulation of those ideas in fluent speech.2 Memory 
was the orator’s treasury; the treasured wealth within, his memories. Memory protected the 
orator as the orator protected his client. Memory, on the forensic battlefield, was the orator’s 
mightiest defence, securing the bulwarks whence his garrulous battalions advanced. 
I shall stop before the analogies turn an even deeper shade of purple – although, as 
this thesis will testify, memory and metaphor are difficult to divide. Each analogy I invoked 
above has ancient precedent in the oratorical context; each serves a function in the lexicon of 
memoria. Any study of this part of the mind, the ineffable mental processes we necessarily 
and unsatisfactorily abstract away under the label ‘memory’, must engage with exegetic 
figurative speech. ‘I witness with pleasure the supreme achievement of memory, which is the 
masterly use it makes of innate harmonies when gathering to its fold the suspended and 
wandering tonalities of the past’: so said Nabokov, and if there was anyone who could 
express the ineffable, it was he.3 Yet the ultimate inadequacy of language – modern or 
ancient – to grasp the essence of memory and remembering is, at heart, the reason I have long 
been preoccupied by the phenomenon. Two major works of the twentieth century, Yates’ The 
Art of Memory (1966) and Small’s Wax Tablets of the Mind (1997), inspired the ‘big’ 
questions that underlie the specific concerns of this thesis: the question of whether writing 
and literacy changed individuals’ experiences of memory and remembering; the question of 
 
1 As explicated by Walter (2004) 26-41; for the modern taxonomy of memory (revised periodically), see 
Michaelian and Sutton (2017). 
2 For the famous Demosthenic “delivery” tricolon, Cic. De or. 3.213, Orat. 56, Brut. 142; cf. Rhet. Her. 3.19 for 
a more nuanced approach. For the absence of scripts, see Ch. III, p. 125-30. 
3 Nabokov (1967) 170. 
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whether esoteric ancient theories of memory bore any relation to quotidian practice; the 
question of whether we, today, engage with the act of remembering in a fundamentally 
different way from, say, a Roman orator trained in the mnemonic arts.  
These questions are inherently nebulous – inscrutable, even. While this thesis touches 
upon them, it does so in a discipline-specific fashion. My intention is to help the Classicist 
understand why ancient Greek and Roman authors talk about memory in the ways that they 
do – why, for example, they so readily reach for the metaphor of memory as a wax tablet, 
impressed with mnemonic traces like letters inscribed by a stylus. Does the wax/writing 
analogy reveal something fundamental about the way literate individuals experienced 
memory? Or is it simply another attempt to understand the processes of memory via 
metaphor, and more specifically, via technological metaphor? Taking the long view, we see 
that memory-as-technology analogies are commonplace. In the medieval period, memory 
becomes a bookcase; in the nineteenth century, a camera obscura; in the 1920s, a 
gramophone; and from the 1960s onwards, a computer, replete with CPU, hard drives, and 
RAM.4 Societal and cultural contexts shape individual expressions of universal phenomena. 
More specifically, when it comes to expressions of mnemonic phenomena, comparisons with 
contemporaneous technologies abound. There is a recurring desire to conceptualise memory 
as we might a machine, each unseen process geared towards a result, a memory successfully 
encoded, stored, modified, and/or retrieved. Memory is not a manmade tool, however; it is 
natural, fickle, sometimes uncontrollable. This tension, between the natural processes of 
memory and the desire to control those processes, is ever-present in ancient texts dealing with 
memory, from the earliest expositions onwards. The question is pivotal: how much artifice 
can there be in memory?  
“As much as you like.” That, prima facie, appears to have been the answer for 
rhetoricians of the first century BCE and, appropriately enough, it provides the starting point 
for this thesis. The prefaced summary has already supplied an overview of the structure; 
moreover, each chapter contains its own introduction. Here, I shall simply define the overall 
scope. Although my historical focus is the late Republic, my analysis incorporates relevant 
sources spanning from Plato to Pacatus.5 In particular, the works of the elder Seneca and 
Quintilian sometimes throw additional light on the mnemonic theories and practices detailed 
 
4 John of Salisbury (12th century) Metalogicon 1.2.49-50; Beets (1839), the analogy features in a quote opposite 
the frontispiece; Pear (1922) 3; Atkinson and Shriffin (1968) 90. 
5 Pacatus Drepanius, 4th century CE, see Ch. IV, p. 183-4. 
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in republican rhetorical texts. The earliest surviving treatments of rhetorical memory, in the 
anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium and Cicero’s De oratore, are examined in depth in 
Chapter I, which analyses memory as a rhetorical subdiscipline, delineating the easily-blurred 
bounds between natural and artificial, that is, between memoria naturalis and memoria 
artificiosa. Chapter II develops the focus on ancient theories of artificial mnemonics, tracing 
their roots in Greek philosophical theories of memory while revising the developmental 
chronologies presented by Yates and Small. Chapter III aligns itself with a recent and 
productive trend, exemplified by numerous papers in Castagnoli’s and Ceccarelli’s 
collaborative Greek Memories: Theories and Practices, by examining real-world scenarios in 
which mnemonic theory was put into practice.6 My analysis demonstrates that scrutinising 
how Roman orators utilised memory (natural and/or artificial) can improve our understanding 
of the practical business of forensic speechmaking. Chapter IV continues to develop this 
theme, investigating Cicero’s portrayals of mnemonic ability by juxtaposing the realities of 
various Roman mnemonic practices against Ciceronian exemplary fictions.  
Finally, in my Concluding Remarks, I address certain conceptualisations of memory 
that are outside of this thesis’ scope, to which my findings nevertheless pertain. My study 
does not, for instance, concern itself with collective or cultural memory, as so many projects 
have done in recent years – Galinsky’s Memoria Romana being the most prominent 
example.7 Yet we must be mindful of ancient concepts of individual memory when dealing 
with modern concepts of the collective, to avoid conceptual slippage and unwarranted 
conflation of terms. My study glosses certain Roman authors’ desires for memoria 
sempiterna, achieved via self-memorialisation in text, although this is an interesting and 
popular field, to which my findings concerning Cicero are relevant.8 My study has too little 
space for a proper treatment of Roman mnemonic practices outside of the oratorical sphere – 
but this too is a field rich with future possibility. In sum, while the central focus of the thesis 
is narrow, the periphery is wide. 
 Conversely, that periphery necessarily impinges upon the central focus. We cannot 
fully understand the place of memory in late-republican oratory without acknowledging, to a 
 
6 Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019); see also review by Pagkalos (2021), who observes (fairly) that some papers 
achieve the mission statement more successfully than others. 
7 See Galinsky (2014) and (2016), plus Galinsky and Lapatin (2015). I assume the reader’s familiarity with the 
theory of Memory Studies – the seminal text is Assmann (1992) (= Assmann (2011)). 
8 See e.g. Bishop (2019), La Bua (2019). 
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greater or lesser extent, the discourse surrounding memory in other areas of Greek and 
Roman literature and thought – most notably, in poetry and philosophy. The trained Classicist 
is equipped to tackle such subjects well enough. Memory, however, knows no disciplinary 
bounds. My studies have taken me outside of the Classicist’s comfort zone, away from 
safely-dead authors to the rehearsal rooms of very-much-alive actors, the inboxes of memory 
athletes, and the labs of cognitive scientists. Modern insights into memory have helped me 
draw conclusions from limited ancient evidence; I have been guided by the precept, however, 
that for any such conclusions to be sound, the application of modern findings must be 
confirmed valid by those with the relevant expertise.  
That precept may seem obvious, but the overly liberal application of findings from 
cognitive science to the humanities is far from uncommon. A cautionary example will 
illustrate this important methodological point: I have selected (more or less at random) 
Hughes’ analysis of the Arch of Constantine.9 Hughes begins with a summary of modern 
cognitive studies conducted by Tulving on the cued retrieval of keywords.10 She then 
hypothesises an analogy between the presentation of images to the Roman Arch-viewer and 
the presentation of keywords to Tulving’s test subjects, before raising the possibility that 
‘contemporary viewers who examined the imagery on the Arch of Constantine and then went 
on to encounter other images of Trajan, Hadrian, and Marcus Aurelius on display elsewhere 
in the city might be cued automatically to recall their own emperor’ (p. 113). I pass no 
judgement on the plausibility of such a hypothesis: my point is that the original analogy is 
flawed. A review of the scientific literature quickly reveals that human memory is extremely 
task-specific.11 We cannot take a study on the cued recall of keywords and assume that the 
results will hold valid for the cued recall of images (let alone for the complex variety of 
images on the Arch). The results may indeed be similar – but it is unsound to cite a study 
involving memory for keywords as grounds for a hypothesis involving memory for complex 
images. This error, typical of its kind, highlights the issues that can arise through the 
misapplication of scientific results. Readers will note, therefore, that where I have invoked 
modern parallels in this thesis, I have invoked them in strictly-defined instances, which 
should not be generalised.  
 
9 Hughes (2014) 112-4. 
10 See Tulving and Pearlstone (1966) 381-91; Tulving and Osler (1968) 593-601. 




1. Rhetoric at Rome in the first century BCE 
The remainder of this Introduction presents the social and historical backdrop that frames the 
stage upon which late-republican rhetoricians and orators, the protagonists of this thesis, 
performed. The early first century BCE was, for both rhetorical memory and rhetoric in 
general, a period of transition: Greek treatments of the art of speaking were becoming 
increasingly influential in the Roman world and, alongside a transition from teaching rhetoric 
exclusively in Greek to teaching it in Latin as well, instructional approaches were being 
developed that would remain a feature of pedagogic programmes for centuries to come.12  
Already in the second century, acquiring rhetorical skills was an important part of the 
education of the elite Roman male, since the ability to speak well in public was tied to status 
and power.13 Somewhat counterintuitively, young Roman men, native Latin speakers, 
conducted their rhetorical education largely in Greek: tutors, often enslaved, would be 
brought from Greece to teach in elite households; students might also, when they reached an 
appropriate age, travel to the schools of Greek experts.14 Practical experience was highly 
prized in Roman education and more advanced oratorical training consisted of students 
shadowing advocates and observing them at work in the forum (the so-called tirocinium 
fori).15 Latin-medium rhetorical pedagogy does not, however, seem to have been common 
and we must suppose that students took the techniques they had acquired from their Greek 
tutors and simply applied them to their Latin speechmaking.16  
As the influence of the Greek East on Rome grew, certain members of the Roman 
elite perceived that the traditional approaches to Latin oratory were under threat. The elder 
Cato, for instance, began to assert his vision of the ‘ideal’ Roman orator, the vir bonus 
dicendi peritus, while promoting a traditionally plain-spoken approach to speechmaking with 
 
12 Classical mnemonic rules were adopted and adapted enthusiastically throughout the mediaeval and 
renaissance periods. Yates (1966) still provides a decent introduction to the history of mnemonics from classical 
times to the dawn of the scientific method. Ch. 1 in Worthen and Hunt (2011) continues this survey up to the 
modern day.  
13 See Morgan (1998) 234-9. 
14 For enslaved grammatici, see Rawson (1985) 66-76. Cicero himself explains why he travelled to the Greek 
East to improve his skills at Brut. 314-6. 
15 See David (1992) 332-41, Richlin (1997) 92-3. 
16 Rawson concludes that the second-century elite commanded Latin speaking skills ‘by mere birth and 
upbringing’: Rawson (1985) 119-21. See also McNelis (2007) 292-3. 
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maxims such as rem tene, verba sequentur, an advocation, in essence, of substance over 
rhetorical artificiality.17 These traditionalist objections to Greek rhetorical methods ran much 
deeper than a difference of opinion over speaking technique, however. A senatorial decree of 
161 BCE (reproduced by Suetonius) gets to the heart of the matter: it orders the praetor to see 
to it that there be no philosophers and rhetoricians allowed at Rome, in a declaration Morgan 
describes as a classic case of Roman consuls experiencing a ‘fit of anti-Hellenism’.18 It has 
been suggested that this banning order may have originated from a perceived threat to the 
traditional tirocinium fori, the sophistication of Greek rhetoric, or the use of rhetoric in public 
at Rome by non-elite outsiders.19  
In my view, we might do best to think about the philosophi et rhetores targeted by the 
decree in the context of the Roman reaction to Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus, the 
philosophers who made such an impression at Rome with their virtuoso sophistic and 
rhetorical performances when they arrived as ambassadors from Athens some five years later, 
in 156.20 Many Romans apparently admired them; the elder Cato did not. His response to 
Carneades’ dissoi logoi on justice was, according to Plutarch, one of condemnation: he was 
afraid such rhetoric would entice Rome’s youth to ignore the magistrates, the laws, and their 
practical duties in favour of what he characterised as useless studying.21 If this view 
represents the attitude of an elite minority accurately, we should understand the slightly 
earlier decree of 161 as a reaction to a new and potentially destabilising cultural 
phenomenon, rather than as the suppression of Greek methods of education per se.22 It was 
persuasive and politically-provocative epideictic display – often designed to be deliberately 
contrarian – that threatened deeply-held Roman moral beliefs and the long-established 
hierarchies of power underlying the rights to public speech.23 Perhaps Cato and his ilk were 
 
17 Cato’s writings are fragmentary. For these maxims, see Sen. Contr. 1. pr. 9 (vir bonus…); Iul. Vict. Rhet. I 
(rem tene…) = Halm (1863) p. 374, ln. 17. For Cato and his attitude towards Hellenistic rhetoric, see Sciarrino 
(2007) 55-60, Dominik (2017) 160-2. 
18 Suet. Gramm. et rhet. 25; Morgan (1998) 27. 
19 See Bonner (1977) 65-6, Dominik (2017) 161-2. 
20 The famous embassy is a frequent reference point for Cicero: e.g. De or. 2.155, Tusc. 4.5, Luc. 2.137. For 
details, see Habicht (1997) 264-6. 
21 Plut. Cat. Mai. 22-3; discussed in Biesinger (2016) 79-92. 
22 Note that grammatici, whom the elite employed for their sons’ basic education, were not targeted. 
23 Perceived, even, as a risk to military and governmental institutions: Steel (2017) 205-6. 
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as much opposed to a class of up-and-coming Romans with access to philosophy and rhetoric 
as they were to the philosophi et rhetores themselves. 
The early decades of the first century BCE saw increasing numbers of rhetorical 
schools being established in and around Rome. Significantly, these schools were run by 
independent professionals who taught rhetoric in Latin as well as Greek. This change in 
pedagogic practice prompted the Roman censors to issue a notorious edict in 92 (again 
preserved by Suetonius), condemning any teachers who called themselves Latini rhetores in 
the harshest terms: these teachers, their novum genus disciplinae, and the young men who 
attended their ludi were, in the eyes of the censors, committing sacrilege against the mos 
maiorum.24 The censorial edict is of great significance, although not as a banning order akin 
to the decree of 161 but, rather, as an expression of outrage from the foremost moral 
authorities in Rome. It seems highly unlikely that it led to anyone being punished and there is 
no need to conclude that any rhetorical schools were shut down.25 Nevertheless, the edict is a 
remarkable instance of unified intervention in education (a sphere of life upon which the 
Romans imposed little regulation) from two censors, Crassus and Domitius, who were 
notorious for not being able to agree upon anything.26 The censors’ concerns are, in fact, 
those hardy perennials of modern educational debates: that the wrong sort of things are being 
taught to the wrong sort of people, by the wrong sort of people, in the wrong sort of way.  
Corbeill’s influential studies of the edict construe it as a regressive measure against 
the democratisation of education, focussing (to use my own phrasing) on the idea that ‘the 
wrong sort of things’ were being taught to ‘the wrong sort of people’.27 Latin-medium 
schools that anyone could attend, run by professionals for profit, posed a threat to the 
established senatorial elite – a threat that they were ultimately unable to contain as more 
schools sprang up. In turn, greater accessibility to rhetorical education allowed well-off but 
non-aristocratic Romans to attain greater status and power through public speaking. 
 
24 Suet. Gramm. et rhet. 25 (text: Kaster (2016)); also reproduced by Gellius NA 15.11.1.  
25 Although a number of scholars have concluded otherwise, e.g. Bonner (1977) 71, Luzzatto (2002) 301-46. 
Such conclusions are based on later renderings of the edict by Cicero, who has Crassus say that he ‘removed’ 
(sustuleram) the Latini rhetores, De or. 2.93, and Tacitus, who takes this one step further, asserting that Crassus 
had their schools ‘shut down’ (cludere), Dial. 35. The fact that Latin-medium ludi were flourishing only a few 
years later suggests that, even if sanctions were attached to the edict, they were inconsequential. For other 
possible repercussions, see Corbeill (2001) 273. 
26 Gruen (1990) 182-4. 
27 Corbeill (2001) 261-88, (2007) 67-82; see also Dominik (2017) 163. Older ideas view the decree as a partisan 
political intervention between the Marians and anti-Marians, but the evidence is flimsy: see Bonner (1977) 71-2, 
Gruen (1990) 180-4. 
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Gradually, rhetorical schools were institutionalised and, by the turn of the millennium, it was 
no longer necessary for Romans to go abroad to get a ‘proper’ education.28 Thus, despite the 
opposition of certain conservative elements, the 90s and 80s saw the incipient creation of 
fresh opportunities, educational and social, for men such as the Latini rhetores and their 
students.  
It was in this environment that Cicero, despite ostensibly heeding the advice of his 
more conservative elders and pursuing his rhetorical training in Greek, produced the Latin 
rhetorical treatise De inventione, which deals exclusively with the first subdiscipline of 
rhetoric.29 Likewise, in or around the 80s BCE, an anonymous author embarked upon the 
composition of the Rhetorica ad Herennium, a comprehensive treatment of every element of 
Greek rhetorical theory in Latin.30 The anonymous author (hereafter simply ‘the Auctor’) 
provides our earliest and most complete exposition of the rhetorical theory of memory. 
Consequently, his text is one of the two main reference points in Chapter I, the other being 
Cicero’s treatment of memory in De oratore.  
Cicero needs no introduction. As for the Auctor, his expansive rhetorical treatise has 
recently received even more expansive exegesis in the form of Calboli’s three-volume 
commentary.31 In his introduction, Calboli asserts that the Auctor must be one Cornificius (a 
name mentioned repeatedly and disparagingly by Quintilian), while admitting that the 
identification remains ultimately (strong) conjecture (p. 19-37). With my use of ‘the Auctor’, 
I have already sided with the majority: authorship cannot be demonstrated conclusively and 
the work should remain unassigned.32 Likewise, we can glean only a small amount about 
Herennius, the Auctor’s addressee. The Auctor professes that his undertaking was prompted 
by Herennius’ desire for the fruits of Latin rhetoric and, in this respect, Herennius represents 
 
28 The elder Seneca, for instance, chose to bring his sons to Rome for their education: Griffin (1976) 32, n. 6. 
29 Cicero later considered De inventione (composed circa 89) part of his unsophisticated ‘juvenilia’, De or. 1.5. 
In a letter to M. Titinnius (quoted by Suetonius at Gramm. et rhet. 26), Cicero confesses his youthful enthusiasm 
for the Latinus rhetor Lucius Plotius, saying that he was only persuaded by the auctoritas of certain learned men 
to train in Greek instead. Calboli raises the possibility that Plotius influenced the codifications of rhetoric 
presented in De inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium, while highlighting the apparently eclectic nature of the 
original Greek source material: Calboli (2020) 64-72. 
30 It is worth noting here the issues surrounding the dating of the Rhetorica, which seems to have been 
composed after Cicero’s De inventione and, based on mentions of recent historical events, somewhere in the 
region of 86-82, although considerably later dates have been proposed. I follow Calboli (2020) 8-12. Some 
scholars advocate more extreme dates: e.g. Douglas (1960) 65-78 (circa 50s BCE) and Herrmann (1980) 149-51 
(circa 50s CE).  
31 Calboli (2020). 
32 For a concise exposition of the debate, along with a list of proponents on either side, see Gaines (2007) 170. 
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the Auctor’s intended audience – ambitious young Romans, eager to learn the art of 
speaking.33 The Auctor also mentions that he and Herennius practise rhetoric together as 
friends, that they are related, and that they have studied philosophy together.34 The last point 
is the most pertinent to this study, since the Auctor’s attitude towards philosophy takes on 
particular significance when it comes to his presentation of mnemonic theory. 
In short, these new-wave Latin-medium versions of Greek rhetorical manuals were 
designed to appeal to aspiring novi homines, students of private means who wanted to equip 
themselves with the skills necessary to speak in the forum and desired more than the 
traditional grounding in Greek letters and techniques on which previous generations of 
Roman aristocrats relied – they wanted an education in Latin. Writers such as the Auctor and 
Cicero produced and circulated instructional handbooks in response to these developments. In 
the context of Rome’s evolving (and traditionally aristocratic) literary culture, however, it is 
possible that they were motivated less by notions of democratising access to education than 





33 Rhet. Her. 1.1. 
34 Rhet. Her. 4.69.  
I 
Rhetorical memory in theory and practice 
This chapter redefines the roles and functions of the ars memoriae, reassessing extreme 
exaggerations of both its useless- and usefulness in the Roman world. It is all too easy to 
dismiss the ars memoriae as some utilitarian debasement of earlier Greek theorising, a party 
trick used by rhetoricians to recite long texts.1 At the other extreme, the prominence of 
memoria in surviving rhetorical texts has led some modern scholars to conflate different 
conceptualisations of memoria, blurring the boundaries between lieux de mémoire and the 
loci utilised in ancient mnemotechnics (that is, between concepts of collective/cultural 
memory and the artificial techniques utilised by individual Roman orators). I postpone full 
discussion of these issues until my ‘Concluding remarks’.2 For now, I highlight only that the 
Romans who ‘trained’ their memories were but a small subset of wider society. The ars 
memoriae was not utilised in all spheres of everyday Roman life and we should maintain 
clear divisions between the rhetorical theory of memory (memoria artificiosa) and other 
conceptualisations, such as memoria as posthumous reputation, or the role of memoria in the 
transmission of history.  
With that tenet in mind, throughout this thesis, I confine myself almost exclusively to 
the mnemonic capacities of the individual. Even with such a restriction in place, we must 
nevertheless confront another Greco-Roman distinction, between ‘natural’ memory and 
‘artificial’ memory – the difference (and the very existence of the latter) was not always 
clear-cut and appears to have been contested by philosophers, if not by rhetoricians.3 The 
principal aim of this first chapter is, therefore, a careful delineation of the terms memoria 
naturalis and memoria artificiosa as they appear in the ancient sources, defining not only the 
boundaries and areas of overlap between these two forms of memoria, but also the 
circumstances and contexts in which each type of memoria operated.  
In delineating conceptualisations of ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ memory, I also address 
modern perceptions of memoria artificiosa. Current scholarship generally posits two practical 
 
1 A view illustrated starkly by Pruchnic and Lacey (2011) 474, who assert that rhetorical memory itself, 
compared with its golden Greek origins, was ‘already an impoverished concept’ by the time the Romans came 
along. 
2 See p. 187-91. 
3 See p. 38-9 below, and Ch. II, p. 96-7. 
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uses for the mnemonic technique: the verbatim memorisation of prose and the partial 
memorisation of speeches (their structure and itemised content).4 I show that the first belief 
(that memoria artificiosa was routinely applied to verbatim memorisation) is unsound, 
drawing my conclusions from three main strands of evidence: late-republican works on 
mnemonic theory; modern scientific studies concerning the efficacy of memoria artificiosa in 
different scenarios; and an analysis of the most common scenario in which we know verbatim 
memorisation was required, namely, when young Roman students were instructed to 
memorise by rote. Based on this evidence, I argue that memoria artificiosa was principally 
intended not to facilitate an orator’s ability to memorise scripts verbatim but to free him from 
the need for scripts at all – a conclusion developed fully in Chapter III, which is devoted to 
the practical application of memoria artificiosa in the forensic fora of late-republican Rome. 
At this juncture, regarding the terminology used in modern scholarship and 
throughout this thesis, it is worth noting that the phrases ‘the rhetorical theory of memory’, 
memoria artificiosa, the ars memoriae, and ‘the method of loci’ (hereafter abbreviated to ‘the 
MOL’) are entirely interchangeable: they all refer to a sophisticated mnemonic technique 
involving the manipulation of imagines and loci, as it was presented in late-republican 
rhetorical handbooks (described in detail below, p. 21). I should also highlight my own 
decision to use the modern term ‘theory’ to describe both ancient models of natural 
mnemonic function (such as the notion that memory retains external impressions as if it were 
wax) and the set of precepts underlying the MOL. The two types of ‘theory’ are distinct: on 
the one hand, we have exegetic analogies proposed initially by philosophers (comparable to, 
say, ‘atomic theory’, vel sim.); on the other, we have a body of instructional rules taught by 
rhetoricians (comparable to ‘medical theory’, ‘music theory’, etc.). Nevertheless, I use the 
phrases ‘philosophical theory’ and ‘rhetorical theory’ throughout to describe both approaches 
to memory to highlight how they are both, ultimately, different ‘ways of seeing’ an 
individual’s mnemonic capacity. At some points, these ways of seeing intersect, while at 
others, they diverge. 
 
 
4 As summarised by Small (2007) 195-6. 
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1. Rhetorical memoria: between memorisation and improvisation 
Fig. 1 (below) presents memoria within the taxonomy of rhetoric. The subdiscipline was 
typically listed as the fourth of five: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio 
(otherwise known as actio).5 Practitioners of the ars rhetorica used the precepts of the first 
three subdisciplines when preparing to speak, to develop and arrange their lines of argument 
(inventio; dispositio) and to phrase those arguments as persuasively as possible (elocutio); the 
final two subdisciplines dealt with the speaker’s performance, his production of a speech 







At a subdisciplinary level, rhetoricians defined two different types of memoria. As the Auctor 
ad Herennium puts it, sunt igitur duae memoriae: una naturalis, altera artificiosa.6 Memoria 
naturalis was defined as the memoria inherent to an individual’s mind, the type ‘born 
simultaneously with thought’.7 Memoria artificiosa, on the other hand, was understood to be 
neither innate nor involuntary, but a type of mnemonic technique, a collection of rules that 
described how to memorise a predefined set of information.8 Accordingly, in what follows, 
when I refer to memoria naturalis, I mean the involuntary mental processes that occur when 
we ‘remember’ something – a person, a place, an object, an abstract concept. When I refer to 
memoria artificiosa, I mean the mental processes involved in executing a specific mnemonic 
technique, the MOL, as outlined by the Auctor and Cicero in the first century BCE (and 
subsequently by Quintilian et ceteri).  
 
5 ‘Invention’, ‘arrangement’, ‘expression’, ‘memory’, and ‘delivery’: see Rhet. Her. 1.3; Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.9. For 
definitions, see May and Wisse (2001) 29-38. 
6 Rhet. Her. 3.28. 
7 Rhet. Her. 3.28: Naturalis est ea, quae nostris animis insita est et simul cum cogitatione nata. Text: Calboli 
(2020). 
8 The Auctor uses the phrase ratio praeceptionis: Rhet. Her. 3.28. 
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In brief, the oratorical MOL involved a speaker memorising a set of familiar loci, or 
stopping points on a mental journey, in an orderly series. He would generally assign one of 
the major talking points or topics in his speech to each locus. Within each locus, he fabricated 
a set of memorable mental images, imagines, to act as reminders of the details of each topic. 
Loci could be recycled from speech-to-speech since they simply retained the order of talking 
points; the imagines were specific to a given talking point, so had to be fabricated 
individually to reflect different content. As the speaker progressed through his speech, he 
would mentally progress from one locus to the next, dealing with the imagines placed in each 
locus in turn. When the imagines in one locus were exhausted, he knew that it was time to 
move on to the next, and hence to start talking about the next topic in his speech.9  
While the two conceptualisations of memoria outlined above, one ‘natural’ and the 
other ‘artificial’, are notable for their differences, they are not polar opposites. Both assume a 
shared understanding of various underlying processes of mnemonic encoding, storage, 
retrieval, and execution. Memoria naturalis operates in accordance with many of the 
principles described by the theoretical framework of memoria artificiosa. In turn, the efficacy 
of memoria artificiosa relies upon the existence and correct functioning of memoria 
naturalis. I explain these statements in greater detail below – although the task is made 
somewhat tricky because our surviving rhetorical texts shy away from addressing the exact 
relationship between ‘natural’ and ‘artificial’ memory. 
To begin, then, with memoria naturalis (an individual’s innate mnemonic faculty), 
rhetorical texts tend to highlight how mnemonic capacity varies greatly between individuals, 
asserting that some possess astonishing, almost superhuman memoria naturalis.10 Inherent 
mnemonic skill is generally accompanied by incredible talent and intellect – Cicero’s 
favourite exemplum is Themistocles, who possesses extraordinary ingenium and consilium 
alongside superlative powers of recall.11 The concept of memoria naturalis therefore seems 
intuitive enough, as a faculty on a spectrum of strength from ‘goldfish’ to ‘savant’. In 
cognitive terms, however, it encompasses a series of complex mental processes, namely, 
mnemonic encoding (the processes of memory formation), storage (the processes of memory 
retention), retrieval (the processes of recall), and execution (the mental or physical processes 
 
9 For further exegesis, see Yates (1966) 22-6, and Blum (1969) 3-37. 
10 On variance, see e.g. Rhet. Her. 3.29, Cic. De or. 2.357. 
11 E.g. Cic. De or. 2.299-300, 2.351. For Cicero’s Themistocles, see Ch. IV, p. 172-4. 
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prompted by recall).12 In rhetorical theory, memoria naturalis is the innate capacity of an 
individual to encode, store, retrieve, and execute information related to a speech; it does not 
include the information itself. That information, or mnemonic content, is denoted by the 
suitably all-embracing terms res and verba.  
On the relationship between ars and natura, and the associated question of whether 
we can even talk about ‘artificial’ memory, as indicated above, the Auctor and Cicero 
generally avoid debate, taking the existence of artificial memory as given. What they do have 
to say might be summed up as follows: they agree that natura is the principal source of 
memoria; that the function of ars is to further strengthen natura; that natura and ars often 
function in a similar manner; and hence, that ars must imitate natura.13 Thus, rhetorical 
mnemonic theory – the goal of which was to consciously improve the retention of specific 
mnemonic content – was not at all concerned with questions such as why memories form or 
whether memories are accurate. Rather, rhetoricians and orators wanted to know what made 
particular memories particularly memorable, and how those particular memories could be 
accurately retrieved.  
Latin rhetoric presented the answer to these questions as a set of rules that collectively 
defined the ars memoriae. As its name suggests, rhetoricians treated the technique as an ars 
(equivalent to the Greek τέχνη), though they did so in a relatively loose, non-philosophical 
sense – it was a set of rules that could be taught and which, if executed correctly, could 
increase (but not guarantee) the practitioner’s chances of obtaining reliable results.14 In the 
case of the MOL, the desired results were the encoding, storage, and reliable retrieval of the 
content of a speech. The content itself was encoded in the form of imagines and, as our texts 
make clear, it did not include every word of a speech. Details are provided by the Auctor ad 
Herennium: there are, he says, two types of imagines used in memoria artificiosa, one set for 
memoria rerum (‘memory for things’) and another for memoria verborum (‘memory for 
[individual] words’).15 The ‘res’ in memoria rerum are defined as the talking points of a 
speech – the material (including commonplaces, lines of argument, evidence, names, details, 
 
12 For terminology, see Ellis and Freeman (2008) 1-2: the mnemonic tasks of encoding, storing, retrieving, and 
executing a speech fall under the modern definition of ‘prospective memory’. 
13 Rhet. Her. 3.28-9, 3.36. Cic. De or. 2.356-7. For fuller analysis, see p. 77-9. 
14 For the ancient definition of an ars, see May and Wisse (2001) 23. Greek philosophers had stricter 
requirements for τέχναι, notably that the application of rules should ensure consistent results: see Ch. II, p. 100. 
15 Rhet. Her. 3.33. See Fig. 1. 
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and facts) from which the speaker will construct his case.16 At Rhet. Her. 3.33, the Auctor 
illustrates how one ‘uncomplicated’ (simplex) imago might encode all the main facts of a case 
in a single locus using a remarkable worked example, which concerns a defendant on trial for 
poisoning someone to get his inheritance. This imago involves a sick man on a deathbed, the 
defendant holding a poisoned chalice, a will, and a set of ram’s testicles; each feature of the 
composite imago symbolises a detail of the case.17 Evidently, in this example, the orator is 
not expected to encode every word of his defence speech using imagines – rather, the 
imagines prompt his talking points, reminding him of the facts (the inheritance, the poison, 
and so on) as he moves through the details of the case. The exact phrases and words that the 
orator uses to make his points will be largely improvised. The MOL functions at a macro 
level, while the orator improvises the minutiae. 
The Auctor asserts that this branch of memoria artificiosa, namely memoria rerum, is 
the skill that the orator will actually deploy in the forum, because it is more useful (utilior) 
and has greater potential (plus facultatis) than memoria verborum.18 Memoria verborum, 
because it encodes word-by-word, is more difficult, slower, and laborious. Again, the 
Auctor’s worked example, provided at 3.34, is demonstrative. In this case, the Auctor 
explains how memorising the six words iam domum itionem reges Atridae parant (a single 
line of verse) might involve visualising two different loci, each a complex scene containing 
numerous personae and composite imagines: in the first locus, members of the Marcian gens 
flay a certain Domitius with whips, while he appeals to the heavens, hands outstretched; in 
the second, two named actors are dressed as Agamemnon and Menelaus, as in the play 
Iphigenia.19 Yet the Auctor stresses that even using complex imagines such as these will not 
be enough for the practitioner to memorise the line securely unless he also stimulates his 
memoria naturalis by repeating the line multiple times. This complexity explains the 
Auctor’s view that the MOL is of greatest utility and efficacy for those who want to 
memorise res (rather than verba). Cicero concurs: memoria verborum is not essential for the 
 
16 This definition can be deduced from the Auctor’s exposition of memoria rerum (e.g. the res to be memorised 
in the exemplary case at 3.33) and the Auctor’s own definitions, e.g. Rhet. Her. 1.3: Inventio est excogitatio 
rerum verarum aut veri similium […] Memoria est firma animi rerum et verborum et dispositionis perceptio. 
17 The poisoned chalice and the will are self-explanatory. As for the ram’s testicles (testiculi arietini), they are 
probably meant to symbolise a trial witness (testis), while the ram may symbolise the first astrological sign of 
the zodiac, Aries, thus serving as a reminder that the imago is located in the first locus. For discussion, see Yates 
(1966) 11-2; also Caplan (1954) 215 n. ‘b’, den Boer (1986) 11-4.  
18 Rhet. Her. 3.39.  
19 The named actors are Clodius Aesopus (a celebrated contemporary) and Cimber (otherwise unknown). These 
lines receive detailed treatment in Calboli (2020) 626-9, ad loc. 
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orator, whose true province is memoria rerum.20 Quintilian goes even further, denying that 
the MOL is of any use for memorising oratio perpetua (i.e. continuous prose passages), 
especially because verbal constructions and conjunctions cannot be readily represented by 
imagines.21  
Of our early sources, then, the Auctor is the most enthusiastic about the potential 
application of the MOL to verba as well as res – but even he admits its severe shortcomings 
in this area. Memorising strings of words is really only useful as an exercise for students in 
the ludus, he says, in order that they might pass ‘without effort’ (sine labore) from the overly 
difficult memoria verborum to the comparatively easy memoria rerum.22 This approach, of 
executing more difficult tasks to make the effort required during a live contest or 
performance seem easier by comparison, was used in Rome by athletes training for physical 
sports (just as athletes undertake resistance training today).23 The Auctor’s MOL – and more 
specifically, memoria rerum – was therefore designed to be most effective at meeting the 
demands of a very particular scenario: i.e. a trial, in which setting an orator was required to 
memorise and recall the details of a case swiftly and fluently, but was not required to 
reproduce a prepared speech verbatim.24  
Did the MOL fulfil its intended purpose? While the Auctor would certainly have us 
believe so, he (and other ancient advocates of the method) cannot provide evidence beyond 
unverifiable anecdote; and lawyers do not, as far as I am aware, use the MOL to make 
speeches in court today. Fortunately, ancient testimony concerning the efficacy of the MOL 
has been supplemented in recent decades by numerous cognitive studies conducted in lab 
conditions and also by revived enthusiasm for classical mnemonic techniques among modern 
mnemonists.25 I shall deal first with some of the relevant lab studies, the most basic of which 
involve participants who are asked to memorise lists of items – numbers, objects, words, and 
so on. In these instances, the MOL is shown to significantly improve retention and ordered 
 
20 Cic. De or. 2.359: verborum memoria, quae minus est nobis necessaria… […] rerum memoria propria est 
oratoris. Text: Kumaniecki (1969). 
21 Quint. Inst. 11.2.24-6. 
22 Rhet. Her. 3.39. 
23 See Sen. Contr. 9.pr.4. 
24 How this worked in practice is explored fully in Ch. III. 
25 For a brief summary of modern psychological research in mnemonics, see Ericsson (2003) 233-5. For a fuller 
introduction to the MOL in the cognitive science of ‘mnemonology’, I recommend Worthern and Hunt (2011) 
Ch. 4-5.  
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recall.26  Probably the most famous ancient example of an individual using the MOL to 
memorise lists in this way is Cicero’s oratorical rival Hortensius, who is said to have 
memorised the exact order of a whole day’s worth of auction listings as they were being sold, 
along with their prices and buyers, entirely unaided.27 The memorisation of a speech – even a 
speech reduced to its key talking points – might initially appear to be a much more complex 
task than memorising lists of items. A series of studies have, however, shown that the MOL 
proves especially successful in scenarios where participants are asked to memorise the salient 
features of expository prose passages – not the passages verbatim, but the key pieces of 
information contained in the passages.28 That is to say, using the MOL, the participants were 
able to memorise a list of topics as each one was being presented. Interestingly, the MOL 
proved more effective when subjects were asked to assimilate information from passages 
presented orally as opposed to passages presented in writing (a phenomenon called ‘the oral 
presentation effect’).29 Thus, although the participants were listening to and processing a 
large volume of information, they were able to reduce that large volume to a list of key 
details, which they then memorised using the MOL. The ancient forensic scenario, in which 
an orator would listen to his adversary’s speech and commit talking points to memory (ready 
to make a response) is not dissimilar.30  
Another set of experiments, conducted on modern mnemonists who have trained 
themselves to be proficient at specific mnemonic tasks (such as memorising the exact order 
of a pack of playing cards at speed), confirms that mnemonic techniques are highly 
specialised and not universally applicable: a technique that is extremely effective for 
memorising one kind of information may be much less effective for memorising another; and 
individuals who show superlative skill in specific mnemonic tasks may demonstrate average 
 
26 E.g. Ross and Lawrence (1968) 107-8; Groninger (1971) 161-3. 
27 Sen. Contr. 1.pr.19; Quint. Inst. 11.2.24. There is also good evidence that Hortensius used the MOL when 
making speeches: for full discussion, see Ch. III, p. 138-42. 
28 The researchers define ‘expository’ passages as those that follow a logical structure, including elements such 
as classification and comparison, as opposed to ‘narrative’ or ‘descriptive’ text. See Cornoldi and De Beni 
(1991) 511-8; De Beni and Moè (2003) 309-24; Moè and De Beni (2005) 95-106.  
29 De Beni et al. have hypothesised that the oral presentation effect is caused by selective interference between 
reading a written text (using the sense of sight) and mental imaging (when using the MOL). Both activities are 
visuo-spatial and one can impede the other, whereas when material is presented orally, the two activities 
(listening to speech and mental imaging using the MOL) are performed in different modalities: De Beni, Moè, 
and Cornoldi (1997) 401-16. 
30 Again, evidence for this scenario is discussed in detail in Ch. III, p. 139-42. 
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ability when asked to memorise other information of a different type.31 Independently of the 
cognitive scientists, modern mnemonists have continued to use and to develop techniques 
based on the traditional MOL to meet the demands of competitive memorisation. Participants 
in ‘Memory Championships’ attempt to memorise and recall large quantities of information 
in a race against both the clock and other competitors. Disciplines include ‘Spoken Numbers’ 
(which involves memorising numbers as they are spoken aloud at a rate of one per second); 
‘Random Words’ (memorising a list of random words); ‘Cards’ (memorising the number, 
suit, and arrangement of multiple packs of playing cards); and ‘Abstract Images’ 
(memorising the order of textured, random shapes).32 Hence, the events generally entail the 
encoding, storage, and retrieval of information that can be ordered, grouped in sets or lists, 
and often reduced to numerical values, which makes it ideally suited to a mnemonic 
technique based on visualisation, grouping, and sequencing such as the MOL.33  
For our interests, perhaps the most instructive event to emerge from the World 
Memory Championships is the discontinued ‘Poem’ discipline, which demanded participants 
memorise a new, previously unpublished poem word-for-word under timed conditions before 
reproducing it in writing, receiving marks based on how close they came to verbatim recall.34 
The discipline was, according to Foer’s account, ‘universally dreaded’: competitors who 
relied upon the MOL in this event tended to do badly, while those who did well relied instead 
upon infusing the content of the poem’s words with emotional resonance. The approach of a 
one-time record-holder in this discipline, Corinna Draschl, for instance, was to segment a 
poem and assign a series of emotions to each chunk, associating the words with feelings 
rather than images.35 This approach seems to align with a series of studies conducted by the 
researchers Helga and Tony Noice into how professional actors manage to memorise their 
scripts. They found surprisingly little rote repetition of lines, and no method in the sense of 
the ‘method of loci’. Instead, the actors tried to identify the meaning and emotion behind the 
 
31 E.g. Maguire et al. (2002) 90-5: in this lab study, the superior performance of expert mnemonists was no 
better than a control group when asked to memorise the shape of snowflakes, a mnemonic task for which they 
had not trained. See also Ericsson and Kintsch (1995) 214-5. 
32 See the ‘World Memory Championships’ (www.worldmemorychampionships.com and www.world-memory-
statistics.co.uk/disciplines.php).  
33 On modern mnemonists’ use and adaptation of loci mnemonics, see Foer (2011) 97, 163-8. 
34 My understanding is that the discipline was discontinued internationally because it may have given native 
English speakers an unfair advantage. It is still practised in the USA: for the rules, see 
www.usamemorychampionship.com/events/.  
35 Foer (2011) 121-2, 132-3. 
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words of their characters – a process that rendered word-for-word memorisation 
unnecessary.36 This reflects the ancient advice that memoria verborum – that is, the word-for-
word memorisation of poetry or prose using the MOL – is extremely difficult and (relatively) 
inefficient.37 Today, individuals who are required to memorise long passages verbatim, such 
as actors, find different approaches to the task. I know of no ancient advice, however, which 
recommends deliberately infusing mnemonic content with highly-charged emotional force (as 
Corinna Draschl did). As I argue throughout this thesis, the reason for this – that is to say, the 
reason why more efficient methods of verbatim memorisation were not incorporated into the 
ars rhetorica – is because rhetoricians and orators had no need to memorise their speeches 
verbatim. They relied upon memoria to mentally store and retrieve the structure and top-level 
content of their speeches, while utilising their extensive training in improvised delivery to 
supply the individual words. 
I shall continue to refer to the modern studies outlined above throughout the rest of 
this thesis where relevant. As regards the two ‘types’ of memory defined in rhetoric, memoria 
naturalis and memoria artificiosa, modern cognitive science provides evidence that can help 
us deduce when and where (in pedagogic and oratorical settings) these different types of 
memoria would have proved most useful. There are two key points. First, the modern studies 
confirm that the MOL is no panacea for forgetfulness: the orator who was also an expert 
practitioner of the MOL had an enhanced capacity for encoding, storage, and retrieval of the 
types of material to which the MOL was most suited (including structured lists, the salient 
details of an oration, and the topics to be covered in a speech), but he was not necessarily 
equally brilliant at memorising other types of mnemonic content (such as faces, foreign 
languages, or everyday events). For mnemonic tasks unrelated to oratory, even the small 
percentage of the population who had been trained in memoria artificiosa relied heavily upon 
memoria naturalis or external mnemonic aids (i.e. written notes or assistants).38 Second, even 
within the sphere of rhetoric and oratory, utilisation of memoria artificiosa was targeted and 
specialised. Orators and rhetoricians did not need to memorise texts verbatim to make 
 
36 See e.g. Noice, H. (1992) 417-28. The experimental series is summarised and reviewed in Noice and Noice 
(2002) 7-19. 
37 That is not to say that it cannot be done. Noice details how the mnemonist H. Lorayne devised an elaborated 
version of loci visualisation techniques to learn a theatrical script verbatim, Noice, H. (1996) 1-17. 
38 Most orators seem to have produced written notes in the form of commentarii when preparing for trial: see 
Ch. III, p. 120-5. As for assistants, by the late Republic the elite commonly utilised enslaved nomenclatores, 
whose duties included memorising the names and details of influential voters. See Kolendo (1989) 13-9; and 
Ch. IV, p. 165-6. 
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forensic speeches, so in practice they used the subdiscipline of memoria rerum rather than 
memoria verborum. Although memoria verborum was ostensibly used as a (purposefully 
difficult) training exercise, the method is unlikely to have been utilised for routine verbatim 
memorisation of large quantities of poetry or prose because it became so rapidly intricate and 
convoluted. Nevertheless, memorisation exercises were a key feature of Roman pedagogy. As 
I argue below, I think it most likely that the strength of a student’s memoria naturalis was the 
deciding factor in whether he succeeded at these less sophisticated exercises of rote 
memorisation.  
 
In both Republic and Principate, Roman students were required to memorise texts from an 
early age – a pedagogic methodology that had long precedence in the Greek-speaking 
world.39 Since rhetoric was typically only taught to older students, the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium and De oratore do not provide much information on exercises for the young. 
Nevertheless, in the Brutus, Cicero tells us that in his boyhood, he studied and committed to 
memory the exemplary Epilogus of Gaius Galba.40 Not dissimilarly, the elder Seneca 
(recalling a period in the very late Republic when he was attending the ludus) indicates that 
the memorisation of poetry was commonplace – even competitive, perhaps, with students 
attempting to memorise the most verses.41 Although Quintilian’s testimony is from a later 
era, it provides our richest source material on how memorisation exercises had become a 
pedagogic staple in the ludus; and how, given the long didactic tradition, they probably 
always had been. Quintilian inherited and preserved a great deal from the earliest Latin 
rhetorical treatises – and this is especially true in the subdiscipline of memoria, to the point 
that rather than provide his own rules for the MOL, he simply quotes Cicero verbatim.42 As 
regards the pedagogic role of memorisation exercises more generally, Quintilian recommends 
rote memorisation of set texts for even the youngest students, on the grounds that they cannot 
produce compositions themselves (Inst. 1.1.35-6); small children thoroughly enjoy learning 
 
39 E.g. Xenophon’s Socrates, who asserts that memorising texts is part of a good education if accompanied by 
deeper understanding, Xen. Symp. 3.3.5; or Plato’s Athenian, who explains how boys are made to memorise the 
works of poets, Pl. Leg. 810e-811a. 
40 Cic. Brut. 127: the key verb is ediscere, ‘to learn by heart’. 
41 Seneca was born in the 50s BCE. I suggest ‘competitive’ only because of the context of Seneca’s boasting in 
Contr. 1.pr.2, where he reminisces about how his peers in the ludus would test his ability to memorise vast tracts 
of verse.  
42 Quint. Inst. 11.2.22, quoting Cic. De or. 2.358. 
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snippets of poetry, apparently; and he suggests they should memorise moral sententiae too, 
since these shape young minds and are retained until old age.43 
When it comes to preparing slightly older students for speechmaking, for starters, 
Quintilian recommends they simply repeat what they have heard, perhaps in a different order, 
‘so that they might strengthen the memory from the outset’ (2.4.15-7).44 Relying on memory 
to reproduce phrases also allows them to develop correct speech, as opposed to speech that is 
fluent but flawed. Building on this approach, when the student becomes more advanced, 
Quintilian advises that they should refrain from memorising their own compositions (2.7.1-
5). This is a common practice, he says, but should be changed. It is done to please fathers 
who like to watch their boys declaim as proof that they have learnt something. It proves, says 
Quintilian, nothing of the sort – he has his students memorise texts that are truly worth 
learning by heart, passages of histories, or speeches (some of Cicero’s, no doubt), and only 
very occasionally has them deliver their own work.45 Memorising the work of the best 
authors is a better workout for the memory because it is more difficult to memorise 
unfamiliar text; and further, it means the student permanently retains the best models, which 
he may consciously and subconsciously imitate in his own style. Quintilian also uses a 
metaphor frequently invoked in other rhetorical treatises on memory: the thesaurus (2.7.4).46 
He explains that memorisation exercises create a thesaurus of optimal vocabulary, phrases, 
and figures in the mind, a valuable store of eminently quotable material, which will win 
praise when used both in private conversation and when speaking publicly in the forum. 
Quintilian’s prescriptions for memorisation are a good indication of the knowledge 
that he believed his elite students needed to secure permanently in their minds, ready for easy 
access later in life. He specifies famous authors and canonical texts – the kind of material that 
would invest a student with the ‘cultural capital’, as it were, of well-educated Roman 
 
43 Cf. Augustine, De civ. D. 1.3, who states that Romani make young boys read Virgil so much that his poetry 
(and the non-Christian gods it contains) cannot be forgotten from memory. Quintilian’s recommendations might 
be compared with those of Aelius Theon, who (writing in Greek no earlier than the late first century BCE) 
collects some examples of extracts that young students might learn by heart in his Progymnasmata, 65-70 
(Spengel); see also useful notes in Kennedy (2003) 9-13. 
44 Inst. 2.4.15: ut protinus memoriam firment. 
45 Quintilian’s recommended method for such memorisation exercises is outlined at Inst. 11.2.40-2: students 
must practice memorising texts from other authors daily, starting with short extracts before building up 
incrementally, and with rhythmical passages (i.e. poetry) before gradually moving to technical prose, like the 
writings of iurisconsulti. Thus, difficulty is increased; but the exercises should remain difficult, he says, so that 
when it comes to memorising for a real speech, the task seems easy. Cf. the Auctor ad Herennium, above, p. 24. 
46 See below, p. 38. 
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society.47 Specifically, for the student who would one day go on to become an orator, the 
ultimate purpose of practising basic memorisation exercises in the ludus was to learn models 
of best practice, which would eventually, it was hoped, improve his speaking ability. Yet, 
even if a student’s future career did not demand proficiency in public speaking, the 
acquisition of a mental repository of great works of past literature would still aid him in adult 
life, allowing him to understand and to be accepted into the cultural milieu of the social and 
political elite. Consider the provincially-born younger Seneca and his brothers. Unlike 
republican aristocrats of earlier generations, they were not compelled to travel to Greece for a 
‘proper’ education. Instead, their father brought them to Rome to receive schooling.48 The 
subsequent career of the younger Seneca, with his roles as Nero’s tutor and advisor, provides 
a notable illustration of how the newly-institutionalised rhetorical curriculum could equip 
ambitious young men with the prerequisites of elite life.  
Elite Roman education furnished students with the kind of knowledge that enabled 
them not only to write and speak proficiently, but also to demonstrate their membership of an 
exclusive club; if a student failed to secure that knowledge in his memory, it could bring his 
membership of the club into question. We witness the consequence of such mnemonic 
failings in one of Seneca’s letters, as he lambasts a wealthy man named Calvisius Sabinus for 
his appalling memory and lack of literary learning.49 Seneca tells Lucilius (the recipient of 
the letter) that Sabinus’ memory was so poor, he would regularly forget the names of 
Homeric heroes like Ulysses and Achilles, characters whom ‘we knew as well as our own 
paedagogi’.50 Sabinus’ memory was worse than that of a senile nomenclator, who forgets 
everyone’s names.51 In order to appear educated, however, he spent ridiculous sums on slaves 
who had been forced to memorise poetry, one for Homer, another for Hesiod, and nine more 
for each of the lyric poets. In Sabinus’ eyes, any knowledge his slaves possessed, he 
possessed too – he believed that their memories were a literal extension of his own. The 
 
47 The ‘canonisation’ of texts, Greek and Latin, in Roman literature is discussed by Citroni (2006) 204-34. For 
the role of texts of ‘high-culture’ within rhetorical education, see Connolly (2011) 104-6. 
48 For the younger Seneca’s life, see Griffin (1972) 1-19; Cornell (2013) Vol. 1 505-6. 
49 Sen. Ep. 27.5-8. The fullest discussion of Sabinus’ identity remains Vassileiou (1974) 241-56. The 
assumption made by some (e.g. Préchac and Noblot (1945) 119, n. 3; Sullivan (1968) 129-32) that Sabinus was 
a freedman is unfounded. Vassileiou believes Sabinus was most likely the member of the elite Calvisii Sabini 
who held the consulship in 26 CE; cf. Elvers and Eck (2006) nos. 5 and 8, which distinguish two different 
members of the same family. 
50 Sen. Ep. 27.5: quos tam bene quam paedagogos nostros novimus. Text: Préchac and Noblot (1945). 




moral of Seneca’s story is that although ordinary literary activity (as opposed to philosophy) 
requires help to achieve proficiency (in the form of teachers, and so on), nevertheless, you 
can neither borrow nor buy intelligence and common sense; and even if you could, men 
would prefer to purchase idiocy and depravity (Ep. 27.8). Yet the fact that Sabinus betrays his 
lack of culture through his defective memory can also tell us a great deal about the kind of 
literature Seneca believes a ‘properly’ educated Roman should study and memorise when 
young.  
Take the heroes whom Seneca ostensibly knew as well as his paedagogus (a label 
typically given to an enslaved guardian who accompanied the young dominus in an elite 
family, acting as his chaperone and assistant in the ludus).52 The name of the paedagogus is 
indelibly linked, in Seneca’s early memories, to the heroes of myth. The comparison between 
the names of Greek heroes and the names of paedagogi is therefore carefully chosen, 
especially as we know that Roman masters often gave their slaves mock-epic names.53 In 
making the comparison, Seneca is appealing to the shared pedagogic experiences of his class, 
which are, specifically, experiences exclusive to the sons of the privileged elite. To be a 
member of Seneca’s club, you must be able to relate to his schoolboy memories of Achilles, 
Priam, and the paedagogus – Sabinus is so far from qualifying for membership that he cannot 
even fake these basic credentials. The lengths to which Sabinus has gone to gloss over his 
lack of learning, paying out over one million sesterces for bespoke enslaved poetry-reciters, 
merely demonstrates his vulgarity. He fails to understand that the minds of others cannot be 
treated as an extension of his own. It is simply not enough that Sabinus dons a mask, as it 
were, and roleplays the intellectual; what he ought to do is take ownership of the knowledge 
for himself and have the sense to know when to deploy it. 
The exercise at which Sabinus failed so embarrassingly, poetry memorisation, was a 
staple for Roman pueri from the late Republic onwards. Exactly how these pueri went about 
their memorising is, however, far from clear. Certain properties of poetry do of course render 
it inherently more memorable than prose (Quintilian, for instance, highlights rhythmic 
arrangement).54 Orally-derived poetry in particular had evolved to facilitate recall, and much 
has been written on its various mnemonic elements – by which I mean organisational 
 
52 For paedagogi, see Bonner (1977) 37-45. 
53 For discussion of the social significance of this naming custom, see Fitzgerald (2000) 5-6. 




structures such as rhythm, repetition of epithets and half-lines, the use of standard poetic 
vocabulary, and so on.55 Likewise, the idea that the poetic catalogue as an archaic constituent 
of oral epic exhibits internal mnemonic structure is convincing.56 These intrinsic traits will 
have helped young students memorise their Homer at least, if not their Lysias. 
As for extrinsic aids and techniques, I have already observed that the MOL was 
deemed ineffective for the memorisation of poetry and prose. Instead, Quintilian makes 
several practical suggestions: for verbatim memorisation of long passages and speeches, he 
recommends a technique referred to today as ‘chunking’, that is, splitting a passage up into 
meaningful sections of suitable length before attempting to memorise them consecutively; he 
also recommends basic associative techniques if something is not sticking in the mind (i.e. 
the sparing use of imagines to visualise a few subjects mentally, without the accompanying 
use of loci or the consecutive, spatial associations of the MOL); visualisation of the target 
text on the page (or, rather, tablet); reciting the text aloud; frequent testing; getting a good 
night’s sleep; and, of course, unremitting daily practice and repetition.57 Hence, approaches to 
memorising texts verbatim seem to have been eclectic, and were no doubt determined by a 
student’s individual mnemonic strengths – i.e. by his memoria naturalis. Younger pupils 
were not taught to memorise in the systematised way that older students learning rhetoric 
were taught to utilise the MOL, and there existed in Roman ludi a clear distinction between 
general mnemonic techniques for verbatim memorisation and the oratorical memoria rerum, 
which was designed to meet the needs of live performance. 
 
The evidence presented above also raises the possibility that the goal of the memorisation 
exercises recommended in the more advanced rhetorical treatises differed from the goal of 
the basic memorisation exercises undertaken by younger students. The basic exercises 
essentially required students to retain and reproduce target texts, thereby providing them with 
the bedrock of what the Romans considered a ‘classical’ education; the more advanced were, 
by way of contrast, frequently the province of the rhetor and his budding orators, who needed 
to utilise their mnemonic skills while making speeches. The purpose of memorisation 
exercises therefore shifted as the Roman youth progressed through his education, from 
 
55 See Ong (1982) 34-6; Rubin (1995) Ch. 8-9.  
56 Nikulin (2015) 39-41. 
57 Quint. Inst. 11.2.27-35, 11.2.40-4. 
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knowledge-acquisition and content-reproduction in the early stages, to creative mental 
composition and live performance later on.  
We can observe the shift away from content-reproduction and towards improvisation 
in an advanced memorisation exercise advocated by Cicero’s Crassus (who is, it should be 
noted, generally lukewarm about the MOL per se).58 At De oratore 1.154-5, he tells us that 
when he was young, he would memorise as much of a poem or a speech as he could, before 
reproducing a paraphrase of it in prose (an exercise also used by Gaius Carbo, and one which 
continued to be practised throughout antiquity). He realised, however, that his paraphrases 
were of inferior quality, because the most appropriate vocabulary already appeared in the 
originals. Consequently, he adapted the method, and would instead memorise as much of a 
famous Greek work as possible, before reproducing it in spontaneous Latin translation: thus, 
he learnt to always choose the best vocabulary to express himself.59 Whether the historical 
Crassus practised this exercise or not, Cicero appears to have personally recommended it.60 
Why? Because, as I see it, the exercise forces the student to improvise. He cannot simply rely 
on rote memorisation, as he may have done when memorising his Homer or his Lysias. 
Rather, he must mentally paraphrase what he has memorised; then, in an act of improvisation 
that must occur almost simultaneously with the act of recall, he must invent new words to 
express the original sentiment (while the additional burden of Greek-to-Latin translation 
forces him to focus on finding the optimal Latin vocabulary). In this way, the exercise 
combines the rhetorical subdisciplines of elocutio and pronuntiatio with memoria; it becomes 
a much more productive training method than rote memorisation, and one designed to meet 
the special demands of oratory. It does not matter at all whether the student is able to 
reproduce the original text – verbatim memorisation is actively discouraged (and prevented 
entirely when the element of translation is introduced). Paraphrase and paraphrase-translation 
were therefore memorisation exercises where the goal was not word-for-word content-
reproduction but mnemonic retention that led to and facilitated improvised invention.  
 
58 Cicero’s Crassus states that the (more advanced) student of oratory might use mnemonic techniques to help 
with memorisation exercises if he wishes, but he sees no obligation: De or. 1.157. For Crassus’ views on the 
praecepta of the MOL, see De or. 1.144-5. 
59 Aelius Theon describes various paraphrase exercises with some examples but does not mention translation: 
Progymnasmata 107-110 (Spengel). Quintilian, however, references the methods of Cicero’s Crassus and fully 
endorses them, as well as recommending basic paraphrase: Inst. 10.5.2-11. Finally, over four centuries later, 
Augustine, Conf. 1.27, tells us that when he was a boy, he had to perform paraphrase exercises using Juno’s 
speech from Verg. Aen. 1.37-49. 
60 As asserted by Quintilian, Inst. 10.5.2. 
34 
 
The above observation, that there were several distinct objectives for memorisation 
exercises at different stages of a student’s education, is often overlooked, although it is 
crucial if we are to properly understand the role of memoria in the ars rhetorica as a whole: 
in the context of oratorical training, memorisation was practised less to enhance verbatim 
recall than to facilitate improvisation. Quintilian provides probably the clearest exposition of 
why students should concentrate on memory when training to deliver unscripted and/or 
largely improvised orations. At Inst. 10.6.1-7, he explains how professional orators put their 
rhetorical training into practice when preparing for and speaking in real forensic cases, thus 
describing the ‘endgame’ of the orator’s education. He calls the method cogitatio (‘mental 
preparation’). He opens by suggesting that cogitatio is perhaps the most frequently used 
preparatory method, since pure improvisation relies too much on chance, while working out a 
speech in writing does not make it stick in the memory and its words, though they may feel 
secure, slip from the mind.61 From 10.6.3-4, he explains that preparing for a speech using 
cogitatio therefore relies primarily on the capacities of memoria, the enhancement of which 
requires intensive training in accordance with the rules of the rhetorical subdiscipline. 
Proficiency in the method will, he says, produce impressive speeches, as well-structured and 
coherent as if they had been worked out in writing and learnt by heart – as was demonstrated 
by the most exemplary oratorical mnemonist of the Ciceronian era, Hortensius.62 Quintilian 
expands the theme in the next section of his work (Inst. 10.7), explaining his view that an 
ability to improvise (facultas dicendi ex tempore) is the sine qua non of the orator. 
Unsurprisingly, his model of best oratorical practice is based on Cicero and, using Cicero’s 
commentarii as supporting evidence, he again explains how proficient orators who conduct 
many cases do not devise their speeches fully in writing beforehand, nor do they rely entirely 
upon improvisation, but they ready themselves instead using cogitatio (10.7.30).63  
To focus on the role of memoria in this process, consider the following passage, in 
which Quintilian explains why students should practice exercises involving cogitatio, before 
presenting the ideal outcome, which relies upon mnemonic strength: 
 
61 Cf. Inst. 11.2.9-10: here, Quintilian references the famous passage in Plato, Phdr. 275a, where Socrates 
proposes that writing hinders mnemonic ability; he concludes that Socrates’ reasoning explains why written 
texts take so long to memorise, whereas the product of cogitatio is automatically retained.  
62 For Hortensius, see Ch. III, p. 138-44. 
63 For detailed discussion of this ‘preparation phase’ (and Cicero’s commentarii), see Ch. III, p. 119-30. 
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Ideoque totum hoc exercitationis genus ita instituendum ut et digredi ex eo et redire in id 
facile possimus. […] Id autem fiet memoriae viribus, ut illa quae complexi animo sumus 
fluant secura, non sollicitos et respicientes et una spe suspensos recordationis non sinant 
providere. 
Quint. Inst. 10.6.5-6.64 
We must undertake this whole mode of exercise in this way, so that we are able to digress 
from a subject and return to it with ease. […] But it is strong memoria that enables the 
thoughts we have held in our mind to flow unperturbed, allowing us to be relaxed, to look 
forwards without looking backwards, without hanging all our hopes on our powers of recall.  
For Quintilian, truly strong memoria means that the speaker’s chances of success are not tied 
to his ability to recall things exactly. The speaker will have no need to worry about what he 
has said or is going to say – he can focus instead on how he is going to say it. Strong memoria 
provides him with an infallible route map, as it were, in his mind, which has all his talking 
points (his loci) fixed so firmly that he can ad-lib or improvise, departing from them and 
returning to them at will. Ultimately, whether the orator utilises memoria naturalis or 
memoria artificiosa to achieve his mnemonic strength does not matter – the goal remains the 
same. The proficient speaker does not aim for superlative memoria to memorise scripts or 
reproduce the exact words of a prepared speech but, rather, so that he might go off-piste 
without worrying about regaining his course; so that he might elaborate one of his carefully-
premeditated sententiae with an inspired extemporalis color; so that he might, in short, adapt 
his performance to the changing circumstances of a live trial. It was for this reason that 
memoria was counted alongside actio as one of the performative subdisciplines of the ars 
rhetorica. 
Further, regarding the performative aspects of memoria, all our texts stress the same 
imperative: that the orator’s speech should appear natural, spontaneous, and not as if it has 
been extensively rehearsed or memorised (even if the orator is an expert practitioner of the 
MOL). I discuss late-republican views concerning the appropriate application of mnemonic 
skills during performance in detail in Chapter III.65 For now, to illustrate the point briefly, we 
can refer to Quintilian’s summation of how to use memorised material to best effect. In an 
early aside at Inst. 2.4.27-32, Quintilian expresses his distaste for speakers who memorise a 
 
64 Latin text: Russell (2001). 
65 See p.133-6. 
36 
 
few generally-applicable commonplaces and then force them, stale and unpalatable, down 
their listeners’ throats: the tactic is unimaginative, ineffective, and disliked by audiences.66 At 
Inst. 11.2.46-7, he reiterates that an orator will appear stilted and charmless if he speaks like 
he has learnt a speech by heart; if, however, he conceals the use of his memoria to give the 
appearance that he is speaking impromptu, he will gain a reputation for ready wit (and it may 
even make the iudex drop his guard). Thus, it was important that an orator’s mnemonic 
capacity, however incredible, remain hidden, such that it would be perceived, from the 
audience’s point of view, as an incredible capacity for improvisation. If used in this ideal 
fashion, memorisation could endear an orator to his audience, helping him to achieve his 
primary goal, persuasion.67  
If we are to understand the function of memoria in rhetoric and oratory fully, we must 
abandon the notion that the traditional goal of memorisation was the verbatim reproduction of 
written content. In forensic oratory specifically, word-for-word memorisation was certainly 
not the intended outcome, since a speaker could harm his performance if he gave the 
impression of having learnt something by heart. Orators in the forum were not being assessed 
like pueri reciting their lessons in the ludus, nor indeed like modern mnemonists competing 
in the World Memory Championships. For orators, the goal of practising mnemonic exercises 
and/or of using the MOL was the enhancement of a performance for the benefit of their 
audience. To this end, they relied upon memoria to provide their speeches with a firm 
scaffold, a well-structured series of solid talking points or loci. As importantly, memoria 
allowed orators to free themselves from the shackles of a script, to adapt, to display their wit, 
to improvise – with their arguments and the facts of the case always retrievable and secure.  
 
2. Memoria in Rhetorica ad Herennium: normalisation and 
differentiation 
The numerous sources introduced in the section above illustrate how memoria was a well-
developed subdiscipline of Latin rhetoric, but this had not always been the case. Our best 
insights into how the various technical subdisciplines of Greek rhetoric were integrated into 
the Roman rhetorical curriculum come from the earliest surviving Latin treatises, De 
 
66 Quintilian compares cliched commonplaces to frigidi et repositi cibi: Inst. 2.4.29. 
67 For this conventional definition of the officium oratoris, see Rhet. Her. 1.2-3, phrased otherwise at Cic. De or. 
1.138. It was inherited from Hellenistic rhetoricians like Hermagoras (as quoted in Sext. Emp. Math. 2.62). 
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inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium. There are, for example, explicit and underlying 
similarities in the treatments of inventio presented by Cicero and the Auctor, which provide 
good evidence of an increasingly standardised pedagogic approach.68 Likewise, although the 
Auctor claimed he was introducing – and perhaps even coining – previously non-existent 
Latin terms for Greek concepts, the sometimes word-for-word correspondences between his 
and Cicero’s rhetorical definitions are a clear indication that an accepted rhetorical lexicon 
was already instituted by the 80s BCE.69 As I argue below, standardising the rhetorical 
curriculum in this way would have helped to normalise the practice of teaching rhetoric in 
Latin rather than Greek. At the same time as Roman rhetoricians were adopting Greek 
concepts, however, they were also attempting to adapt rhetorical theory to suit the desires and 
sensibilities of an oratorically-oriented Latin-speaking audience, by distancing themselves 
from the practices of their Greek-speaking counterparts.70 It is this fine line – between 
normalisation and differentiation – that the Auctor ad Herennium attempted to walk in his 
treatment of memoria artificiosa.  
I begin with the Auctor’s mnemonic terminology. Although external evidence is 
limited, it appears that the Auctor learnt and implemented a Latin vocabulary for rhetorical 
memoria that was already in wider use. As in the case of other rhetorical subdisciplines, 
terminological and conceptual congruences feature throughout the surviving texts. In De 
inventione, Cicero provides the following summation: memoria est firma animi rerum ac 
verborum perceptio; the Auctor, memoria est firma animi rerum et verborum et dispositionis 
perceptio, adding to Cicero’s definition only the qualifier that rhetorical memoria 
encompasses retention of the arrangement (dispositio) of words and ideas in the mind, along 
with the words and ideas themselves.71 The Auctor and Cicero also include other 
conceptualisations of memoria that are specific to rhetorical theory but unrelated to the MOL, 
such as the rhetorical definition of historia as gesta res, ab aetatis nostrae memoria remota.72 
 
68 For the relationship between the Rhetorica and De inventione, begin with Guérin (2006) 61-76, Gaines (2007) 
171-80. 
69 Rhet. Her. 4.10. For the similarity of definitions, see notably the enumeration of the five subdisciplines, Rhet. 
Her. 1.3 and Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.9.  
70 We see this in, for example, the disdain expressed by the Auctor for Graeci scriptores, Rhet. Her. 1.1; or 
Cicero’s Catulus, who criticises the Greek approach at De or. 2.75; similarly, Cicero’s Crassus, De or. 3.93-5. 
71 Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.9, text: Hubbell (1949). Rhet. Her. 1.3. Note the alternative manuscript reading at Inv. rhet. 
1.9, …rerum ac verborum [ad inventionem] perceptio: see apparatus in Achard (1994) 64, ad loc. 
72 Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.27; Rhet. Her. 1.13, where the phrasing is identical, save for sed (gesta res, sed ab…). This 
‘historical’ conceptualisation of memoria, which invokes the notion of a set of past events remembered 
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Similarly, both authors indicate that the possession of strong memoria is a prerequisite for the 
character trait prudentia (‘wisdom’ or ‘foresight’).73  
 The rhetorical texts share a notably standardised set of metaphors for memoria, which 
imply a shared view of both mnemonic function and mnemonic content. These include the 
metaphors of memoria as custos omnium partium rhetoricae and thesaurus inventorum.74 To 
conceptualise memoria as custos attributes a defensive function to the faculty, with the notion 
that one’s individual memory operates as a watchful guard and protector of knowledge. This 
is complemented by the conceptualisation of memoria as thesaurus, which implies one’s 
memory acts as a secure container for valuable content.75 Thus, in the context of the ars 
rhetorica, these metaphors present memoria as both protecting and defining the limits of a 
speaker’s knowledge. Probably the most famous shared metaphor for memoria is, however, 
the ‘wax tablet’, whereby the formation of memories in the mind is rendered analogous to the 
impression of marks in wax.76 The origins of this metaphor in Greek philosophy are analysed 
fully in Chapter II (p. 68-71).  
When it comes to the technical aspects of memoria artificiosa, here also, the Auctor’s 
and Cicero’s treatments are fundamentally the same, using the same concepts, specialised 
terminology (imagines, loci, and so on), and the same underlying set of rules. Their framing 
of those rules, however, differs markedly: it is the purpose of the following sections to 
delineate and explain those differences. I begin with the Auctor ad Herennium, whose 
approach is certainly the more didactic of the two and is consequently (and perhaps unfairly) 
often considered less sophisticated.  
Unlike Cicero, the Auctor is primarily interested in providing a technical blueprint for 
the MOL, which the aspiring practitioner might use to develop, test, and refine his own 
mnemonic technique. The exposition of memoria is to be found at Rhet. Her. 3.28-40. After 
stating that there are two types of memoria (naturalis and artificiosa), the Auctor refuses to 
get side-tracked into a debate over whether memoria artificiosa should be classified as a true 
 
collectively by a generation, enters the territory of modern Memory Studies: for memoria nostrae aetatis 
specifically, see Walter (2004) 35-8.  
73 Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.160, Rhet. Her. 3.3. 
74 Rhet. Her. 3.28, Cic. De or. 1.18.  
75 For possible origins of the thesaurus metaphor, see Ch. II, p. 92. 
76 Rhet. Her. 3.30-1, Cic. De or. 2.354.  
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ars in the strict (philosophical) sense (3.28).77 Similarly, the question of whether our 
mnemonic powers can be enhanced through training or whether they are entirely determined 
by nature is, he says, a discussion more suited to some other time – the effectiveness of the 
MOL should, for the budding student of rhetoric, be assumed. He further justifies his stance 
on the utility of the MOL by asserting that however great one’s natural mnemonic talent, 
theory can always aid nature; and even if those who only rely on their natural talent do not 
need it, the precepts he sets out will be beneficial to others (3.29).78 After explaining those 
precepts in detail, to close the discussion, the Auctor advises Herennius (the hypothetical 
student and addressee of the work) that he will realise the utility of memoria artificiosa as he 
learns to use it in practice – and to argue the point further would be to doubt Herennius’ 
assiduity (3.40).  
These utilitarian justifications, repeated at intervals, tacitly acknowledge the existence 
of contemporaneous doubts over the worth of teaching students the MOL – expressed 
explicitly in later treatments of the subdiscipline by Cicero and Quintilian.79 The Auctor, 
however, refuses to air or argue against those doubts, instead framing memoria as a 
subdiscipline of emergent practical value, a value that will be realised when theory is put into 
practice, and a theory in which there is no room for extraneous philosophising. Some modern 
scholars have seen instances such as these, where the Auctor avoids tricky questions, as a 
reason to criticise and doubt his sagacity – Müller, for example, believes they betray ‘ein 
gewisses “intellektuelles Defizit”’.80 Yet the fact that such questions are acknowledged in the 
text at all seems to me to suggest less that the Auctor was unable to address them and more 
that he deemed a rhetorical treatise – and moreover, a Latin rhetorical treatise – the wrong 
place for such tangential discussion.  
Consider the Auctor’s reluctance to provide proof of the MOL’s utility. While we 
might read it as a simple case of avoidance, or a desire to dismiss the age-old student 
favourite, “Why should we bother learning this?”, when we compare it to the Auctor’s overall 
approach to promoting the ars rhetorica as a subject worthy of study, we find that it is 
 
77 See above, n. 14. 
78 This justification was evidently commonplace: cf. Cic. De or. 2.351. 
79 Cicero’s Antonius cites unskilled/lazy people (inertes) who say that the ars memoriae is ineffective at De or. 
2.360; Quintilian states that some consider memoria ‘a gift of nature only’ (naturae modo… munus, Inst. 
11.2.1), and expresses his own doubts concerning the limitations of the MOL at Inst. 11.2.23-6. 
80 Müller (1996) 104, and p. 83-103 for Müller’s general criticisms of the Auctor’s failure to address 
philosophical questions concerning memoria.  
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entirely consistent. The Auctor’s general attitude is nowhere more apparent than in the 
opening lines of the work, where he states that he generally prefers to spend his otium 
(‘leisure time’) in the pursuit of philosophia; but he has engaged himself in the negotium 
(‘business’) of writing a treatise on rhetoric at Herennius’ behest because he knows that 
oratorical skills bring great benefits.81 This is an archetypically Roman justification for 
‘intellectual’ study and composition, somewhat reminiscent of Cato’s introduction to the 
Origines, where, as part of his apology for writing historia, Cato states the moralising 
principle that great and distinguished men ought to justify the worth of their otium no less 
than their negotium.82 The Auctor was writing in a period when there was still considerable 
aristocratic stigma attached to the teaching of rhetoric in Latin; thus, his Catonian apology for 
composing a work that fundamentally advocates such an approach can be construed as an 
attempt to address and refute any such stigma. He presents rhetoric as the opposite of his 
otiose philosophical studies, as a subject not of leisure but of business, of resolutely utilitarian 
and practical value – an intellectual discipline that will aid the productive Roman in his 
negotium, whether conducted on behalf of his family or the wider community.83 The Auctor, 
from the outset, attempts to normalise the exposition of rhetoric in Latin to suit Roman mores 
by investing his project, and the ars rhetorica itself, with potent benefits for other members 
of society.  
Following this line of reasoning, when the Auctor turns to the rhetorical theory of 
memoria, he avoids what we might call ‘meta-disciplinary’ questions not because he is 
incapable of addressing them (he is, after all, a lover of philosophy), but because they are 
extraneous to the practical instruction required by those who want to put memoria artificiosa 
to beneficial use.84 At the end of the mnemonic exposition, he highlights how the techniques 
prove most useful when ‘we are engaged in some negotium of major importance’.85 Thus he 
invokes once more the Catonian ideal that study pursued during otium should be as 
worthwhile as the tasks of negotium: specifically, the Auctor’s treatise on memoria, pursued 
 
81 Rhet. Her. 1.1: non enim in se parum fructus habet copia dicendi et commoditas orationis…  
82 Cato Orig. 1.2 = Cic. Planc. 66. For analysis of Cato’s prologue, see Churchill (1995) 91-106. The 
foundational study of dedicatory conventions in Latin literature is Janson (1964): his comments on the Auctor 
(p. 27-32) remain relevant. 
83 The Auctor states that much of his time is taken up with negotia familiaria, Rhet. Her. 1.1. 
84 Cf. Rhet. Her. 3.3: the Auctor professes that he is (again) postponing extraneous discussions of war and 
statecraft to a more suitable time – although he still wants us to believe that he is capable of writing treatises on 
these (more obviously ‘utilitarian’) disciplines. 
85 Rhet. Her. 3.40: cum aliquo maiore negotio detinemur. 
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during the course of his personal otium, has (he says) the potential to benefit others when 
they are pursuing negotium. By cutting out extraneous detail and tangential questions of 
merely theoretical importance, the Auctor attempts to present a sustained case for the utility 
and value of studying rhetoric in Latin. Instead of wasting time asking why rhetorical theory 
is useful, as the Greeks do, Roman students should put theory into practice and witness its 
utility with their own eyes.  
Consequently, it seems to me that the Auctor’s unadorned, rather prosaic, and overtly 
technical treatment of rhetorical theory was prompted at least in part by his need to justify an 
exposition of rhetorical theory written in Latin rather than Greek. As he remarks in his 
opening statements, it is Graeci scriptores who discuss, ‘for the sake of vain arrogance’ 
(inanis adrogantiae causa), topics that he omits; to protect the façade of their expertise, they 
teach absolutely irrelevant subjects, ‘so that the ars might be thought more difficult to 
understand’ (ut ars difficilior cognitu putaretur).86 The Auctor promises instead to strip his 
ars rhetorica of all Greek intellectual gimcrack and, motivated to fulfil that promise, he 
deems certain questions, such as whether or not memoria qualifies as a true ars, irrelevant – 
they smack a little too much of Greek intellectual quibbling. 
Another hallmark of the Greek approach was the charging of fees for tuition. Again, 
in his opening statements, the Auctor stresses that he is not motivated by desire for profit or 
glory (unlike the rest) – thus, he simultaneously condemns and distances himself from 
mercenary Greeks and perhaps also the Latini rhetores of Crassus’ infamous censorial edict, 
who presumably took payment for their services.87 We might (justifiably) question the 
Auctor’s selfless motives and his claims about the Greeks; nevertheless, by removing what 
the stereotypical aristocratic pater might have considered the faults and flaws of Greek 
rhetoricians, the Auctor at least attempted to make his approach more palatable to his 
intended audience, to normalise the exposition of rhetoric in Latin and to render it a subject 
worthy of budding Latin orators.88 Moreover, those same budding orators, when faced with 
the sprawling rhetorical curriculum, may well have appreciated the Auctor’s straightforward 
 
86 Rhet. Her. 1.1. 
87 See p. 15. 
88 On the other hand, the Auctor (and Cicero, in De inventione) sometimes fails to adapt his source material to 
his Roman audience, with references that only make sense in a Greek cultural context: for examples and 
discussion, see Corbeill (2002) 34-8.  
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and unadorned prose. His work is ultimately presented as an instructional text and, in 
pedagogy, concision and clarity are often key considerations. 
In the absence of Greek or Latin rhetorical texts from the late second century, it is 
difficult to judge whether the Auctor’s framing of his Latin ars rhetorica was in any way a 
true departure from what came before – we do not even know whether his criticisms were 
aimed at anyone specifically, since he never engages with other rhetoricians by name, tending 
instead to criticise generalised groups (such as the Graeci scriptores).89 The fact that his 
definitions are sometimes identical to those in Cicero’s De inventione rather leads one to 
suspect that the Auctor was seriously exaggerating the extent of his originality. Many in the 
Auctor’s Roman audience would have known that his rhetorical theory was imported directly 
from the Greek tradition; yet it seems that, for the Auctor, it was not the content but the 
packaging of this theory that mattered most. 
To this end, the Auctor was fully committed to differentiating his own methods from 
those of his Greek predecessors. He provides a summary of the main tenets of his ostensibly 
novel approach at the beginning of his fourth and final book (Rhet. Her. 4.1-10). His 
principal belief is that the rhetorician should be able to talk in accordance with the precepts of 
his ars.90 He explains that, unlike Greek rhetoricians who copy out passages from other 
authors and rely on the prestige of ancient orators and poets to elevate their texts, he has 
created his own examples of rhetorical techniques in action. The Auctor frames this method 
as a positive innovation, stating that ‘there is no need to concede everything to antiquity’ (non 
omnia concedenda esse antiquitati, 4.4).91 He warns that others who satisfy themselves with 
quotes from previous authors run a real risk of appearing naïve and inexperienced in matters 
of greater importance (insueti rerum maiorum, 4.6); a true expert should be able to 
demonstrate practical application of the subject he purports to have mastered (4.9).92 Thus, by 
claiming to have produced his own (suitably Roman) exempla, the Auctor simultaneously 
 
89 Schmidt and Gruen note that a lack of references is no proof of the non-existence of earlier Latin-medium 
treatises: Schmidt (1975) 193-4, Gruen (1990) 184. 
90 Specifically stated at Rhet. Her. 4.6, 4.10; cf. Cic. Inv. Rhet. 1.8. 
91 Note the Auctor’s latent implication that the Romans will one day surpass antiquitas – i.e. the Greeks – in 
literary and oratorical achievement. 
92 The Auctor’s criticisms are hardly unprecedented. Isocrates, writing several centuries earlier, made similarly 
damning condemnations of other rhetoricians for imparting knowledge as prescriptively and unimaginatively as 
if they were teaching the letters of the alphabet, and for failing to demonstrate practical mastery of rhetorical 
τέχναι: Isoc. C. soph. 10, 12-8. For Isocrates’ approach (and what we know of his successors), see Heath (2017) 




rejects Greek models and demonstrates to his audience how dissimilar he is to Greek 
rhetoricians who are content to study ars gratia artis.93 
In general, the Auctor’s didactic approach to memoria artificiosa follows the tripartite 
pedagogical model that he advocates in the rest of his ars rhetorica: first, the student must 
learn the theoretical method (ars); then, he must imitate others (imitatio); finally, he must 
practice his own style (exercitatio).94 These are the Auctor’s three ingredients for rhetorical 
success.95 Accordingly, in the section on memoria, he provides the theoretical method (Rhet. 
Her. 3.28-40, passim); he provides a limited number of exempla for the purposes of imitation 
(the most remarkable of which can be found at 3.33-4); and he asserts that, in the 
subdiscipline of memoria especially, practice is key (3.40). The Auctor’s overarching desire 
to differentiate himself from earlier Greek rhetoricians is also particularly apparent in this 
section. As was discussed above in relation to 3.28-9, he rejects the Greeks’ ostensible 
fondness for tangential debate and extreme complexity by refusing to engage in meta-
disciplinary discussion about the nature and utility of memoria artificiosa. We see another 
instance of the Auctor prioritising concision at 3.34, where he starts to develop the metaphor 
of memoria as custos. Memoria artificiosa acts, he suggests, as a reinforcement for the 
defence provided by memoria naturalis, ‘for each of the two types [of memoria] will, when 
separated, be less reliable, although it is still true that there is much greater protection 
(praesidium) in theory and in ars’.96 Taken at face value, this assertion tells us something 
more about how the two types of memoria were perceived in rhetorical theory, with memoria 
artificiosa (the MOL) treated as the praesidium of the potentially vulnerable memoria 
naturalis. The Auctor’s claim remains, however, unsupported. He states that he would be 
quite happy to prove the greater protective power of memoria artificiosa, were it not that it 
would ruin the ‘straightforward concision of his instruction’ (dilucida brevitas 
praeceptionis). So once more, tangential debate is omitted in favour of unadorned technical 
exposition.  
 
93 For more on the ‘Romanness’ of the Auctor’s exempla, see Corbeill (2002) 42-3. 
94 Rhet. Her. 1.3; cf. 4.69.  
95 Note that although the Auctor clearly believed natura, in the sense of ‘natural ability’, was another 
prerequisite for success, he omits it from his list. It was usually included: e.g. Pl. Phdr. 269d; Isoc. C. soph. 14; 
Cic. De or. 1.146-7, 2.89-92.  




The Auctor’s most overt attempt to differentiate his exposition of memoria from 
earlier treatments comes in a passage at Rhet. Her. 3.38-9, where he denigrates and rejects the 
prescriptivist approach of certain (unnamed) Greek rhetoricians. He says that these Greeks 
prescribe vast numbers of imago-verbum pairs – i.e. they pre-designate a mental image of 
their own design for each word. He then argues that the practice is absurd on numerous 
counts: first, such prescriptivism is rendered unfeasible by the vast quantity of words students 
might need to memorise; second, it robs students of their agency by removing the need to 
devise personalised imago-verbum pairs; and finally, it is ineffective, since what is 
profoundly memorable for one person will barely make an impression upon another (3.38). 
The Auctor develops this final point at some length, observing that there are certain things 
that everyone remembers particularly well – images of outstanding beauty, singular ugliness, 
hilarity, etc. – but the details always differ between individuals. Just as it is up to the 
individual to devise his own arguments using the principles of inventio, therefore, the 
practitioner of the MOL must himself seek out and discover what works best. In contrast to 
the overly prescriptive Greeks, good Roman tutors (like the Auctor) will provide one or two 
examples to illustrate the theory, then leave it up to students to exercise their own initiative 
and gain all-important practical experience. 
We might argue that the Auctor, in criticising the methods of other rhetoricians at 
such great length, borders on hypocrisy; that his condemnation of excessive tangential 
discussion becomes itself excessive. It is no accident that when the Auctor allows himself the 
liberty of digression, it is to promote his own pedagogic practices at the expense of the much-
maligned Greeks. As the passages discussed in this section illustrate, his attempts to 
differentiate his approach are particularly prominent in his treatment of memoria artificiosa – 
perhaps he felt it necessary to provide robust justification of the somewhat esoteric MOL. 
Until recently, the MOL had been taught only in Greek, and the Auctor had to sell the merits 
of his Latin translation of the technique to a potentially sceptical Roman readership. As later 
texts confirm, there were some who doubted the effectiveness of memoria artificiosa. In De 
oratore, Cicero’s Antonius addresses these doubts by admitting that although some truly 
great orators will never need the MOL (he gives Themistocles as an example), others such as 
himself will always benefit.97 In contrast, the Auctor generally avoids the debate or refuses to 
engage: just try the MOL for yourself, he says, and see how useful it proves in the pursuit of 
 
97 Cic. De or. 2.351. 
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your daily business. The Auctor’s MOL is not ars gratia artis, but ars gratia negotii. We can 
thus view the Auctor’s efforts to reframe the exposition of the MOL as an attempt to 
normalise the teaching of the technique to suit the mores of a pragmatic, outcome-oriented 
Roman audience. Another facet of this bid for normalisation involved stripping the MOL of 
its ‘Greekness’. By rejecting the methods of his Greek counterparts, by doing away with 
prescriptivism and returning agency to the student, the Auctor attempted to differentiate his 
approach to the MOL, even if this differentiation was only superficial. In the Auctor’s model, 
control comes to reside with the would-be Roman orator, so that he might master his memory 
and put it to work in his oratory. 
 
3. Memoria in De oratore: differentiation from the norm 
If the Auctor’s approach to memoria as a subdiscipline of the ars rhetorica was characterised 
by the normalisation in Latin of a prior, exclusively Greek tradition, then Cicero’s 
presentation of the same subject in De oratore bears witness to how the Auctor’s approach 
rapidly became the norm; so much so that Cicero, writing a few decades later, desired to 
differentiate his work from it. A desire for generic differentiation from rhetorical pedagogy 
was of course one element of Cicero’s overall authorial agenda for De oratore: as he himself 
wrote in a letter to Lentulus Spinther (dated December 54), De oratore avoids rehashing the 
communia praecepta of the rhetoricians.98 Accordingly, Cicero elevated the register of the 
work above that of a typical didactic treatise. 
We can detect the differing overall goals of the Auctor and Cicero in their 
justifications for the utility of memoria. The Auctor, writing primarily for the purpose of 
rhetorical instruction, asserts at the end of his discussion that strong memoria is always 
useful, especially when engaged in business of special importance (maius negotium). He does 
not, however, provide explicit examples, instead encouraging his readers to try the technique 
for themselves.99 Cicero, by way of a slight but significant contrast, delineates the nuanced 
and varied utility of memoria for the Roman advocate specifically: the object of his 
discussion is the orator himself as much as it is rhetorical instruction. Accordingly, at De or. 
2.355, Cicero has Antonius list the benefits of excellent mnemonic capacity before he gives 
 
98 Fam. 1.9.23. Scholarship on Cicero’s agenda in De oratore is extremely wide-ranging, but for a general 
introduction to his goals, see May and Wisse (2001) 3-55. 
99 Rhet. Her. 3.40; above, p. 39. 
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any technical rules. Cicero’s Antonius states that memoria is of great value to the orator since 
it allows him to remember all the information pertaining both to the case in hand and to cases 
from the past; it allows him to secure and arrange all his ideas and vocabulary before 
speaking; and it even enables him to memorise arguments made by his opponents while they 
are speaking.100  
On a more technical level, Cicero’s treatment of the MOL in De oratore is based 
fundamentally upon the same set of rules presented in Rhetorica ad Herennium – yet Cicero 
summarises them in such a compressed fashion that, if we did not have the Auctor’s full 
exposition, it would be difficult to extrapolate some of the more granular details.101 As 
discussed earlier, Cicero uses the same generic metaphors for memoria as the Auctor.102 He 
also recognises the existence of doubts over whether memoria can be classified as an ars. But 
rather than taking the Auctor’s approach and avoiding or dismissing these doubts, Cicero 
generalises the question to encompass the ars dicendi at large, referring back to a debate that 
the participants in his dialogue have already conducted in the first book (De or. 2.356, 
referring to 1.96-110). There, Cicero’s Crassus argues that for the orator’s purposes the 
question is effectively irrelevant (and more suited to some ‘Greekling’, Graeculus), but that 
in his view, speaking strictly, oratory cannot constitute an ars, save perhaps in the barest 
sense, because the precepts an orator follows and the language he uses must change in 
accordance with his audience and general circumstances, whereas the precepts of a true ars 
are never changed by the influence of external factors or one’s own judgement.103 He admits, 
however, that in less technical terms oratory does contain precepts comparable to those of an 
ars, which, if followed, will help the orator achieve his goals and become truly eloquent. 
With this previous discussion in mind, when addressing the question of whether ars can aid 
memoria naturalis, Cicero’s Antonius acknowledges Crassus’ views, then takes a similar 
approach to the Auctor, resolving the issue by saying that while the principal source of 
memoria is certainly natura, there is hardly anyone whose inherent mnemonic ability will not 
 
100 The final point is often overlooked: see Ch. III, p. 139-42. 
101 Demonstrated most starkly at De or. 2.358, where Cicero refers with extreme brevity to several mnemonic 
rules that the Auctor treats in much greater detail (Rhet. Her. 3.31-2, 3.37). Our reliance on Rhet. Her. for 
interpretation is evident in the commentary of Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse (1996) 75-7, ad loc. Cicero’s 
precise rules for the creation of appropriate imagines are particularly obscure: see Blum (1969) 23-32. I note 
also that the correspondence between the Auctor’s and Cicero’s rules is not one-to-one: the Auctor cites more 
rules and explains them in greater depth; Cicero’s are necessarily compressed, though he introduces a few 
mnemonic tricks that the Auctor omits, e.g. the transformation of case endings to enhance memorability. 
102 See p. 38. 
103 For ars/τέχνη in philosophy, see Ch. II, p. 100. 
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be improved by putting into practice some of the precepts of the MOL (2.356-7).104 Thus, 
Cicero recognises sceptics of the ars memoriae in referencing Crassus’ views, while 
simultaneously using Antonius to justify why an exposition of the MOL remains necessary. 
 
The underlying similarities in Rhetorica ad Herennium and De oratore are ultimately 
overshadowed by Cicero’s main strategy of differentiation: the introduction and incorporation 
of the poet Simonides of Ceos into his explanation of the MOL and, hence, into Latin 
rhetorical pedagogy itself. As Quintilian states, it was Cicero who first popularised the story 
that connected Simonides to the MOL.105 As I argue below, that connection was not routinely 
made by Roman rhetoricians before Cicero released De oratore. Yet, thanks not least to his 
posthumous reputation as the paragon of Latin oratory, Cicero’s Simonidean take on 
memoria artificiosa was so successful that it fundamentally changed Roman understanding of 
the origins of the MOL – and all later expositions of the technique became almost obliged to 
follow suit.  
Cicero sets the tone for his treatment of the MOL immediately, choosing not to 
introduce the theory by conventional direct means, using definitions and technical instruction, 
but with narrative. He has Antonius voice a vote of thanks to Simonides of Ceos as the first 
man to demonstrate the effectiveness of the MOL (De or. 2.351). He then relates the origin 
myth, explaining how Simonides had been invited to dine with Scopas in Thessaly and to 
compose a poem in Scopas’ honour. In this poem, Simonides also praised Castor and Pollux; 
Scopas objected, paying Simonides only half the agreed commission, because, as Scopas 
argued, only half the poem was about him. Later, Simonides was told that two young men 
were requesting his presence outside but, when he left the palace, they were nowhere to be 
seen. While Simonides was gone, however, the dining hall collapsed. Scopas and the other 
dinner guests were crushed inside, and the story concludes as follows: 
Simonides dicitur ex eo, quod meminisset quo eorum loco quisque cubuisset, demonstrator 
unius cuiusque sepeliendi fuisse. hac tum re admonitus invenisse fertur ordinem esse maxime, 
qui memoriae lumen adferret. itaque iis, qui hanc partem ingenii exercerent, locos esse 
capiendos et ea, quae memoria tenere vellent, effingenda animo atque in iis locis conlocanda: 
 
104 Cf. Rhet. Her. 3.28-9. 
105 Quint. Inst. 11.2.15: Cicero hanc famam latius fudit. 
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sic fore, ut ordinem rerum locorum ordo conservaret, res autem ipsas rerum effigies notaret 
atque ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris uteremur. 
Cic. De or. 2.353-4.106 
Simonides is said to have identified every one of them for burial based on his memory of the 
locus where each of them had reclined at the table; then, prompted by this event, he is said to 
have discovered that it is order, above all, that sheds light upon memoria and, consequently, 
that those who would train this aspect of their intellect must choose loci and fashion 
representations of the things that they wish to retain in memory to be placed in those loci. 
Thus, it will be the case that the order of the loci preserves the order of the res, while the 
representations of the res signify the res themselves, and that we use loci in place of the wax 
on a tablet and likenesses in place of the letters. 
First, a few notes on vocabulary. In contrast to the Auctor, who uses a limited range of terms 
consistently throughout, Cicero refers to technical concepts using a variety of expressions. 
Take imagines, for example: in the quoted passage alone, Cicero uses simulacra and effigies 
as synonyms for imagines, plus the related effingenda animo to describe their formation. It is 
not that he has rejected the term imago in favour of others (it appears frequently elsewhere), 
but he has expanded upon the more limited and strictly technical vocabulary of the Auctor, 
emphasising, with the terms effigies and effingenda, the idea that imagines must be 
consciously ‘fashioned’ as likenesses of the objects they resemble. The Auctor never uses 
effigies or consanguineous terms, and whereas Cicero deploys simulacra as a synonym for 
imagines liberally, the Auctor uses it twice only, once simply to define imagines as a 
technical rhetorical term and once to emphasise that imagines must be an accurate 
representation of the objects they denote.107  
The Auctor’s more limited range of technical vocabulary aligns with his stated aims, 
both to introduce and normalise Latin terms, and to be clear and concise in his instructional 
exegesis of rhetorical precepts. Cicero’s Antonius, on the other hand, is not concerned that 
his audience will misunderstand the theory: the ruleset of the MOL is, he says, common 
knowledge (De or. 2.358). Cicero’s unrestrained deviation from the standard term imagines 
thus assumes his audience’s familiarity with the MOL and elevates the register of Antonius’ 
 
106 Latin text: Kumaniecki (1969). 
107 For Cicero’s use of imagines, see De or. 2.355-60. For the Auctor’s limited use of simulacra, see Rhet. Her. 
3.29, 31. Re the ‘fashioning’ of imagines, I note that Cicero elsewhere uses the terms figura and, even more 
unusually, conformatio, which May and Wisse deem was chosen for its parallel usage in the fashioning of 
figures of speech: see May and Wisse (2001) 220, n. 344. 
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speech above that of basic pedagogy to a more sophisticated level. Another consideration for 
Cicero was perhaps the non-technical connotations of the terms simulacrum, effigies and, 
especially, imago, which are all associated with death, funerals, and representations of 
deceased individuals.108 Such evocations are particularly resonant when set alongside the 
Simonidean origin myth, since it was Simonides’ memories of the deceased dinner guests that 
enabled proper funeral rites to be performed even after their physical features had been 
obliterated in death. 
When it comes to Cicero’s rendering of the Simonidean origin myth itself, it is clear 
from the use of res in the final sentence of the quoted passage, as well as the fact that 
Simonides was remembering people and where they were sitting, that Cicero is focussing 
here on memoria rerum rather than memoria verborum. Antonius does mention memoria 
verborum, but only later, when he states that it is unsuited to the orator (2.359); he makes no 
explicit link between Simonides and memoria verborum. I mention this because it is difficult 
to square the representation of memoria verborum as a cumbersome and ineffective technique 
for memorising individual words in passages of prose or poetry – a representation that 
appears in the Auctor, Cicero, and Quintilian, and which has been confirmed by modern 
mnemonists (see above, p. 23-7) – with the modern scholarly perception that Simonides 
invented the MOL precisely because he needed to learn his written poetry by heart.109 This 
perception, overly influenced by Cicero’s hold on the rhetorical tradition, is untenable.  
As well as discarding the notion that the MOL was invented for the purpose of 
memorising poetry, we should also remove Simonides from any historical role as its inventor. 
For the last fifty years, modern scholarship has generally subscribed to a chronology for the 
development of rhetorical memory that commences with Simonides’ invention of mnemonic 
techniques and a method akin to the MOL, if not the MOL itself. The most influential works 
on rhetorical memory remain Yates’ The Art of Memory (1966) and Small’s Wax Tablets of 
the Mind (1997). For Yates, Simonides was a figure of true importance, and ‘really did take 
some notable step about mnemotechnics, teaching or publishing rules’.110 Like Yates, Small 
concludes that Simonides had something to do with the invention of mnemonic techniques, 
but goes further, adding the reasoning that I have challenged above: Simonides, she says, was 
 
108 I am thinking here of wax funerary masks (imagines), statues, and portraits (imagines/effigies/simulacra). For 
funerary imagines (in Roman life and rhetoric), see Flower (1996) esp. 32-59, 150-8.  
109 Epitomised by Small (2007) 195-6.  
110 Yates (1966) 28-9. 
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a natural inventor because he was one of the first poets to compose his work on the page and 
needed a method of memorising words for oral recitation.111 Hence, both Yates’ and Small’s 
studies conclude that Cicero’s Simonidean origin myth does bear some relation to historical 
reality. Of course, the question of whether Simonides really invented the MOL is age-old – 
Quintilian, for instance, went to significant lengths to ascertain and fact-check Cicero’s 
sources.112 He believed that Cicero followed a Callimachean poetic tradition, as opposed to 
the version of the story promoted by various Alexandrian scholars, who asserted that the 
collapsed palace was located at Pharsalus rather than Crannon. He also states that the sources 
do not agree whether Simonides really wrote his poem for Scopas; that, regardless, Scopas 
did perish in the disaster; and finally, that he does not personally believe Castor and Pollux 
descended from heaven to save Simonides.113 Leaving Quintilian’s doubts about the Dioscuri 
aside, what emerges most clearly from his Quellenforschung is that Simonides’ reputation as 
a mnemonic innovator was not common knowledge among Roman writers before the mid-
first century BCE when Cicero apparently introduced it.  
Quintilian’s engagement with a multitude of variations on the basic story also reflects 
the complex nature of Simonides’ legacy in antiquity, which presents problems compounded 
for us by the loss of most Simonidean poetry and the fragmentary nature of that which does 
survive. Simonides’ reputation was fostered during the Hellenistic period in intellectual hubs 
such as Alexandria, to the point that he was installed among the canon of nine lyric poets.114 
Many epigrams and gnomic sayings, a sizeable number of which are spurious and/or 
unverifiable, were attributed to him.115 At the same time, a host of biographical stories 
spread, about his alleged miserliness, his sage-like wisdom, and his mercenary greed.116 
Simonides’ reputation as a mnemonist was also part of this complex legacy. The earliest and 
clearest attribution of a system of mnemonics to him comes from the Marmor Parium, a 
marble chronicle inscribed during or shortly after 264/3 BCE, which names him as ὁ τὸ 
 
111 Small (1997) 73-4. 
112 Quint. Inst. 11.2.14-5. 
113 The fullest investigation of Quintilian’s own sources can be found in Slater (1972) 232-40, although the Loeb 
text of Institutio book 11 has some useful notes on these Alexandrian scholars, plus alternative readings of 
Quintilian’s reference to Callimachus: Russell (2001) 65, n. 8. For the Callimachean fragment (probably) 
referenced here, see Callim. Aet. fr. 64.10 (Pfeiffer). The fragment is corrupt at the point where Simonides’ 
mnemonic system may (or may not) be referenced. 
114 See Barbantani (2009) 302-3. 
115 Parsons (2001) 56-8. 
116 For Simonides’ developing reputation, see Bell (1978) 29-86. 
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μνημονικὸν εὑρών.117 The sources of the chronicle’s entries remain obscure. Although it has 
been suggested that they were based on Athenian records, and it would be convenient to 
conclude that stories about Simonides (including the one about the palace-collapse) were 
promulgated in Athens and that he appeared on the marble as a result, the fact that the start of 
the inscription is lost means that such a scenario can be nothing more than an attractive 
possibility.118 Likewise, to rely on much later sources such as the Byzantine Suda to confirm 
the reality of Simonides’ invention of the MOL would be seriously misguided.119 It seems 
entirely possible that Simonides had acquired a reputation for being a master of memory by 
the end of his life, and that this reputation was fostered after his death.120 The story of 
Simonides as the ‘inventor of mnemonics’ may even have resulted from the conflation of his 
reputation as an elegist whose poetry preserved memories of the dead with the idea that he 
employed an actual system of mnemonics to retain memories in his mind.121  
I believe the most likely scenario, however, is that the narrative of the Simonidean 
origin myth, with the details of the palace-collapse and the intervention of Castor and Pollux, 
was itself invented alongside other stories of Simonides’ exploits, like those relating to his 
astonishing wisdom or (equally astonishing) greed, in intellectual hubs such as Alexandria 
where his poetry was preserved.122 To be clear, I am not suggesting that Cicero was the first 
to link this Simonidean story with the invention of the MOL, but it is entirely possible that 
another practitioner of memoria artificiosa saw the potential of the pre-existing palace-
collapse story to explain the utility of ordo to the ars, and adapted the myth by appending the 
‘lesson’ that order enhances memory. Simonides, already famed for possessing impressive 
powers of memory, was a natural fit for the role of inventor and, thus, a new explanation of 
 
117 Mar. Par. 54: text, Jacoby (1904) p. 16; see also Rotstein (2016) 31, 45. Rotstein provides an up-to-date 
introduction to the inscription (Ch. 1) and considers our application of historical details from the inscription to 
the many literary figures it mentions (Ch. 6). 
118 Young and Steinmann (2012) 230, cf. Rotstein (2016) 1-3. 
119 Suda Σ439. Obbink believes the entry in the Suda contains ‘nonsense’: Obbink (2001) 74-5. Nevertheless, by 
the Renaissance period, Simonides’ position as the ‘founding father of mnemonics’ had become so entrenched 
that Giordano Bruno (1548-1600 CE) included him on his ‘memory wheel’: see Yates (1966) 221-2. 
120 In a line (of unverifiable authorship) quoted by Aristides, Simonides boasts that, even aged 80, when it came 
to memory, nobody rivalled him: see Aristid. Or. 28, with the caveats of Slater (1972) 235-6. 
121 See Parsons (2001) 58, n. 32 for this idea, and also the more unorthodox reading of Farrell (1997) 377-9. 
122 Cf. Post (1932) 107, who speculates that the Simonidean origin myth first appeared in a lost work by Hippias 




why the MOL works was born. Cicero, using his knowledge of the Hellenistic tradition, 
picked up this explanation and ran with it in De oratore.  
Such a hypothesis is of course speculative – but the fundamental idea that the 
Simonidean origin myth contains little historical fact is hardly revolutionary. Small seems 
unaware of the views of classicists from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, who 
rejected the notion that a poet could have developed the MOL. Morgenstern (writing in 1835) 
and Post (1932) both agreed on the issue, the latter stating that, ‘the development of an 
artificial system of memory is appropriate only to a teacher of rhetoric’.123 We can bring 
these views up to date and supplement them with the evidence from modern cognitive science 
presented earlier, which demonstrates that the ancient MOL is not necessarily the most 
effective method for memorising poetry verbatim, but that it is particularly useful for 
extracting and memorising the salient points of expository passages (see p. 25). The old 
argument, that a poet is highly unlikely to have created the MOL, stands. The MOL was 
designed to meet the requirements of the forum, not the poetry recital, and we should 
consequently conclude that the Simonidean origin myth was just that – a myth. This 
conclusion rather disrupts the start of both Yates’ and Small’s timelines for the chronological 
development of the MOL. The implications of this disruption will be considered in detail in 
Chapter II.  
 
For now, with the question of historical (in)accuracy addressed, we can focus on Cicero’s 
own presentation of the Simonidean origin myth within the specific context of Roman 
rhetoric. First, I note that the narrative feature most relevant to the underlying principles of 
the MOL is Simonides’ memorisation of the dining hall’s arrangement – in other words, the 
story is most useful as an illustration of the importance of ordo or dispositio to the MOL. Yet, 
although the myth provides a reasonable demonstration of how order promotes accurate 
mnemonic retention, it hardly supplies a comprehensive explanation for the derivation of a 
complete ruleset involving ordo, loci, and imagines.  
This inadequacy is highlighted at the point when Cicero’s Antonius transitions from 
mythic narrative to the statement of rules, which occurs at De or. 2.354 (quoted p. 47-8), 
 
123 Morgenstern (1835) 7-10; Post (1932) 106. Post posits the Sophists as likely inventors, but I disagree: fifth-
century Sophists did not use any mnemonic systems as sophisticated as the Auctor’s fully-fledged MOL: see 
Ch. II, p. 67-8. 
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immediately after Simonides’ inference concerning the importance of order for effective 
mnemonic retention. Cicero first employs the metaphor of ordo as a light that illuminates the 
dark recesses of memory. Subsequently, the transition to the rules (itaque iis…) is somewhat 
abrupt, tied together by an extended AcI construction dependent on invenisse. The transition 
is smoothed over by various translators with the reintroduction of Simonides as agent: for 
example, Sutton and Rackham, ‘He [Simonides] inferred that persons desiring to train this 
faculty must…’ or May and Wisse, ‘And he [Simonides] concluded that those who would 
like to employ this part of their abilities should…’.124 That Cicero wanted to credit Simonides 
with the initial formulation of the laws for loci and the placement of imagines in loci is clear; 
the circumlocutory fashion in which he does so might, however, be explained by the idea that 
Cicero’s invocation of Simonides to explain the rules of the MOL was novel and unfamiliar 
to his audience.125 If Cicero, while attempting what was already an unorthodox introduction 
to rhetorical memory, had simply stated up front that it was Simonides who invented the rules 
for the creation of loci and imagines, he would have directly contradicted his readers’ prior 
knowledge of memoria artificiosa. The standard curriculum (or at least, the curriculum 
presented in the Rhetorica ad Herennium) did not offer students explanations for the rules of 
mnemonics that were based on Simonides’ mythical discovery; rather, students were 
probably taught mnemonics according to the Auctor’s approach, which relies on explanations 
such as the traditional wax tablet metaphor. Cicero’s explanation of loci and imagines was 
highly irregular. 
The clearest indication of this irregularity is the fact that, by the end of the quoted 
passage, Cicero feels it necessary to revert to the Auctor’s wax tablet metaphor to explain 
how loci and the imagines placed in them work.126 For the Auctor, the wax tablet is the go-to 
explanation for the rules of the MOL, and he elaborates the analogy between writing in wax 
and memoria artificiosa at much greater length than Cicero.127 The differences are worth 
 
124 Sutton and Rackham (1948) 467; May and Wisse (2001) 219. Cf. Small, whose translation preserves the 
absence of Simonides: ‘…he [Simonides] is said to have invented the order that especially brings light to 
memory. And so for those who would train this part of the mind…’ Small (1997) 73. The most comprehensive 
commentary on this section is Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse (1996) 64-78. 
125 Cf. Quintilian, whose rendering of the Simonidean origin myth makes the causal relationship between the 
palace-collapse and the invention of mnemotechnics explicit: Inst. 11.2.17. Marchesi (2005) 395 believes the 
causal relationship to be a ‘specific Roman contribution’; again, we cannot be certain. 
126 And he returns to the wax tablet model again at De or. 2.360: see p. 60. 
127 Rhet. Her. 3.30-1. For the origins of the wax tablet metaphor, see Ch. II, p. 68-70. 
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scrutinising. Consider how the Auctor uses the wax/writing analogy to justify the necessity of 
creating loci and imagines:  
Nam loci cerae aut cartae simillimi sunt, imagines litteris, dispositio et conlocatio imaginum 
scripturae, pronuntiatio lectioni. Oportet igitur, si volumus multa meminisse, multos nos nobis 
locos comparare, uti multis locis multas imagines conlocare possimus. 
Rhet. Her. 3.30.128 
For the loci are extremely similar to the wax or the parchment, the imagines to the letters, the 
arrangement and placement of imagines to the writing, and the delivery to the reading. We 
should, therefore, if we desire to memorise many things, prepare many loci, so that we can 
place many imagines in those many loci. 
In the Auctor’s model, then, the analogy between writing and the MOL leads directly to the 
rule that a large number of loci must be prepared in order to accommodate an equally large 
number of imagines. Cicero, on the other hand, chooses to place the same assertions (locos 
esse capiendos et ea, quae memoria tenere vellent, effingenda animo atque in iis locis 
conlocanda, see p. 47) directly after his retelling of the Simonidean origin myth. He thus 
replaces the conventional preliminary explanation of how the MOL works, used by 
rhetoricians in treatises such as the Rhetorica ad Herennium, with a novel narrative 
derivation. Or, rather, this seems to be his intention, until the wax tablet metaphor suddenly 
reappears, relegated to half a sentence at the end of the passage and dismissed in a few words. 
The fact that the metaphor remains entirely unelaborated is a good indication that Cicero 
assumed familiarity on his readers’ part; that the metaphor was the model they would have 
expected to encounter in any conventional exegesis of the MOL. Thus, Cicero’s Antonius 
concludes his explanation of how ‘we use loci’ (ut locis pro cera, simulacris pro litteris 
uteremur) in the same manner that the Auctor initiates the statement of mnemonic rules.  
The idea that Cicero was attempting to graft the Simonidean origin myth onto what 
was, by the 50s, the ‘normalised’ wax tablet derivation is supported by Cicero’s later use of 
the same metaphor in Partitiones oratoriae, when he briefly introduces memoria as the fifth 
subdiscipline of the ars dicendi. He says that the ‘composing’ or ‘completing’ of memory 
(confectio memoriae) involves arranging imagines in loci just as letters are arranged in 
wax.129 Here, there is no mention of the Simonidean origin myth – and it cannot be the case 
 
128 Latin text: Calboli (2020). 
129 Part. or. 26. 
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that Cicero took this passage from the Partitiones and elaborated it in De oratore, since De 
oratore was produced first.130 Rather, in the Partitiones, Cicero dispensed with the 
Simonidean myth in favour of the normal, more succinct wax tablet explanation. This 
approach is in accordance with the differing treatments of memoria artificiosa in the two 
works: the Partitiones contain a simple gloss, passing on from the subject in a couple of 
sentences; the De oratore aims for a much fuller exposition. In the Partitiones, Cicero 
therefore chose the regular explanation with which his audience was familiar, and which 
required no further elaboration.131 In De oratore, he had more scope for innovation, not least 
because he was presenting the subject as part of a wide-ranging dialogue delivered by 
characters with differing views and approaches. Accordingly, Cicero used Antonius’ speech 
to develop a treatment of memoria artificiosa that foregrounded the Simonidean origin myth 
and relegated the standard wax tablet model to the end of the narrative. The wax tablet model, 
as a well-established justification for the creation of loci and imagines, thereby acts in De 
oratore as a reaffirmation of the mnemonic principles that Cicero is attempting to illustrate in 
a novel manner with the story of Simonides.  
Cicero’s construction of the MOL in De oratore is consequently something of a 
bricolage, incorporating his innovative Simonidean derivation alongside more standard 
explanations such as the wax tablet metaphor – occasionally, as in the transition between 
narrative and the statement of technical rules, the stitching shows at the seams. The story of 
Simonides and Scopas was not originally intended as an aetiology of the MOL and, 
consequently, it contains inconsistencies. As mentioned above, of all the technical precepts 
underlying the MOL, the Simonidean origin myth illustrates the importance of ordo most 
readily. But even here, the pedant will find holes in Cicero’s derivation where, by contrast, 
the Auctor’s explanation remains watertight. The Auctor says that strict order is necessary, 
firstly, to prevent confusion; secondly, to aid speedy recall of successive memories; and 
thirdly, to enable the practitioner to move both backwards and forwards in his mnemonic 
sequence.132 He then asks us to imagine a queue of acquaintances. The order of the queue, he 
says, would not affect your ability to name the acquaintances, no matter where you began – 
but the clear implication is that, were the order of this queue to be broken, you would lose 
 
130 Two dates have been proposed for the composition of Partitiones oratoriae: 54 and 46 BCE. Both are later 
than De oratore (55). 
131 Cf. Orat. 54, where Cicero deliberately omits memoria from a brief survey of the parts of the ars dicendi.  
132 Rhet. Her. 3.30. 
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track of which acquaintances had already been named, just as you will lose track of which 
imagines you have already dealt with if the order of loci is not preserved in the MOL. Thus, 
maintaining a strict order enables recall and prevents confusion. 
Now let us consider the logic underpinning Cicero’s derivation of the same principles 
concerning order and arrangement, which are based on Simonides’ identification of the 
deceased dinner guests’ remains. As in the case of the Auctor’s queue of acquaintances, the 
ordered arrangement of the dinner guests at Scopas’ table is essential to Simonides’ 
identification of their bodies: if they had swapped their respective loci, he would have failed 
to name them correctly. Nevertheless, Cicero’s narrative assumes that the guests maintained 
their ordered arrangement while Simonides was out of the room searching for the elusive 
Castor and Pollux. This prompts the following question: if the guests’ remains were so 
absolutely crushed that they defied recognition, how did Simonides know that they had not 
moved around while he was absent? It is a somewhat trivial detail, and the last thing I want is 
to ruin a perfectly good story with pedantry. Rather, my point is that Cicero’s explanation of 
the need for order in the MOL relies upon details of the pre-existing Simonidean origin myth 
to do the same job as the Auctor’s tailor-made queuing analogy. The Auctor’s imaginary 
scenario does not present the problem of misidentification as a result of a reordering outside 
of his control because the faces of his compliant (and, most importantly, invented) 
acquaintances remain mercifully intact. Cicero had to work much harder than the Auctor to 
make his exposition of the MOL’s rules follow on logically from the details of the 
Simonidean origin myth, since the Auctor could either rely upon standard justifications or 
invent suitable analogies. At points, when using the myth meant that the logic of his 
explanations for the rules was questionable, Cicero reverted to the accepted approach – in this 
case, by invoking the wax tablet metaphor and citing the ordered arrangement of letters on a 
tablet to justify, in one summative phrase, the rules concerning ordo, loci, and the placement 
of imagines. 
Cicero’s final efforts to weave Simonides into the fabric of rhetorical mnemonic 
theory come at De or. 2.357, where he re-introduces Simonides as follows: 
vidit enim hoc prudenter sive Simonides sive alius quis invenit, ea maxime animis effingi 
nostris, quae essent a sensu tradita atque impressa; acerrimum autem ex omnibus nostris 
sensibus esse sensum videndi; quare facillime animo teneri posse, si ea, quae perciperentur 
auribus aut cogitatione, etiam oculorum commendatione animis traderentur… 
Cic. De or. 2.357. 
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For it was discerned wisely, whether it was Simonides or someone else who made this 
discovery, that the things represented most accurately in our minds are those that are 
transmitted and imprinted by a sense; and moreover, that the keenest of all our senses is the 
sense of sight; and for this reason, things that are perceived through the ears or through the 
process of thought can be retained by the mind most easily if they are also transmitted to our 
minds via the mediation of the eyes…  
In this passage, Cicero presents and combines several concepts with great concision. He 
invokes the Simonidean origin myth once more, alongside the notion of the ‘mind’s eye’: a 
concept developed in relation to memory-formation by Aristotle, who likened mental images 
(φαντάσματα) contemplated by the primary sense faculty (το πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν, equivalent 
to the ‘mind’s eye’) to material bodies perceived by the sense of sight.133 Cicero draws on 
this same analogy to explain the remarkable retentive power of imagines as utilised in the 
MOL, reasoning that because the sense of sight is the most powerful of all the senses, words 
and ideas should be translated into imagines if they are to be memorised effectively using the 
MOL. Whereas Aristotle’s theory of memory-formation is concerned with natural mnemonic 
functions, in the context of memoria artificiosa, Cicero takes the notion that mental imagines 
are the principal media through which mnemonic content is naturally transmitted and uses it 
to justify the primacy and effectiveness of imagines in the MOL. Hence, says Cicero, ‘as if 
by seeing, we can retain things [in memory] that we could have scarcely embraced by 
thought’.134 He then goes on to summarise, again in an extremely compressed fashion, 
various precepts of the MOL, such as the rules that loci should be visible and spaced at 
moderate intervals, and that imagines should be clearly-defined, conspicuous, and striking.135  
Cicero’s invocation of the concept of the mind’s eye to explain the MOL was not 
necessarily novel. The Auctor had done almost the same when discussing rules for imagines 
and loci, by likening the faculty of thought (cogitatio) to the sense of sight (aspectus):  
Intervalla locorum mediocria placet esse, fere paulo plus aut minus pedum tricenum: nam ut 
aspectus item cogitatio minus valet, sive nimis procul removeris sive vehementer prope 
admoveris id, quod oportet videri. 
Rhet. Her. 3.32. 
 
133 For Aristotle, see Ch. II, p. 80-7. 
134 De or. 2.357: ut ea, quae cogitando complecti vix possemus, intuendo quasi teneremus. 
135 De or. 2.358. 
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The displacements of the loci should be moderate, for the most part a little more or less than 
30 feet; for like the sense of sight, the faculty of thought has less power if you have moved 
what needs to be viewed too far away, or if you have brought it objectionably close.136  
Here, the Auctor uses the mind’s eye to explain how imagines and the loci that contain them 
must be arranged to function effectively (Fig. 2, below, illustrates the basic principle). In fact, 
all the Auctor’s precepts for the MOL (summarised at Rhet. Her. 3.31-2 and 3.37) take the 
concept of the mind’s eye for granted, focussing exclusively on the visual characteristics of 
loci and imagines: size, separation, clarity, brightness, distinctiveness, and so on. Thus, the 
Auctor explains rules concerning the spacing of loci and the clarity of imagines using the 
same concept of the mind’s eye that Cicero introduces to explain a similar ruleset – although 
in Cicero’s case, the rules are covered extremely succinctly, because, as Antonius says, they 












136 Precisely what the Auctor means by intervalla locorum is not immediately transparent: does intervallum refer 
to the distance between individual loci, or to the distance between a given locus and the mind’s eye? The second 
half of the sentence seems to imply the latter, but I mean to retain the Auctor’s ambiguity with my use of 
‘displacement’, which should be understood in its modern mathematical sense as a vector defining the position 
of an object (in this case, a given locus) relative to the point from which it was moved (which the Auctor does 
not specify, but could be either another locus, or the notional ‘viewer’ – see Fig. 2).  
137 De or. 2.358: [res] nota et pervolgata.  
59 
 
At this point, once more, the underlying correspondence between the two authors 
ends. The Auctor only explicitly invokes the analogy between cogitatio and aspectus briefly, 
whereas Cicero deals with it at much greater length. Hence, the two approaches are a reversal 
of one another. The Auctor, who has stated that he is going to avoid tangential discussions of 
a philosophical nature, assumes that his readers will intuitively understand the visual nature 
of mental imagery, and focusses on explaining how to put the technical rules of the MOL into 
practice, even specifying an (apparently arbitrary) figure of thirty feet for the displacement of 
loci. Cicero, by contrast, wants to move away from this formulaic exposition of precepts, and 
does so by engaging in a more sustained discussion of a concept that has its roots in 
philosophy, namely the ‘mind’s eye’, which culminates with the axiomatic statement that, ‘a 
body (corpus) cannot be comprehended without a locus’.138 Cicero’s exposition of mental 
imagery and its relationship to the sense of sight, which is mostly in line with Aristotle’s 
theorising, is consequently much more developed than the Auctor’s. Cicero even includes an 
analogy involving a painter producing images (non-existent in the Auctor’s treatise) that is 
reminiscent of the parallels Aristotle drew between a mental image (φάντασμα) and a 
pictorial representation (ζῷον/εἰκών).139  
More overt than Cicero’s extraneous philosophising is, of course, his re-introduction 
at the start of De or. 2.357 (quoted above) of Simonides. With an allusion to the Simonidean 
origin myth, once again Cicero innovates on the Auctor’s unembellished statement of rules. 
Whether Cicero’s weaving of myth, philosophy, and technical advice from 2.357-8 is an 
overall success is, of course, a matter of individual judgement. There is absolutely no 
mention in Cicero’s original palace-collapse narrative of Simonides’ discovery of the 
superior strength of the sense of sight, and Antonius’ acknowledgement that ‘someone else’ 
(sive Simonides sive alius) might have made the discovery is a good indication that Cicero 
recognised any links between Simonides and the visual nature of memory were tenuous at 
best. On the other hand, in what is ultimately a short section on rhetorical memory, Cicero 
manages to combine an abundance of metaphors and multiple philosophical commonplaces, 
while linking them (however tendentiously) back to Simonides. Throughout, Cicero’s 
assumption that his readers are familiar with traditional explanations of memoria artificiosa 
 
138 For Latin text, see Kumaniecki (1969) 256, ad loc. Cicero’s statement here may hint at philosophical ideas 
concerning the prerequisites for flawless perception of external objects, as developed by philosophers such as 
Carneades: see Ch. II, p. 74-5. Cf. Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse (1996) 74-5, who assume that corpus is here 
just another Ciceronian synonym for imago. 
139 Compare Cic. De or. 2.358 with Arist. Mem. 450b-451a.  
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allows him to express the MOL’s precepts in a compressed format and to concentrate instead 
on establishing the unfamiliar Simonidean derivation. 
 
In sum, Cicero differentiates his treatment of memoria in De oratore from earlier Latin 
treatises in two key ways: by developing some of the links between the philosophical and 
rhetorical theories of mnemonic function that the Auctor took pains to avoid; and by 
introducing the Simonidean origin myth as a running narrative to help bind together the mix 
of technical precepts, philosophical concepts, and oratorical disciplinary discourse. The 
contribution of the Simonidean origin myth to the overarching narrative framework of De or. 
2.351-60 is illustrated neatly in Antonius’ closing statements on rhetorical memory. Having 
started the section by expressing a personal debt of gratitude to Simonides, he concludes with 
another personal touch, citing his own meetings with Charmadas and Metrodorus (in Athens 
and Asia respectively) as proof of the efficacy of the MOL’s rules – both, he says, recorded 
imagines in loci as if they were writing on wax.140 The wax tablet metaphor, which first 
appeared tagged incongruously onto the back end of the Simonidean origin myth, returns, this 
time as solid proof of the MOL’s methodological efficacy. The real-life (and relatively 
recent) exempla of Charmadas and Metrodorus contribute to the notion of a canon of 
impressive mnemonists stretching back to Simonides and the ‘golden age’ of oratory 
embodied by his notional coeval Themistocles, which in turn contributes to establishing the 
pedigree of the MOL as a time-honoured discipline. 
In this way, Cicero’s treatment of the MOL is less instructional than it is literary and 
faux-historical. Moreover, asking why Cicero chose to differentiate his exposition of the 
MOL from the norm exemplified by the Auctor helps answer the question of why he included 
Simonides in the first place: abandoning the Auctor’s approach to memoria enabled Cicero to 
abandon convention. We must bear in mind Crassus’ statement at De or. 3.95: the Romans, 
he says, await the arrival of sufficiently learned men (homines eruditi), who will be able to 
produce treatments of rhetoric in the Latin language that will match and surpass those of the 
Greeks; the current stock is simply not up to scratch. If we view Crassus’ remarks as, in fact, 
a commentary from the mouth of their author, Cicero, reviewing the rhetoricians of the 90s 
and 80s BCE (who were Cicero’s own teachers, and who presumably taught a curriculum 
similar to the one established in De inventione and Rhetorica ad Herennium), we can 
 
140 Cic. De or. 2.360. Full discussion of the passage: Ch. II, p. 104. 
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understand the reframing of memoria artificiosa as a reaction against the instructional 
programmes of Cicero’s youth some three decades earlier, which presumably remained 
prevalent.141 Part of Cicero’s goal, in writing De oratore, was to live up to the ideals for Latin 
rhetoric that he has Crassus espouse, to produce a treatment of the subject worthy of the most 
erudite of those homines eruditi. The incorporation of the Simonidean origin myth into the 
exegesis of memoria artificiosa, where it could be fused with both technical and 
philosophical precepts, helped him towards that goal, and contributed to the creation of a text 
that is less about the rules of the MOL (which are dispatched in a few sentences) than it is 
about ensuring De oratore stands as a literary edifice in its own right. That Cicero was 
successful in his bid to reformulate the standard approach to the ars memoriae is attested by 
the subsequent influence of his ‘Simonidean’ MOL. We see traces of Cicero’s version of the 
origin myth in works from Horace, to Quintilian, to authors of later antiquity, and beyond.142 
  
 
141 The degree to which Cicero’s Crassus reflects the views of the historical Crassus is debated: some scholars 
(e.g. Gruen (1990) 189-90) would like to believe that Cicero’s Crassus provides authentic commentary on the 
censorial edict of 92. Scepticism is, however, required. 
142 I am thinking here particularly of the dinner guests and the collapsing canopy in Horace’s Satire 2.8. For 
Simonidean allusions in this poem and Horace in general, see Marchesi (2005) 393-402, Harrison (2001) 264-7. 
The Simonidean myth continued to evolve in late antiquity: see, for example, Ammianus Marcellinus 16.8, 
where it is reported that Simonides acquired his mnemonic prowess by drinking certain potions. 
II 
Towards a chronology of memoria artificiosa 
In the previous chapter, I proposed that we reassess memoria artificiosa as it was taught at 
Rome by conceptualising the MOL as a technique designed to facilitate largely improvised 
oratorical performances, rather than verbatim memorisation. This reassessment demands, in 
turn, a rethinking of the longer history of artificial mnemonic techniques. The last chapter 
also highlighted instances where the concepts of memoria naturalis and memoria artificiosa 
infringed upon or were (to a certain extent) merged with one another, which raises the 
question of whether the borders between philosophical and rhetorical theories of mnemonic 
function were in fact more porous than has previously been assumed. Accordingly, the 
primary aim of this chapter is to provide a new chronology of rhetorical mnemonic theory 
prior to the first century BCE.  
The current timeline for the development of the subdiscipline of memoria within 
rhetoric is relatively crude, moving no further beyond the vague notion that, around the time 
when Hermagoras of Temnos was innovating doctrine, rhetoric was divided into five parts, 
with the key additions of ‘delivery’ and ‘memory’ (the latter in the form of the MOL).1 This 
gives the impression that the MOL appeared fully-formed in the rhetorical canon, a complete 
system developed at one point in time in isolation from other fields of knowledge, which was 
then transcribed and preserved for us in later Latin texts. Certainly, this is an impression 
endorsed by the Ciceronian narrative, whereby a single inventor – sive Simonides sive alius – 
enshrined the principles of the ars in stone (or, rather, in wax).2 Just as with all of Cicero’s 
chronologies – presented in his dialogic histories of oratory, philosophy, and so on – such a 
narrative belies an underlying complexity that would have been difficult to unpick even at the 
time of writing.3 This latent complexity is, for us, only accentuated by the dearth of surviving 
evidence for philosophical and rhetorical activity in the third and second centuries BCE. 
 
1 E.g. Kennedy (1963) 304. The idea is seemingly based on the inconclusive passage at Quint. Inst. 3.3.8-10. 
The approach of dividing rhetoric into subdisciplines dates from at least Aristotle’s Rhetoric, but it is unclear 
when the (Roman) five became canonical. Fortenbaugh suggests the codification of ‘memory’ as a subdiscipline 
can only have occurred after Theophrastus, who may have formulated a four-part rhetoric: Fortenbaugh (2005) 
72. 
2 Cic. De or. 2.357. 
3 Fox (2007) explores what he calls Cicero’s ‘philosophy of history’ in detail: see esp. p. 244-56 for Cicero’s 
history of the philosophical schools.  
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Nevertheless, enough remains to introduce nuance into, and in some cases overturn, our 
current overly simplistic narrative. 
Having already done away with the notion that Simonides played any historical role 
in the invention of the MOL, in the first section of this chapter, I examine the earliest 
surviving descriptions of artificial mnemonics – simple associative techniques, which are 
much less sophisticated than the fully-developed MOL. They appear to have been utilised by 
certain Sophists in the late fifth/early fourth century BCE, including Hippias of Elis, who 
consequently receives criticism from Plato’s Socrates. Platonic criticisms of Sophistic 
techniques do not, however, mean that philosophical theories of memory had no influence on 
the development of memoria artificiosa. There is in fact good reason to believe that an 
intersection may have existed: there are three identifiable concepts (all of which were 
touched upon in the previous chapter and all of which have their roots in Greek philosophy) 
in the expositions of memoria artificiosa supplied by the Auctor ad Herennium and Cicero. 
The origins of these concepts are discussed in turn, beginning with the ‘wax tablet’, moving 
on to the ‘mind’s eye’, and finishing with the ‘ars/natura axiom’. 
The second section progresses to examine the Aristotelian evidence for the existence 
of mnemonic techniques in the fourth century. Numerous scholars have used this evidence to 
conclude that Aristotle had some role in developing the MOL, but my analysis casts doubt 
upon the validity of that claim. Certainly, mnemonic techniques that associated image and 
space (relatively early ‘τόποι-mnemonics’) did exist in this period. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s 
references to them are generally incidental: they do not indicate the presence of the fully-
fledged oratorically-oriented mnemonic theory that appears in the later Roman texts, and we 
should not force such a reading onto them. The third section of this chapter proceeds to pose 
questions about when and where, in the interval between Aristotle and the Auctor ad 
Herennium, basic τόποι-mnemonics may have developed into the systematic τέχνη that is the 
Latin MOL. I focus on interactions between rhetoricians and philosophers of three important 
Hellenistic schools of philosophy, namely the Epicureans, the Stoics, and the Academic 
Sceptics.4 Based on the (primarily Ciceronian) evidence, I suggest that the codification of the 
rhetorical mnemonic theory presented in the Rhetorica ad Herennium is most likely to have 
 
4 The Peripatetics appear to have had little to say on memory in this period, whether because none of their 
writings have survived, or because they failed ‘to exploit Aristotle’s work or develop it in a positive way’: 
Gottschalk (1998) 292. 
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taken place in the late second century BCE, on the fringes of the Sceptical Academy, where 
philosophical instruction seems to have embraced rhetorical pedagogy.  
The fourth section develops this suggestion by investigating two prominent Academic 
Sceptics who were also renowned mnemonists: Charmadas of Athens (section 4.a.) and 
Metrodorus of Scepsis (section 4.b.). I posit that we should envision the existence of a 
spectrum of artes memoriae in the late second century, ranging from the simplest of 
associative techniques, through the oratorical MOL, right up to the most complex and 
intricate methods, such as the astrological variation of the MOL devised by the erstwhile 
Academic Sceptic Metrodorus. For rhetoricians and orators, the most effective of these 
techniques was the standard MOL, which was codified and survived as a subdiscipline of the 
Latin ars rhetorica. The survival of the oratorical MOL in Roman ludi does not, however, 
rule out the existence of other contemporaneous mnemonic systems: Metrodorus, whose 
patron was Mithridates VI, may even have utilised his own artificial techniques to perform 
encomiastic speeches and virtuoso feats of memory before audiences at the court of the 
polyglot king.  
Some of my hypotheses in this chapter are obviously more speculative than others. 
Consequently, when in the fifth section of this chapter I propose a revised chronology of 
memoria artificiosa, I do so with the caveat that it can only be a ‘model of best fit’, derived 
from a combination of the available ancient evidence and the novel insights into mnemonic 
techniques we have gleaned from recent studies in modern cognitive science. Despite this 
limitation, the chapter adds detail and nuance to our understanding of how memoria 
artificiosa influenced, and was influenced by, various schools of ancient intellectual thought. 
The revised chronology is presented in graphical format in Fig. 3 at the end of the chapter (p. 
116, described p. 111-5). The reader may find this chart helpful as a point of reference 
throughout. 
 
1. Evidence of philosophical concepts in the MOL 
It will be worthwhile to summarise here at the outset the two chronologies of the 
development of memoria artificiosa that have been most influential on previous scholarship, 
which were formulated (as discussed earlier in relation to Simonides) by Yates and Small. 
The traditional narrative proposed by Yates in The Art of Memory remains attractive for its 
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relative simplicity, which leaves scope for individual interpretation.5 Simonides is a key 
figure at the start of Yates’ chronology (p. 28-9). She moves on to cite Plato’s caricature of 
the Sophist Hippias as evidence of early practitioners of artificial mnemonics, even 
wondering whether novel techniques might not have been a key factor in the success of 
Sophistic teaching (p. 30-1). Aristotle, according to Yates, did not make major advances in 
the MOL, but referred to the techniques as ‘illustrations of his argument’ (p. 35). She posits 
the existence of handbooks on mnemonics written by Metrodorus of Scepsis (p. 39-42) and 
suggests that thereafter Greek techniques were introduced along with other rhetorical 
teachings to Rome, where Cicero, thanks to his reading of Platonic philosophy, recognised 
that memoria was more than just a rigid tool to be exploited by orators (p. 43-6).  
Small, in Wax Tablets of the Mind, proposes a rather different developmental model, 
based on the emergence and spread of written texts.6 As mentioned, Small believes it 
plausible that Simonides invented the MOL, on the grounds that he was one of the first to 
compose written poetry, which then required memorising (p. 73-4, 91-2). This idea, that 
‘mnemotechnics is very much an art of literacy for the highly literate’ (p. 89), propels the 
development of memoria artificiosa down the centuries of Small’s timeline: she argues that 
an increasing volume of written material was not accompanied by an adequate increase in the 
efficiency of physical systems of organisation, storage, and retrieval, and that this deficit led 
to the emergence of mnemonic techniques as reliable mental alternatives (p. 74). Finally, she 
argues that memoria only became a rhetorical discipline in the late second century, and that 
the use of buildings as loci, as recommended by the Auctor’s MOL, was a Roman innovation 
(p. 85-90).7  
I have already spelled out the issues with Yates’ and Small’s conclusions regarding 
Simonides’ role as the inventor of the MOL. The ‘invention of Simonides’ (in both senses of 
the phrase) was a later creation.8 Yet it is not just Simonides who had little to do with the 
development of memoria artificiosa, but poets in general. Small’s chronology in particular 
 
5 Yates (1966) Ch. 1-2. 
6 Small (1997) esp. Ch. 7-9. 
7 Aside from Yates and Small, a third frequently-cited source is Carruthers’ The Book of Memory (2008), which 
focuses primarily on the reception of classical mnemonic techniques in the mediaeval and renaissance periods. 
This later focus means that Carruthers tends to conflate important distinctions between earlier theories of 
rhetorical and philosophical memory (e.g. p. 24-5 and 32-3, where she conflates early philosophical ‘seal in 
wax’ metaphors with later rhetorical ‘writing in wax’ metaphors, missing some of the key distinctions explored 
in this, and the previous, chapter). 
8 See p. 49-52. 
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relies on the method’s poetic origins. Beginning from the point at which the dominant form 
of poetic composition moved from oral to written, she correlates the ongoing development of 
mnemonic techniques to the increasing prevalence of large quantities of written material and 
interprets the evidence in a way that allows her to deduce cause and effect. This deduction 
ultimately rests on the premise that the prevalence of written records creates a demand for 
accurate (verbal) reproduction of those records, and while I agree that this may well be the 
case – and that less emphasis seems to be placed on verbatim recall in oral cultures – I cannot 
see that there is any contemporaneous evidence to suggest that this was the driving force 
behind the development of Greek and Roman theories of rhetorical memory.9  
Our earliest surviving evidence for the existence of basic mnemonic techniques 
illustrates the point that artificial mnemonics were, from the start, the province of those who 
argued, lectured, and orated for a living, rather than poets who composed verse on the page. It 
comes from a section on memory in the Dissoi logoi, which has been dated to the late 
fifth/early fourth century BCE.10 From the nature of its content, the text appears to have 
originated in the Sophistic tradition, since it deals with the strengths of opposing arguments 
concerning such subjects as the Good and the Bad, the Just and the Unjust, and so on. The 
fragmentary section prior to the one on memory initiates a discussion of the necessary traits 
and skills of the politically active wise man (ὁ σοφός); this is perhaps significant for the 
opening of the memory section, since it is stated here that excellent mnemonic ability is 
extremely beneficial for both φιλοσοφία and σοφία, terms which have been interpreted in this 
context as referring, on the one hand, to the theoretical abilities of the wise man (φιλοσοφία) 
and, on the other, to the application of these theoretical abilities to civic life (σοφία).11 This 
interpretation would suggest that the author considered mnemonic techniques useful for both 
intellectual pursuits and practical, real-world applications. On the other hand, if we interpret 
φιλοσοφία in a stricter disciplinary sense, as ‘philosophy’ (i.e. the discipline of philosophers, 
as opposed to σοφία, the discipline of Sophists), then this passage may provide a precedent 
 
9 For Parry and Lord’s classic study of inaccurate ‘verbatim’ recall among oral poets, see Lord (1960) 20-29 and 
Ch. 7 (where the findings are applied to Homeric Greece). For a summary of progress since Parry and Lord, plus 
a detailed study of the transformation of oral epic into text, see Ready (2019) Ch. 3. 
10 For the text, see Becker and Scholz (2004) 90. The frequently accepted dating of 404/3-390 BCE is uncertain. 
See Bailey (2008) 249 and Becker and Scholz (2004) 16, with Conley (1985) 59-65; more recently, Maso has 
proposed an earlier dating of the mid-fifth century, when the Sophistic approach was just beginning to spread, 
although this is as hypothetical as previous suggestions: Maso (2018) 1-20. Conversely, Molinelli argues for the 
mid-fourth century: Molinelli (2018) 35-44. 
11 Dissoi logoi 9.1. See Sprague (1968) 166-7, Becker and Scholz (2004) 111. 
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for the approach of certain Academic Sceptics like Charmadas of Athens, who (as I argue 
below) appears to have incorporated mnemonics into his philosophical method.12 The section 
on memory comprises a list of techniques: first, in order to improve mnemonic retention, 
your attention must be focussed; second, you must repeat material multiple times; and third, 
you should use associative techniques, such as memorising the name Chrysippus by 
visualising the man riding a golden horse, since χρυσός + ἵππος = Χρύσιππος, or memorising 
the concept of courage by thinking of Ares or Achilles; unfortunately, the fragment then 
breaks off.13  
There are obvious parallels between the techniques in the Dissoi logoi and those in the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium. The Auctor also instructs that the mind must be focussed and that 
repetition is essential. The characteristics of the mnemonic images (such as the golden horse) 
in the Dissoi logoi likewise possess some striking resemblances to the bizarre details of the 
Auctor’s own worked example for the creation of imagines, in which he combines visuals 
into a distinctive and unnatural scenario, while concrete words and familiar people act as 
substitutes for material that would otherwise be difficult to visualise.14 We cannot know, of 
course, what other advice for memorising was included in the fragmentary Dissoi logoi: did 
τόποι feature as the equivalent of the Auctor’s loci?  
In my view, the discrete nature of the techniques listed in the Dissoi logoi indicates 
that even if other elements of the MOL were included in the section, the whole cannot have 
constituted a comprehensive system of the type presented in Rhetorica ad Herennium. 
Explanations and justifications of the MOL’s rules are central to the Auctor’s exposition of 
rhetorical memory. In contrast, in the Dissoi logoi, there are two simple examples for 
recalling names and two for recalling abstract nouns, while each mnemonic technique – 
attention, repetition, association, and so on – features as an item on a list, rather than as an 
integral component of a method that relies upon its other components to be effective (as, for 
example, the creation of memorable imagines relies intrinsically upon their repetition to 
promote retention in the Auctor’s MOL).15 What we have in the Dissoi logoi are, perhaps, 
some of the elements that were combined to form a fully-functional MOL, but they are far 
from a developed system tailored to the memorisation of oratorical speeches. Further, given 
 
12 For the narrow interpretation of φιλοσοφία, see Molinelli (2018) 255-6. For Charmadas, below, p. 102-6. 
13 Dissoi logoi 9.2-6. 
14 Rhet. Her. 3.33.  
15 See Rhet. Her. 3.37. 
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that the purpose of the Dissoi logoi is obscure, it cannot be concluded that mnemonic 
techniques were a key feature of, or integral to, Sophistic doctrine.16 We know that individual 
Sophists, such as Hippias of Elis, had their own mnemonic methods for memorising different 
material: according to Plato’s Socrates, Hippias used his mnemonic skills for memorising 
long lists of items, such as names.17 But Socrates treats Hippias’ μνημονικὸν τέχνημα as 
something of a party trick, a sideshow rather than a method that was intrinsic to the Sophistic 
approach (although this trivialisation may, of course, be part of Plato’s programmatic 
denigration of Sophistic teaching).18 Blum rightly points out that the associative techniques in 
the Dissoi logoi do not contain provisions for the sequential memorisation of lists and, 
consequently, they cannot have been exactly the same as Hippias’ μνημονικὸν τέχνημα.19 
Overall, during this early period, the evidence points to the existence of a range of basic 
mnemonic techniques, which were put to varying use (practical or otherwise) depending on 
the practitioner’s needs. 
 
1.a. The wax tablet 
While Plato may not have shared Hippias’ interest in cultivating mnemonic prowess, he (and 
subsequently Aristotle) was very much preoccupied by the relationship between memory and 
knowledge – a preoccupation that did not trouble later rhetoricians and orators and one 
which, in the interests of concision, this chapter does not address in any great depth.20 
Nevertheless, the first surviving reference to the wax-like ‘fabric’ of memory (defined as the 
region where memories are stored in one’s ψυχή or animus) comes from Plato’s Theaetetus. 
This wax metaphor became, as the first chapter illustrated, a common – probably the most 
common – conceptualisation of natural mnemonic function in the Greek and Roman world. 
The notion of wax at ‘the heart of the soul’ (τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ) may have existed before 
Plato, because (as Socrates tells us) there was a perceived similarity between the words κέαρ 
 
16 Bailey (2008) 249-50 even suggests that the Dissoi logoi may be a ‘heavy-handed spoof’. 
17 Pl. Hp. Mai. 285d-286a, cf. Hp. Min. 368d, Xen. Symp. 4.62. 
18 On the Sophists, Plato, and Socrates, see Broadie (2003) 73-97. 
19 Blum (1969) 50. 
20 I am referring to Platonic ‘recollection’ (as formulated in the Meno and Phaedo) and subsequent debates over 
the role of remembering in knowledge-formation. For a full discussion, see Scott (1995) Ch. 1-6. The reception 
of Plato’s theory of recollection by later philosophers is of occasional tangential importance to my study: see 
below, p. 86 and p. 103. 
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or κῆρ (heart) and κηρός (wax).21 In the relevant passage, Plato’s Socrates asks Theaetetus to 
assume that Mnemosyne, the god-given gift of memory, is a block of wax (κήρινον 
ἐκμαγεῖον) in the soul. The wax is of different qualities in accordance with an individual’s 
capacity to remember. We hold the wax under perceptions and thoughts, which are imprinted 
upon it just like the stamps from seal rings (δακτυλίων σημεῖα). Socrates explains that a 
correct memorial imprint (τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς) that matches what you know (from the past) to 
what you perceive (in the present) leads to the formation of a true judgement.22 Moreover, 
people say that when the wax at the heart of a man’s soul is just right – deep and smooth and 
receptive – the impressions created by perceptions are imprinted properly.23 Thus Socrates’ 
metaphor envisions the waxy element at the heart of the soul as a plastic fabric, capable in 
wise men of holding an accurate image of reality securely. From this waxy element, if 
perfectly balanced, wisdom flows.  
Aristotle, who composed the most important surviving philosophical treatise on 
memory, De memoria et reminiscentia (part of the Parva naturalia), was also exercised by 
the question of what it means to remember something that is not present (whether object, 
sensation, or thought).24 He repeated the idea that the relationship between an original 
sensation and the sensation remembered is the same as the relationship between a signet ring 
(δακτύλιος) and its impression (τύπος) in wax, while construing the metaphor in a way that 
seems to suggest the creation of memories has a physical element and makes a direct 
impression upon the mind, or at least that the physical constitution of an individual plays a 
major role in memory retention.25 For our purposes, the most important aspect of the Platonic 
and Aristotelian formulations of the wax tablet metaphor is that the philosophers were 
 
21 See Pl. Tht. 191c-e, 194c-e. Whether Socrates is serious or not is another matter; he cites Homer as his 
authority for the heart/wax similarity, based on the Homeric description of a heart as ‘rough’ or ‘shaggy’ 
(λάσιον κῆρ: Hom. Il. 2.851). For the wax tablet metaphor in other genres of Greek literature, see Agócs (2019) 
72-81. Agócs (p. 74) states that the tablet metaphor, by the time it appeared in extant poetry, ‘was certainly 
conventional and clichéd (if hardly dead)’.  
22 Pl. Tht. 191e-192c. 
23 Tht. 194c-e. Woolf makes the interesting argument that this paradigm, about men he dubs ‘good waxers’ and 
‘bad waxers’, fails to explain the reality of false belief, so the wax tablet model fails as an explanation of the 
nature of thought: see Woolf (2004) 588-604. 
24 There has been some debate over whether Aristotle is interested strictly in the philosophy of remembering, or 
in the ‘science’ of memory: see Bloch (2007) 56-7. The distinction seems to me somewhat meaningless in the 
ancient context. 
25 Arist. Mem. 450b. For the considerable debate regarding Aristotle’s perception of the physicality of memory-
formation, see Bloch (2007) 65-7. 
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attempting to model the natural processes of memory formation and not, as later rhetoricians 
would do, the artificial creation and retrieval of mnemonic imagery. 
Bearing these philosophical conceptualisations of the wax-like fabric of memory in 
mind, consider the wax tablet metaphor as deployed by the Auctor ad Herennium at Rhet. 
Her. 3.30. The Auctor states that, in the MOL, ‘the loci are extremely similar to the wax or 
the parchment, the imagines to the letters, the arrangement and placement of imagines to the 
writing, and the delivery to the reading’ (Latin text quoted Ch. I, p. 54). This formulation has 
been seen by some scholars as a straightforward replication of Platonic and Aristotelian 
usage.26 There are, however, important differences that indicate how the wax tablet has been 
tailored specifically to explain the MOL, the most distinctive of which is the switch between 
models of memory-formation, from passive to active. By this I mean that the philosophical 
metaphor presents the ‘wax at the heart of the soul’ as a receptive substance upon which 
external forces (sensory impressions) act, in the manner of a seal ring. The seal ring has a set 
of properties that cannot be altered by the individual who is forming the memory and the 
metaphor models a natural process over which the individual has no control.27 In contrast, the 
Auctor’s metaphor ascribes a great deal of agency to the individual who is creating the 
memory. When the Auctor develops the metaphor at Rhet. Her. 3.31, in reference to the 
permanence of loci, he reasons that just as the letters on a wax tablet can be erased and the 
underlying wax can be reused, so imagines can be erased and new ones can be placed in the 
underlying loci. Thus, it is in the practitioner’s power to control what letters/imagines are 
inscribed upon the wax/loci in his mind, and although these imagines and loci must be 
created according to the rules of the MOL, they will all have properties unique to the 
individual practitioner, in the same way (we might say) as handwriting has properties unique 
to its producer.  
The Auctor’s formulation of the wax tablet metaphor almost goes so far as to do away 
with the wax entirely, introducing parchment as an alternative (carta becomes 
interchangeable with cera).28 Parchment is not plastic like wax; it cannot be erased or 
reformed as simply, and yet, as far as the act of inscribing is concerned, it is easier to ink 
letters onto parchment than it is to scratch them into wax. Thus, we can say that the Auctor 
 
26 E.g. Carruthers (2008) 24-5, 32-3; Nikulin (2015) 75. 
27 For the element of passivity in Plato’s wax metaphor, see Woolf (2004) 595-6. 
28 Rhet. Her. 3.30: Nam loci cerae aut cartae simillimi sunt… 
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primarily used the metaphor to demonstrate how the MOL makes material easy to encode in 
memory, rather than because he was interested in it as a model of natural memory-formation. 
Although writing using a stylus on wax was common in both fourth-century Greece and first 
century Rome, it is only in the rhetorical context that we see the metaphor used. Thus, the 
Auctor’s adaptation of the wax tablet metaphor, which replaces nature’s seal ring with the 
mnemonist’s stylus, emphasises the practical applicability of the rules, and reminds us that 
the MOL was valued for its utility in the forum. It helped the orator retain and retrieve 
information and, consequently, to maintain control of his speech and his audience.  
 
1.b. The mind’s eye 
In the first chapter, I introduced the ‘mind’s eye’ as a concept regularly invoked by ancient 
thinkers (explicitly or implicitly) to explain how mental imagery exists in relation to the 
sensible part of the mind.29 The Auctor ad Herennium implicitly assumes his readers 
understand that we engage in some processes of thought with the aid of an internal eye, 
which operates in a similar way to our external eyes, viewing and reviewing mental imagery, 
including memories, just as our external eyes view the physical world. In De oratore, Cicero 
makes the connection more explicit, asserting the primacy of the sense of sight and alluding 
to some of the philosophical discussions regarding the form and function of mnemonic 
mental imagery – that is, mental images that serve as memories. The presence in the MOL of 
the idea that we can review mental imagines as if we are using our eyes has been commented 
upon before: in her influential portrayal of ‘The Roman House as Memory Theater’, 
Bergmann recognises the importance of ‘a moving eye or body’ to the MOL, although she 
does not make the connection to the pre-existing philosophical conceptualisation of how 
memory works or how one ‘senses’ or ‘perceives’ memories.30 Given the evidence from the 
Auctor and from later treatises such as Quintilian’s Institutio, I doubt that ancient rhetoricians 
routinely made or expanded upon that connection either – Cicero’s approach is atypical. It is, 
nevertheless, worth examining ancient philosophical discourse concerning the relationship 
between mental images and memories, to assess the possibility that such discourse influenced 
the development of memoria artificiosa at some earlier stage. 
 
29 See discussion, p. 56-9. 
30 Bergmann (1994) 226. 
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Our most complete discussion of the topic of natural memory formation is again De 
memoria, where Aristotle explores the factors that might affect the perceptive faculty of the 
mind’s eye as it reviews mental images qua memories. He seems to have conceived 
‘remembering’ as an almost exclusively visual process. Firstly, he invokes the precept that 
thought requires φαντάσματα, ‘mental images’.31 This assertion is based on a discussion of 
imagination in De anima, where Aristotle reasons that, like a hand manipulates objects in 
order to do work, the mind manipulates sensible forms, which are similar to perceptions of 
physical objects except that they are without matter. He defines these sensible objects as 
φαντάσματα; the mind must employ them in order to ‘think’ anything.32 When it comes to his 
discussion of memory, Aristotle speaks of internally placing a quantity ‘before one’s eyes’ 
(πρὸ ὀμμάτων) and says that, because the processes of memory take place in and belong to 
the ‘primary sense-faculty’ (το πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν), just as it is impossible to think without 
φαντάσματα, so too is it impossible to experience a memory without them. When addressing 
the nature of memories, and the question of whether a memory originates from a mental 
image of a physical object or is formed directly from the object itself, Aristotle uses the 
metaphor of a portrait painted on a panel: the portrait is at once a lifelike picture (ζῷον) and a 
representative likeness (εἰκών); that is to say, we regard these φαντάσματα like portraits, both 
as objects of contemplation themselves and as mental representations of the original objects. 
Significantly, this metaphor leads Aristotle to equate φαντάσματα with μνημονεύματα, 
‘mnemonic signs’.33 
There are multiple factors, however, that will affect the accuracy with which the 
mind’s eye perceives μνημονεύματα. To explain these factors, Aristotle combines the 
concepts of the mind’s eye and the wax tablet: he says that if the original external 
φαντάσματα have not been impressed accurately upon the waxy surface of memory, they will 
not be retained or re-perceived accurately when we engage in the process of remembering.34 
The surface can be too fluid, like water, so that even strong stimuli do not impress permanent 
memories upon it –  this is the case in those with a disability, or in the young and the old, 
who are in a changing state of growth or decay. Conversely, the receiving surface in the 
 
31 Arist. Mem. 450a1. 
32 De an. 432a5-14. 
33 Mem. 450a1-15, 450b20-30. 
34 Mem. 450b1-12. 
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minds of the slow-witted is so hard that impressions cannot be made in the first place.35 Thus, 
according to Aristotle, excessive softness or hardness leads to poor mnemonic retention. As 
already mentioned, Plato’s Socrates had made similar stipulations, that the ‘wax at the heart 
of the soul’ must be deep and abundant and smooth for correct mnemonic impressions to be 
formed. Further, in Theaetetus, Socrates expands upon the necessary conditions for 
mnemonic retention, stating that the wax must be clean and contain no impurities in order to 
preserve the clarity of memories; that it must be neither too soft nor too hard, to preserve 
definition; and that there must be enough wax, to avoid overcrowding and consequent 
blurring.36 We might generalise these Platonic and Aristotelian explanations of natural 
memory, then, with the statement that, for accurate mnemonic formation and retention, 
conditions in the mind have to be ‘just right’. There is, as it were, a ‘Goldilocks zone’ for 
memories, where the conditions are just right for the accurate formation, storage, retrieval, 
and perception of mnemonic impressions.37 
In the above models, the accuracy of memory formation and retention is determined 
by a set of parameters, including the consistency of the wax-like fabric of memory and the 
ability of the mind’s eye to perceive the mnemonic images impressed therein. As I suggest 
below, according to the Auctor ad Herennium, the accuracy of memory formation and 
retention in the MOL is also determined by a set of similar parameters. Certain concepts 
underlying the theory of natural memory seem to have been adopted and adapted in the 
rhetorical theory of artificial memory – but the mechanisms by which these ideas were 
transmitted from philosophy into rhetoric, if indeed that is what happened, are far from 
transparent. Various Hellenistic schools of philosophy interpreted earlier theories about 
memory in different ways, adopting some aspects and discarding others.  
The Stoics’ approach to memory is particularly illustrative of this point, since the 
school seems prima facie to have followed the well-worn path of Plato and Aristotle by 
introducing the wax tablet analogy to describe how impressions are formed in the mind. Yet 
the Stoics derived quite different parameters for determining the accuracy of mnemonic 
 
35 Cf. Mem. 453b1-8, where Aristotle states that a disproportionately heavy head leads to pressure on the 
primary sense faculty and subsequent poor mnemonic retention (e.g. in babies and dwarves) – that is, the body 
must also possess correct proportions for memory to function effectively. 
36 Pl. Tht. 194c-195a. 
37 I have borrowed the concept of a ‘Goldilocks zone’ from astrophysics, where it is standard shorthand for the 
‘circumstellar habitable zone’, the area of space around a star defined by certain parameters amenable to life 
(e.g. to support life, an exoplanet must be neither too close nor too far from its solar heat source). 
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content. They equated a true impression to an ‘imprinting in the soul’ (τύπωσις ἐν ψυχῇ): 
Diogenes Laertius states that the term τύπωσις derives directly from the τύπος that a seal ring 
leaves in wax.38 Whereas Aristotle used both φαντασία and φάντασμα to denote mental 
images (including a mental image that also represented a memory, μνημόνευμα), the Stoics 
employed a refined definition.39 They reserved the term φάντασμα to denote imaginary 
figments produced by the mind, or unreliable hallucinations produced by inebriation or 
dreams; they also distinguished two types of φαντασίαι (impressions received from the 
external world), calling those impressions that could be apprehended directly by the senses 
‘cataleptic’ and those that could not ‘non-cataleptic’.40 Only a cataleptic impression could be 
assigned the value of truth and, for this reason, it had to meet strict criteria: namely, that it 
was derived from a real object, that it was a faithful representation of that object, and that it 
had been impressed upon the senses accurately.41 Only the re-presentation of a sensible object 
that had produced a cataleptic impression would result in a replicate affection of the soul, that 
is, a memory.42 Anything that qualified as a memory was therefore, a priori, true. Thus, by 
introducing catalepsis into their discussions of memory formation and retention, the Stoics 
ostensibly sidestepped the need to define parameters that would lead to the formation of 
accurate mnemonic impressions in the way that Aristotle had done. In addition, I note that 
according to this strict Stoic definition, artificially fabricated mental images cannot qualify as 
‘memories’ at all. 
When it came to defining parameters for accurate perception, the Academic Sceptics 
took a significantly different approach from the Stoics, devising even more detailed 
specifications than Aristotle. Unfortunately, we have no full discussion concerning memory 
formation from a Sceptical standpoint, so we do not know whether the Sceptics subscribed to 
the idea that conditions in the mind had to be ‘just right’ for accurate mnemonic retention.43 
We can, however, look to the Sceptical theory of sensory perception as established by 
Carneades, scholarch of the Sceptical Academy in the mid-second century BCE, for an 
 
38 Diog. Laert. 7.45-6. Cf. Cic. Acad. 1.40, and below, p. 89-90, for Epicurean usage. 
39 Arist. Mem. 450b25-39. 
40 Diog. Laert. 7.50, cf. Cic. Acad. 2.51-4. 
41 Diog. Laert. 7.46. My summary is an oversimplification of Stoic epistemology: for a thorough exposition, see 
Hankinson (2003) 60-6.  
42 Sext. Emp. Math. 7.219-20. 
43 Although there are circumstantial reasons to believe this was the case: Sceptics such as Charmadas and 
Metrodorus seem to have adopted the wax tablet model of memory formation (see below, sections 4.a. and 4.b.). 
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indication of the Sceptics’ approach to mental images more generally. Carneades described a 
set of necessary conditions for flawless perception of external objects when explaining his 
thesis of ‘the probable’ (τὸ πιθανόν).44 His argument, as presented by Sextus Empiricus, 
suggests that in order for us to be able to trust our judgement of an impression (of an object, 
say) received via our senses from the external world, we must test each of the elements that 
have combined to form that impression against various criteria: for our perception to be 
flawless, we must take into account factors such as the acuity of our vision, our mood, and 
our current activity; as regards the object we are observing, we must consider the size of the 
object (it should not be too small), the medium through which the observation is being made 
(e.g. air/water), the brightness of the atmosphere surrounding the object (it should not be too 
dark), the interval between objects (it should not be too small), the displacement of the object 
from us (it should not be too great), the surroundings of the object (they should not be too 
vast), and the amount of time we have allowed for the act of observing.45 For Carneades, 
then, flawless perception of an object via the eyes of the body could only occur if conditions 
were just right. His parameters defined, as it were, a Goldilocks zone for the formation of 
accurate mental images. Since memories were typically understood to be a specific subset of 
mental imagery, it is not implausible that Carneades, or others in his school, formulated 
similar criteria for the accurate perception of memories via the mind’s eye, just as Plato and 
Aristotle had done before them. 
As in the previous section on the wax tablet, we can now consider the Auctor’s 
invocation of the concept of the mind’s eye, which occurs at Rhet. Her. 3.32 (quoted Ch. I, p. 
57-8), with reference to the earlier Hellenistic ideas outlined above. The Auctor states that, in 
the MOL, the displacements of loci should be moderate, because the faculty of thought 
(cogitatio) is just like the sense of sight (aspectus), which cannot perceive objects if they are 
too close or too far away. Carneades’ argument regarding flawless perception of an object 
relies upon the same logic: if an object we are observing is not presented in the correct 
conditions, it cannot be brought into focus and may be perceived inaccurately. Whereas 
Carneades invokes the concept of the mind’s eye to explain the necessary conditions for 
reliable sensory perception of the external world, the Auctor uses it to justify one of his rules 
for the creation of imaginary loci: namely, that they should be created with intervalla of 
 
44 For Carneades’ concept of τὸ πιθανόν, see below, p. 95. 
45 Sext. Emp. Math. 7.166-84, esp. 7.183. 
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around 30 feet.46 The 30-foot rule is directly comparable with Carneades’ insistence that the 
distance of an observable object from the eyes of the body must not be too great (nor, 
conversely, too small) for it to be perceived and judged accurately.  
The fact that the Auctor justifies one of his mnemonic rules with reasoning 
reminiscent of any given philosopher’s logic would not, by itself, be particularly indicative of 
anything – yet he does so time and again. For the Auctor, as for Aristotle, accurate mnemonic 
retention and retrieval demand optimal conditions. This statement is borne out when we 
examine the Auctor’s rules for the creation of memorable loci collectively: they are designed 
to foster the creation of optimal mnemonic content, loci that will not be forgotten. The end 
result is the definition of a Goldilocks zone for loci – that is, the rules define parameters 
amenable to mnemonic retention, which are designed to aid the practitioner in his search for 
loci that are ‘just right’ for use in the MOL. Here are the Auctor’s rules for the creation of 
loci, examined in turn: 
• Rhet. Her. 3.31: ‘Again, it is more effective to arrange loci in a deserted area than in a 
crowded one, on the grounds that a crowding and swarming of people disorders and 
weakens the impressions of the imagines, while solitude preserves the integral shapes 
of the likenesses’.47 
This rule defines a Goldilocks zone for the density of loci that ensures imagines do not 
overlap or become confused. It is directly comparable with Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
stipulations that the wax-like substance of one’s memory must be pure and abundant, to 
preserve distinctiveness and avoid overcrowding of mental images; and again, with 
Carneades’ tenet that the intervals between perceptible objects must not be too small.48 
• Rhet. Her. 3.31: ‘It is also necessary that loci be of moderate size and medium extent: 
for exceedingly large loci render imagines indistinct, while excessively narrow loci 
often seem incapable of holding the arrangement of imagines’. 
This rule defines a Goldilocks zone for the spatial properties of loci that ensures they are 
neither too large, nor too small. It is comparable with Plato’s and Aristotle’s stipulations that 
 
46 See p. 57-8. 
47 For Latin text, see Calboli (2020) 268-9, ad loc. 
48 Re Carneades, Sext. Emp. Math. 7.183 reads φυλοκρινοῦμεν […] τὸ δὲ διάστημα, μὴ συγκέχυται, lit. ‘we 
distinguish […] the interval, that it is not poured-together/confused’ (Greek text: Mutschmann (1914)). The key 
idea is that a sufficient interval ensures images do not become blurred. 
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the wax-like substance of memory be copious enough to contain many impressions; and 
conversely, with Carneades’ tenet that the amount of space surrounding a perceptible object 
must not be too vast. 
• Rhet. Her. 3.32: ‘It is necessary that loci be neither excessively bright nor 
objectionably dark, so that the imagines are neither rendered unintelligible by 
shadows nor too glittering by brightness’.  
This rule defines a Goldilocks zone for the luminance of loci that ensures they are neither too 
dim, not too bright. It is comparable with Plato’s and Aristotle’s stipulation that the wax-like 
substance of memory, as the environment in which mental images are impressed and stored, 
must be of the right consistency in order to preserve clarity; and even more so, with 
Carneades’ point that the environment around a perceptible object must not be too dark. 
Considered as a group, the above rules define a set of parameters for the creation of loci that 
ensures they are ‘just right’ for the optimal retention of mnemonic content. 
Although the link between the Auctor’s definition of a Goldilocks zone for loci and 
ancient philosophical theories concerning the optimal conditions for perception and/or the 
retention of memories is by no means a one-to-one correspondence, I do not think it is too 
much of a stretch to say that Plato and Aristotle, at least, also believed that an individual’s 
memory and its content must be constituted ‘just right’ to function in an optimal fashion (we 
have no directly comparable evidence for Carneades’ views). The resemblance between the 
Platonic and Aristotelian conditions for reliable mnemonic retention and the Auctor’s list of 
rules defining a Goldilocks zone for loci is therefore striking, even though the Auctor’s rules 
are not grounded on any explicit philosophical precepts. For the philosophers, the ‘wax at the 
heart of the soul’ had to be of the right consistency, it had to possess plenty of room for 
impressions, it had to be clean; for the Auctor, loci had to be spacious, they had to be 
separated, they had to be well-lit. The philosophers established conditions for mnemonic 
wax; the Auctor established conditions for wax-like mnemonic loci. 
 
1.c. The ars/natura axiom 
The mnemonic rules discussed above concern the creation of loci; the Auctor also details 
rules for the creation of imagines. Here again, as explanation and justification for those rules, 
the Auctor invokes a commonplace that had its roots in philosophy: namely, the tenet that 
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‘ars imitates natura’ (hereafter, the ‘ars/natura axiom’). By the first century BCE, this axiom 
had become something of an established philosophical truth. Notably, Aristotle uses it in his 
Physics as an analogy to lay the foundation for many of his arguments about nature. He opens 
with the condition that τέχνη imitates φύσις and proceeds to reason that, if this is true, the 
physicist, whose τέλος is ultimately φύσις, must concern himself with both the form and the 
matter of his object of enquiry.49 Later in the treatise, Aristotle returns to the idea that natural 
processes, like a deliberate art or craft, develop towards a specific end or goal.50 He argues 
that if natural products could be produced using art, the art would be carried out as if it were a 
natural process. Thus, he concludes that an art both produces things that nature cannot and 
imitates the products of nature.  
The Auctor ad Herennium provides, as far as I am aware, our earliest formulation in 
Latin of the axiom ‘ars imitates natura’.51 He first introduces it in a passage at Rhet. Her. 
3.28-9 with the statement that, in many disciplines, ‘excellence of innate talent often 
resembles instruction,’ and, ‘further, ars strengthens and augments the advantages of 
natura’.52 He explains that memoria artificiosa is no exception to this rule: ‘frequently, if the 
memoria naturalis someone has been granted is outstanding, it is similar to the artificial 
type,’ and, ‘further, the artificial type preserves and amplifies the advantages of natura by 
means of systematic instruction’.53 According to the Auctor, then, the product of natura (in 
this case, an individual’s inherent mnemonic ability) resembles the product of mnemonic ars, 
and his reasoning follows Aristotle’s almost to the letter. The Auctor also engages with the 
idea of a τέχνη and its associated τέλος in several sentences at 3.36. ‘Let ars therefore imitate 
natura,’ he says, before asserting that, ‘the principles of things are advanced by natural talent, 
while the ends are obtained using instruction’. The goal (exitus) of memoria artificiosa is (per 
the Auctor’s definition at Rhet. Her. 1.3) the firm retention in the animus of res, verba, and 
dispositio. Thus, the Auctor seems to understand the full implications of the ars/natura axiom 
as they relate to the ars memoriae. 
 
49 Arist. Ph. 194a21-30. The opening condition states: εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν… For text, see Ross 
(1955). For Aristotle’s understanding of τέχνη, see Stavrianeas (2015) 53-4. 
50 Arist. Ph. 199a10-20. For specific illustrations, see also Arist. Mete. 381b. For Aristotle on the τέλος of 
Nature, see Kelsey (2015) 42-5. 
51 Slightly later texts include numerous applications of the precept, suggesting widespread acceptance: e.g. Lucr. 
5.1102, 1354, 1361, 1379; Cic. Orat. 58. 
52 For Latin text, see Calboli (2020) 265-6, ad loc. 
53 Note that in these quotes, ‘instruction’ translates doctrina; ‘systematic instruction’, ratio doctrinae, i.e. the 
didactic precepts of the MOL. 
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With the ars/natura axiom established, at Rhet. Her. 3.35-7, the Auctor then applies it 
to explain and justify his rules for the creation of imagines. Natura, says the Auctor, gives 
instructions for how the ars should work: no one marvels at or remembers every sunrise, 
because sunrises happen daily, but everyone is impressed by a solar eclipse because it is a 
rare event; similarly, recent quotidian events are forgettable, whereas events that occurred in 
our childhoods are fixed in our memories because they were once novel, and remarkable 
novelties remain in the animus for a longer time. He concludes that the imagines we create 
for use in the MOL should be of this memorable type – animated, gaudy, disfigured, hilarious 
– any trait that will, by nature, cause them to be retained in the animus. The rule instructs the 
practitioner of the MOL to imitate natura when applying the mnemonic ars. In accordance 
with the ars/natura axiom, natura leaves signposts that, interpreted correctly, direct the ars.  
 
To clarify, I am not suggesting that the Auctor’s approach to rhetorical memory, in which he 
utilises what were originally philosophical concepts (the wax tablet metaphor, the mind’s eye, 
and the ars/natura axiom) to derive and justify the various rules of the MOL, was his own 
innovation. The Auctor presents his explanations of the rules I have cited as if they were the 
standard ones used in writings on rhetorical memory, making no claims to originality.54 The 
evidence presented in this chapter so far is suggestive of a programmatic approach to the 
didactic dissemination of the MOL whereby philosophical theories of natural memory were 
invoked to rationalise the precepts of artificial mnemonics, some of which would have 
otherwise seemed entirely arbitrary.  
The rhetorical codification of the MOL therefore seems to have borrowed ideas from 
philosophy. We see occasional reference to similar interdisciplinary exchange in other 
rhetorical subdisciplines – in De inventione, for instance, Cicero presents rules for the 
formulation of partitiones that he says are to be found in philosophia and not in ceteris 
artibus.55 In the case of the MOL, judging how much interdisciplinary exchange occurred 
rather depends upon our assessment of the strength of the philosophical presence in the Latin 
texts. At one extreme, we might judge the philosophical influence to be truly ‘weak’ – so 
vestigial as to be attributable to mere commonplace. The evidence for this scenario is entirely 
circumstantial. Nevertheless, I observe that the concepts of the wax tablet, the mind’s eye, 
 
54 Something that he is not shy to do elsewhere – see e.g. p. 42-5. 
55 Inv. rhet. 1.33. For discussion, see Corbeill (2002) 37-8. 
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and the ars/natura axiom are invoked in plenty of other, non-philosophical Greek and Latin 
texts: perhaps these commonplaces, by the time they were incorporated into the ars 
memoriae, had become so common that they had lost any philosophical connotations. 
According to this reasoning, rhetoricians would have deployed them as textbook explanations 
without worrying in the least about the underlying phenomena of ‘memories’ and 
‘remembering’ per se. At the other extreme, we might conclude that a ‘strong’ philosophical 
presence in the MOL implies that it developed directly from earlier philosophical theorising, 
with philosophers involved in the advancement of artificial mnemonics. Unfortunately, we do 
not have sufficient evidence to produce a full and detailed timeline of the evolution of the 
discipline – but in a bid to arrive at the most plausible reconstruction possible, the following 
sections examine a series of Hellenistic philosophers, to assess what (if any) contribution they 
may have made to the codification of the MOL. 
 
2. The Aristotelian evidence 
Our main evidence in favour of the possibility that early philosophers did make some direct 
contribution to the development of the MOL comes, once more, from Aristotle, who makes 
occasional reference to artificial mnemonics. It is worth noting that Theodectes (a fourth-
century-BCE tragedian and rhetorician) is often mentioned alongside Hippias as a potential 
practitioner of mnemonic techniques: Blum even posits that Theodectes was Aristotle’s main 
source of information on mnemonics and ‘der einzige “prominente” Mnemoniker dieser 
Zeit’.56 There is, however, zero contemporaneous evidence regarding Theodectes’ utilisation 
of artificial mnemonics or the nature of his techniques (if, indeed, they existed).57 We 
therefore have no grounds for further speculation. Instead, several scholars have used 
Aristotelian references to mnemonics to argue that Aristotle himself contributed to the 
advancement of the discipline.58 Having just posited the possibility that memoria artificiosa 
was, in the earlier stages of its development, quite receptive to the incorporation of ideas 
 
56 Blum bases the hypothesis on Aristotle’s apparent familiarity with Theodectes’ rhetorical teachings (indicated 
by the fragmentary Aristotelian Theodectea): Blum (1969) 86-100, quoted p. 87. 
57 Cicero is our earliest reference to Theodectes as a mnemonist: Tusc. 1.59, see below, p. 104-5. Quintilian 
mentions Theodectes’ ostensibly impressive memory for verse: Inst. 11.3.51. 
58 See below, n. 69 and 73. 
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taken from philosophical theories of natural memory, I want to add a note of caution, by 
questioning certain conclusions that have been drawn from the Aristotelian corpus. 
Aristotle provides four key pieces of evidence relating to the development of artificial 
mnemonic techniques in the fourth century BCE. Additionally, Diogenes Laertius, in his 
Aristotelian bibliography, lists a (lost) work entitled Μνημονικόν, which has been taken by 
some scholars as proof that Aristotle was engaged in developing artificial mnemonics.59 This 
work is, however, more likely a reference to De memoria et reminiscentia, which does not 
appear elsewhere on Diogenes’ list.60 Of Aristotle’s definite references to artificial 
mnemonics, three are incidental, but remain worth scrutinising nonetheless. The first, in De 
anima, appears in a discussion of ἡ φαντασία, used to denote ‘imagination’, which Aristotle 
defines as the process through which φαντάσματα, ‘mental images’, are formed. Imagination, 
he says, is one of the processes of thought (along with sensation, opinion, knowledge, and 
intelligence) by which we judge truth. Yet imagination is unlike various other thought 
processes (e.g. knowledge or intelligence) since it can be ‘false’: that is, φαντάσματα can be 
invented at will.61 In order to illustrate the difference, he observes that we can hold things 
before our mind’s eye, ‘like those who fashion images and place them according to 
mnemonic rules’.62 These ‘mnemonic rules’, τὰ μνημονικά, are essentially an attribute that 
makes the mental images ‘good for remembering’; no further details about what makes the 
images so memorable are provided. Nevertheless, this reference confirms that there existed 
individuals who were using mnemonic techniques that entailed the manipulation of invented 
mental images and, hence, were similar to those detailed in the Dissoi logoi. 
Second, in Topics, in order to explain why one should learn by heart premises and 
definitions that occur frequently, Aristotle uses the example of τὸ μνημονικόν. In this system, 
he says, the τόποι that have been established cause ‘things themselves’ (αὐτά) to be recalled 
directly; likewise, memorising premises provides starting points from which arguments may 
be developed.63 Thus, we have evidence that contemporary mnemonic rules incorporated 
 
59 Diog. Laert. 5.1.26; e.g. Blum (1969) 102-4, Sorabji (2006) 26. 
60 See Simondon (1982) 318-9, Sassi (2019) 357. 
61 Arist. De an. 427b9-428b11. 
62 Arist. De an. 427b18-20: πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ 
εἰδωλοποιοῦντες. Text: Ross (1961). 
63 Arist. Top. 163b28-33: for text, see Ross (1958). I follow Smith’s interpretation re premises and definitions, if 
not his hypothesis that Aristotle’s τόποι method ‘employed a variation of the place-memory system’: Smith 
(1997) 159-161, ad loc. 
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τόποι, which served as triggers to aid memory-retrieval. Yet, the nature of these mnemonic 
τόποι remains unspecified (while the τόποι of the Topics are generic forms of dialectical 
argument, which have no spatial dimension).64 More broadly, despite the affinity of the 
Greek/Latin terms τόποι/loci, for reasons that will be detailed below, it is far from clear that 
any of the τόποι mentioned by Aristotle are equivalent to the mnemonic loci of later Latin 
texts. 
Third, in De insomniis, in order to demonstrate that dreams and other thought 
processes are quite separate and, moreover, that they can function in parallel, Aristotle again 
invokes mnemonists as an example: 
…οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐνίοτε ἄλλα ἐννοοῦμεν. φανείη δ’ ἄν τῳ 
τοῦτο, εἴ τις προσέχοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ πειρῷτο μνημονεύειν ἀναστάς. ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ 
ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα, οἷον οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ μνημονικὸν παράγγελμα τίθεσθαι τὰ 
προβαλλόμενα· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτοῖς πολλάκις ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον τίθεσθαι πρὸ 
ὀμμάτων εἰς τὸν τόπον φάντασμα. 
Arist. Insomn. 458b18-24.65 
…So also in sleep we sometimes think of other things apart from the φαντάσματα [of the 
dream]. This fact would seem clear to anyone who, upon rising, should focus his attention and 
try to remember. Indeed, some have even observed dreams of this sort, like those who 
imagine that they are placing the proposed objects according to the mnemonic rule. They 
often find themselves placing, before their mind’s eye, some other φάντασμα, apart from the 
dream, into the τόπος. 
The identity of Aristotle’s dreamers is somewhat ambiguous: are they practising mnemonists, 
dreaming of mnemonic exercises? Or is the whole statement an analogy for thought processes 
that occur at the same time as dreaming? And what exactly does it mean to speak of 
φάντασματα that exist alongside and independent of a dream (παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον)?66 Likewise, 
the exact nature of τὰ προβαλλόμενα is obscure: these ‘proposed objects’ could, for instance, 
denote a set of concrete items put forward for memorisation, or a list of more abstract 
 
64 Cf. Sorabji, who assumes otherwise, stating that ‘Aristotle explicitly compares these patterns [the dialectical 
τόποι], in respect of their utility, to the places, i.e. to the background images of places, used in the place system 
of mnemonists’: Sorabji (2006) 29-30. According to this interpretation, the analogy alludes to the practical 
advantages of dialectical τόποι; it also presupposes the existence of a complete system of spatial loci 
mnemonics. See further Blum (1969) 88-9, who believes the passage implies the existence of the complete 
MOL, even attributing its invention to Theodectes.  
65 Greek text: Gallop (1990). 
66 For alternative readings of this line, see Gallop (1996) 86, n.11.   
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subjects, or perhaps even the topics of a speech. These questions are important because 
exactly what was being memorised has implications for our understanding of how 
contemporary mnemonic systems were being deployed and, hence, for the development of 
artificial mnemonic techniques. If τὰ προβαλλόμενα refers to the subject matter of speeches, 
then we might conclude that rhetorical mnemonics were at a considerably more advanced 
stage than if τὰ προβαλλόμενα simply denotes a list of random items – such as the long lists 
of names that Hippias was apparently renowned for memorising.67 What we can say with 
certainty is that Aristotle understood φαντάσματα, in the sense of mnemonic mental images, 
as objects of thought that could be mentally manipulated into a τόπος: the passage is our 
earliest strong evidence that a mnemonic system involving something like the Greek 
equivalents of the MOL’s imagines and loci had been developed, and developed sufficiently 
to be included as a brief but probative example.  
As mentioned, a key difficulty concerning the interpretation of the Aristotelian 
evidence arises when we stop to consider Aristotle’s understanding of mnemonic τόποι. Can 
we really assume that they were the direct equivalents of the Auctor’s loci? A fourth passage 
from the middle of De memoria has attracted much attention in relation to this question: 
δεῖ δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς. διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. τὸ δ᾿ αἴτιον ὅτι 
ταχὺ ἀπ᾿ ἄλλου ἐπ᾿ ἄλλο ἔρχονται, οἷον ἀπὸ γάλακτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ δ᾿ ἐπ᾿ ἀέρα, 
καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐφ᾿ ὑγρόν, ἀφ᾿ οὗ ἐμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύτην ἐπιζητῶν τὴν ὥραν. 
Arist. Mem. 452a12-16.68 
We must take a starting point. This is why some people seem to recollect by way of τόποι. 
The reason is that they move swiftly from one thing to the next, for instance, from milk to 
white, from white to air, and from this to dampness, from which autumn is recalled, if this is 
the season sought. 
By comparing this passage to the Auctor’s later rendering of the MOL in Latin, some 
scholars have concluded that Aristotle had a significant impact on the development of the 
MOL.69 Although it is beyond the scope of this study to engage in a full discussion of 
 
67 See above, p. 68. 
68 Greek text: Bloch (2007). 
69 Notably Small (1997) 77-84, Carruthers (2008) 33-4. Nikulin (2015) 36 believes this passage ‘refers to 
Simonides’ method’. For the historical conflation, by the scholiasts, of Aristotle’s De memoria with Rhetorica 
ad Herennium, which led to the belief that Aristotle provided philosophical justification of memoria artificiosa, 
see Yates (1966) 31-5. 
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Aristotle’s De memoria, I believe such an inference is untenable.70 A weaker conclusion 
holds that Aristotle was simply utilising terminology from pre-existing Greek artificial 
mnemonics for illustrative purposes, as in De anima and De insomniis.71 This suggestion, 
which I examine and develop below, is much more likely. 
Aristotle’s reasoning in the above passage of De memoria cannot have furthered the 
development of artificial mnemonic techniques. The rules of memoria artificiosa were 
developed specifically to help practitioners control the process of memory-retrieval. In the 
passage, Aristotle makes no attempt to illustrate how, by starting from τόποι, we might 
control the recollective process of proceeding from one item to the next (e.g. from ‘milk’ to 
‘white’). Rather, he seems to be suggesting that the recollective process is analogous to a 
mnemonic technique in the sense that it is sequential and associative. An individual’s 
thoughts, says Aristotle, may move from ‘milk’ to ‘white’ because the two things are 
associated naturally, not because they have been connected artificially in, for instance, the 
way that the Dissoi logoi recommends the name Chrysippus be connected to a fabricated 
image of a man riding a golden horse.72 Sassi is quite correct to point out that previous 
scholars have misinterpreted this passage as Aristotelian advice on artificial mnemonic 
techniques.73 The pairs ‘milk’ and ‘white’, then ‘white’ and ‘air’ are naturally associated 
thanks to their shared qualities – Aristotle is not suggesting, however, that the associative 
chain has been (or should be) deliberately designed or manipulated.  
 
70 For a broader introduction to Aristotle’s position in this text, and the associated issues, see Nikulin (2015) 60-
9. 
71 As proposed by Yates (1966) 34. 
72 See p. 67. 
73 Sassi (2019) 355-61. I have simplified the problem somewhat, since immediately after the quoted τόποι 
extract, at Mem. 452a17-26, there appears another hotly-debated passage involving a sequence of letters (the 
text is corrupt and therefore difficult to interpret, although Sorabji’s solution is generally accepted). I do not 
have space to reproduce and discuss the relevant text fully. Nevertheless, Small (1997) 77-8 and Carruthers 
(2008) 34 assert that it constitutes Aristotelian advice on how to control the recall process using an alphabetic 
mnemonic technique; Sorabji (2006) 31-4, that it constitutes a different mnemonic ‘technique of mid-points’. 
Sassi accepts Sorabji’s interpretation, with the caveat that Aristotle is simply using the technique as an analogy 
for the recall process. I would go one step further: it is much more straightforward not to try and squeeze a 
brand-new (otherwise unattested) mnemonic technique from the text, but rather, to read the alphabetic mid-
points as a continuation of Aristotle’s illustrative exposition of the natural, associative process of recollection in 
the preceding passage. Thus, in the same way as our thoughts may move naturally from ‘white’ to either ‘milk’ 
or ‘air’ (because both have natural associations with ‘white’), Aristotle explains that our thoughts may move 
naturally from the letter Β to either Α or Γ. Accordingly, recollecting from the mid-point of a chain of naturally-
associated objects is effective because our thoughts can move in either direction, but doing so can lead to 
mistakes if our thoughts travel down the wrong path. For analysis of the text itself, see Bloch (2007) 237-8. 
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Further, Aristotle’s notion of what people do when they start the process of 
recollection ‘from τόποι’ is severely lacking and confused, at least if we want to read it as an 
exegesis of mnemonic loci. Aristotle does not state that the objects of contemplation between 
which the individual’s thoughts jump – milk, white, air, and so on – are themselves located in 
τόποι. As discussed above, in De insomniis Aristotle seems to suggest that mental images, 
φαντάσματα, might be placed ‘into the τόπος’ (εἰς τὸν τόπον). Therefore, mnemonic τόποι 
must have a spatial dimension. So how can the aforementioned objects of contemplation – 
milk, white, etc. – be equivalent to mnemonic τόποι? Rather, they would be more 
appropriately described as φαντάσματα.74 Yet Aristotle nowhere uses this term, referring to 
the objects in the series simply as τὰ ἄλλα. If he were describing the elements of a mnemonic 
technique, he would have presumably employed the correct technical vocabulary. Barring 
manuscript error, the simplest solution to this conundrum is to conclude that Aristotle, in De 
memoria, was not in fact describing the elements of a mnemonic technique, and that the 
objects of contemplation he lists are neither mnemonic τόποι nor mnemonic φαντάσματα 
akin to the loci and imagines of the MOL, but rather fleeting objects of contemplation, more 
transient than the Auctor’s vivid mental images. Indeed, the series of items that Aristotle calls 
τόποι might more accurately be compared to a set of stepping-stones, which our thoughts 
touch lightly upon in the search for a destination – in this case, the desired information, 
‘autumn’. The items possess the properties of neither mnemonic τόποι nor mnemonic 
φαντάσματα, since they have been neither artificially fabricated nor artificially associated in a 
predetermined sequence. 
The positioning of the passage within De memoria reinforces this interpretation: it 
appears within the context of a longer explanation of memory-retrieval, where Aristotle says 
that all recollection, whether we are actively trying to remember something or not, proceeds 
according to the natural process described, that is, according to a series of mnemonic triggers 
and associated impulses over which the conscious mind has no control, as a man has no 
control over a stone he has loosed, or over anger or fear; moreover, Aristotle states that 
natural processes of recollection can be inhibited by learned or habitual methods of thinking, 
 
74 Consequently, the alternative reading of ἀπὸ τόπων (452a13) as ἀπὸ τύπων is both attractive and plausible (it 
would mean that ‘milk’, ‘white’, etc. should be interpreted as τύποι, the imprints left in the waxy fabric of 
memory, not the spaces that those imprints occupy). Another potential reading is ἀπ’ ἀτόπων, which, if correct, 




so that we arrive at a different destination though starting from the same point.75 This is the 
antithesis of the Auctor’s conceptualisation of the MOL, which essentially asserts that the 
natural function of memory can be controlled, and controlled to the practitioner’s advantage 
rather than to his detriment, while the MOL itself is designed to guarantee that he will arrive 
at the same destination (i.e. the same locus) time and again. So even if later mnemonists 
borrowed some philosophical ideas about natural mnemonic processes to explain their 
artificial methods, Aristotle’s original intent in De memoria was not to understand, describe, 
or give advice on how artificial mnemonic techniques work. Rather, the ‘weaker’ conclusion 
referred to earlier, namely that Aristotle was borrowing a pre-existing concept of mnemonic 
τόποι as an analogy to illustrate natural mental processes, seems the more plausible 
possibility, consistent with his widespread use of τέχνη-analogies to illustrate natural 
phenomena. 
Finally, I observe that in this second section of De memoria, the only one in which the 
term τόπος appears, Aristotle has left behind the subject of the first section, episodic memory, 
and has moved on to discuss semantic recollection.76 Specifically, Aristotle’s aim is to 
reformulate the process of recollection (ἀνάμνησις) as theorised by Plato.77 According to 
Bloch’s interpretation of Aristotle’s argument, a sharp distinction must be drawn between the 
two mnemonic verbs used in the text: μνημονεύειν (‘to remember’), which Aristotle prefers 
in the first section, refers to the retrieval of information from episodic memory (such as 
autobiographical episodes); ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι (‘to recollect’), which he prefers in the second 
section, is applied to the process of retrieving knowledge from semantic memory (such as 
dates, facts, concepts, and ideas – like milk, white, air, and autumn).78 It this context, it seems 
perfectly reasonable that Aristotle would, within a discussion of semantic recollection 
specifically, refer for illustrative purposes to individuals who retrieve information using some 
form of associative mnemonic technique. His intention would not, however, be to convey 
 
75 Arist. Mem. 451b-452a, 453a. 
76 By ‘episodic’ I simply mean the ‘timestamped’ memories that Aristotle defines as relating to an episode in the 
past in the first section of De memoria. For the relevant passage, see Arist. Mem. 449b. Castagnoli argues 
against a restrictive view of Aristotle’s μνήμη as episodic, advocating an Aristotelian ‘as-past cognition view of 
memory’: Castagnoli (2019) 236-56. 
77 See Sorabji (2006) 35-46. To demonstrate the process of recollection, Plato’s Socrates famously has Meno’s 
slave proceed via a series of logical steps to ‘recollect’ a geometrical proof: Meno 82a-85b. For analysis of this 
passage, see Scott (1995) 24-52. 
78 Bloch (2007) 87-109. The two verbs are often translated indiscriminately as ‘to remember’/‘to recall’. 
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instruction concerning the operation of that, or any other, mnemonic technique (hence the 
lack of technical vocabulary). 
In sum, the τόποι-analogy in De memoria makes most sense if we do not start from 
the position that the passage must be a description of an artificial mnemonic technique. That 
position demands several leaps of imagination to fill in various gaps and still leaves an 
incoherent picture when it comes to Aristotle’s conceptualisation of mnemonic τόποι. 
Context is perhaps the strongest indication that the passage at Mem. 452a is, like the rest of 
the work, describing the natural recollective process. According to this reading, Aristotle 
introduces the τόποι-analogy not to initiate the exposition of a mnemonic system, but simply 
as an illustration. For our purposes, regarding the chronological development of the MOL, we 
can conclude that in Aristotle’s era there were individuals who had taken the natural 
associative processes of recollection and enhanced them by incorporating τόποι to aid their 
powers of mnemonic retrieval.  
As for how τόποι came to be used in mnemonics in the first place, all manner of 
permutations have been suggested: that the mnemonic τόπος was derived from the use of 
τόπος to denote a paradigmatic passage or exemplar in rhetorical handbooks; that it was 
derived directly from the axiomatic use of τόπος in geometry; that it came from Aristotle’s 
dialectical τόποι; or, vice versa, that Aristotle derived his τόποι from a pre-existing 
mnemonic usage.79 We are left with multiple possible interpretations of Aristotle’s protean 
mnemonic τόποι, none of which explain his usage flawlessly. As far as the development of 
the MOL in the fourth century is concerned, it seems clear that a method involving both 
φαντάσματα and τόποι did exist at this stage and, in that sense, what Aristotle calls 
(mnemonic) τόποι could be prototypes of the Auctor’s loci. We cannot know whether 
detailed rules for the creation of mnemonic τόποι existed; but we can suppose that the 
practitioners using them were doing so because they had observed that associating space or 
place with mnemonic imagery could aid retention and recall. On the other hand, there is no 
evidence that τόποι-mnemonics were associated with speechmaking; memory is not a feature 
of Aristotle’s surviving works on rhetoric. If a comprehensive mnemonic system designed 
specifically for use in oratory did exist (and it is a massive ‘if’), its details are lost and we 
should not anachronistically infer the existence of the MOL based on later evidence.  
 
79 For derivation from passages in rhetorical handbooks, see Cole (1991) 88-9; for a geometrical derivation, 




3. Memory in the Hellenistic schools of philosophy 
During the two centuries after Aristotle, various Hellenistic schools of philosophy continued 
to theorise about mechanisms of perception and natural memory formation. At some point 
during those two centuries, the development of a comprehensive artificial mnemonic system 
for memorising speeches occurred, to the extent that the Auctor ad Herennium was able to set 
down the precepts of a fully-fledged oratorical MOL for his Latin-speaking audience. This 
chronological coincidence means that it is worth considering whether the Hellenistic schools 
had any influence on the MOL’s development, while bearing in mind that the most natural 
setting for the pedagogic codification of the MOL would have been a rhetorical school of 
some description. Unfortunately, our knowledge of rhetorical pedagogy during the third and 
second centuries is even more patchy than our knowledge of philosophy, at least until 
Hermagoras of Temnos appears, towards the end of this period – and his work has not 
survived.80 It is generally accepted that Hermagoras, by establishing rhetorical doctrine, 
contributed to a ‘revival’ of enthusiasm for rhetoric and that this renewed popularity was met 
with increased hostility towards rhetoricians from various philosophers.81 Murphy presents 
the intervening centuries as a period in which all rhetorical disciplines underwent 
standardisation, likening the ongoing codification to the systematisation of knowledge by 
contemporaneous Alexandrian scholars.82 Given the highly schematic handbooks of rhetoric 
that emerged, interpolating a period of standardisation between Aristotle and the first century 
BCE seems perfectly logical, although the reality is that we have no direct evidence. As for the 
establishment of doctrine relating to the ars memoriae specifically, I am inclined to think that 
the codification of memoria artificiosa as one of the five subdisciplines of rhetoric occurred 
rather late in our two-century window. The reasons for this suggestion are developed in the 
following survey of approaches to memory in the Hellenistic schools.  
 
 
80 The Hermagorean fragments are collected in Matthes (1962). For an overview, see Bennett (2005) 187-93. 
Brittain believes the testimonia justify a relatively precise composition date of 140-130 BCE: Brittain (2001) 
306-7. Re non-preservation, Heath suggests that Hermagoras’ rhetoric was rendered obsolete by later theoretical 
developments: Heath (2002) 289-91. 
81 For the quarrel between philosophers and rhetoricians in this period, see Wisse (2002a) 361-4, Brittain (2001) 
302-6. For attacks on Hermagoras specifically, Reinhardt (2000) 533-5. 




Epicurus founded his school in Athens at the end of the fourth century BCE.83 He and his 
followers, both contemporaneous and subsequent, maintained a determined independence, 
and this seems to have alienated philosophically-minded outsiders: Chandler argues that the 
accusation of Epicurean indifference towards Greek arts and sciences, which was made by 
many writers (Cicero, Quintilian, Plutarch, and so on), is more a mark of hostility towards a 
closed group than a reflection of reality.84 The Epicureans rejected, by and large, engagement 
with the wider world of philosophy and were rejected in turn, their ‘uncultured’ ideas deemed 
unworthy of serious consideration. This ostensible isolationism makes the Epicurean school 
an unlikely site for interaction with outsiders such as rhetoricians. 
Memorisation, however, was a central tenet of Epicurus’ own doctrine.85 Diogenes 
reports that Epicurus used to train (ἐγύμναζε) those close to him to commit his treatises to 
memory, even though (based on the quoted text of a letter he wrote to Pythocles) he was well 
aware of the difficulty of the task.86 In order to combat the challenge, Epicurus epitomised his 
teachings. In another preserved letter, to a certain Herodotus, Epicurus states that the student 
of his philosophy, after getting to grips with the system described in his Physics, ‘ought to 
memorise an outline of the whole treatise reduced to its elements’, and to return continually 
to this outline, because it formed the starting point from which one could fill in the more 
complex details.87 There are several points of interest in Epicurus’ stipulations concerning 
memorisation.  
First, there is the vocabulary Epicurus uses in relation to remembering and the objects 
of memory. What should be retained in memory after one has finished studying Epicurus’ 
works is ὁ τύπος, the ‘outline’ or ‘impression’.88 This same term, τύπος, had been used in the 
 
83 Diogenes Laertius, who had access to Epicurean texts, is the main source for Epicurus’ biography: Diog. 
Laert. 10. For the founders and subsequent transformation of Epicurean doctrine, see Chandler (2006) 5-9. 
84 Chandler (2006) 2. For discussion of the Epicurean attitude towards the arts in general, and those involved in 
paideia in particular, see Blank (2009) 216-33. 
85 See Clay (2009) 20-2; Spinelli (2019) 278-92. For the role that natural memory played in Epicurean 
empiricism, see Asmis (2009) 86-90. 
86 Diog. Laert. 10.12, 10.84. 
87 Diog. Laert. 10.35-6: τόν τύπον τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας τὸν κατεστοιχειωμένον δεῖ μνημονεύειν. Greek text: 
Dorandi (2013). 
88 Whether the use of τύπος implies the Epicureans saw memory as fundamentally materialistic is discussed by 
Spinelli (2019) 284-5.  
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earlier wax tablet analogy of mnemonic function for the impression of a seal ring retained in 
the soul and would, in later Latin rhetorical treatises, be transformed into litterae inscribed in 
wax. Although we should not read too much into the terminological similarities, it is worth 
bearing in mind that vocabulary associated with the notion of a wax-like vestigial mnemonic 
trace remained commonplace across all the Hellenistic schools. 
Second, there is the emphasis Epicurus places on memorisation for pedagogic 
purposes. At its most concise, Epicurean teaching took the form of maxims (κύριαι δόξαι), 
which could be learnt by heart for later rehearsal and reinforcement.89 This approach to 
philosophical pedagogy reflects the role of memorisation exercises in the education of young 
students, as discussed in Chapter I. Yet Epicurus did not fully endorse the unthinking, rote 
memorisation of target texts. In his letter to Pythocles, he recognises the futility of attempting 
to memorise a large amount of dense material verbatim, just as practitioners of the MOL 
would later state that attempting to memorise speeches word-for-word was difficult, 
unnecessary, or even counterproductive.90 Of much greater benefit, he said, was 
memorisation of the outline of a philosophical treatise, or the outline of a speech: from this 
starting point, the details could be subsequently filled in.91 Just as orators would prioritise 
memorising at a macro level, leaving the minutiae to be worked out later, Epicurus advised 
his students to memorise a condensed outline of his work in order to reach an understanding 
of the whole.  
In addition, Tsouna makes the excellent point that Epicurus’ focus on memorisation 
practised repeatedly, if extended into the realm of ethics, would help to build what she calls 
the student’s ‘quasi-automatic moral reflexes’, because (as Aristotle observed in relation to 
the natural processes of recollection) memorising sequentially inclines one’s thought patterns 
to follow the same sequence rapidly the next time the relevant mnemonic trigger is 
encountered.92 This associative principle is at the heart of the later MOL, where locus yields 
imago and imago yields verbum in rapid sequence. Memory does not, for Epicurus, replace 
argument, in the same way that it cannot replace argument for the orator, but it instils 
foundational knowledge upon which that argument can be constructed. 
 
89 Diog. Laert. 10.139-54. 
90 Rhet. Her. 3.39 and, more vociferously, Cic. De or. 2.359. 
91 Sassi sees Epicurus as the first to fully exploit ‘the advantages of summarising’: Sassi (2019) 354-5. 
92 Tsouna (2009) 254-5. Arist. Mem. 451b28-452a2. 
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To be clear, I am not suggesting that the place of memorisation in Epicurean doctrine 
directly influenced the development of memoria artificiosa. Rather, certain core elements of 
the Epicurean approach reflect conceptualisations of memory that bridged divides, 
philosophical and rhetorical, in this period: conceptualisations of the limitations of memory 
(which may be defeated by dense and complex pages of text); of when memorisation was 
useful and of when it was not (for the epitome, rather than the minutiae); and of how the 




The philosophical school that propagated Stoicism was established by Zeno of Citium in 
around 300 BCE.93 As with the other schools, evidence concerning the development of 
Stoicism over the next two centuries is fragmentary and we must rely on later sources, 
principally Cicero and Diogenes Laertius.94 Tracking Stoic thought is especially problematic 
because Zeno (unlike Epicurus) left behind no definitive doctrine and subsequent leaders of 
the school disagreed about how to interpret his teachings. One thing that seems to have united 
these subsequent Hellenistic Stoics is that they all saw a place and a function for rhetoric in 
philosophical discourse. Although they divided the discipline of ‘logic’ into a varying 
number of parts, the division always included rhetoric and dialectic: rhetoric concerned 
speaking well ‘in narrative exposition’ (ἐν διεξόδῳ), while dialectic concerned discussion 
conducted via the method of question and answer.95 Both practices were designed to help 
guide a listener towards knowledge, if by different means.96 
The Stoic definition of the ars rhetorica as a set of principles designed to facilitate 
one’s powers of speaking in narrative exposition seems at first sight like it might have room 
for a system such as the MOL, to help the speaker retain the structure and topics of that 
narrative exposition. When Diogenes describes the division of Stoic rhetoric, however, he 
lists four parts, which correspond (in Greek) to the five parts of the Latin ars rhetorica, with 
 
93 For Zeno and the subsequent development of the school, see Sedley (2003) 7-32. 
94 For discussion of what their sources may have been, see Atherton (1998) 396-7. 
95 Diog. Laert. 7.41-2. Discussion: Atherton (1998) 397-400. 
96 Bartsch (2017) 217-8. 
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one glaring exception: memoria is absent.97 It therefore appears that no one of an affirmed 
Stoic persuasion was involved in the codification of memoria as one of the five pillars of 
rhetoric. This suggestion concurs with my previous conclusions regarding the Stoics’ 
adaptation of the wax tablet model to fit their own theories of cataleptic perception and 
memory formation, which exclude fabricated mental images.98 
Perhaps this is where my discussion of Stoicism and the ars memoriae would end, 
were it not for the Stoic (and probably Zenonian) definition of memory, which describes the 
faculty as a storing-up of impressions, θησαυρισμὸς φαντασιῶν.99 Scholars tend to take 
Zeno’s definition as the first instance of the metaphor of memory as a treasury, a storehouse 
of riches, although Ierodiakonou astutely observes that the Stoics did not actually use the 
word θησαυρός, the noun that generally refers to a physical storehouse for valuable items.100 
At any rate, we can see that the conceptualisation of memory as a store had, by the start of the 
first century, become commonplace: both the Auctor ad Herennium and Cicero present 
memoria as thesaurus in the same breath as they introduce the subdiscipline, suggesting that 
the metaphor was a standard element of the rhetorical definition of memoria.101 The 
solidification of the metaphor, whereby the abstract Stoic notion of memory as an act of 
‘storing-up’ is transformed, in the ars memoriae, into a more concrete stockpile of treasures, 
indicates a divergence of focus. While the Stoics were interested in how memories 
accumulate within the mind or soul, rhetoricians accepted that accumulation of memories 
without question, assigning an immediate assumed value to the mnemonic content of the 
mind as ‘treasure’ held within a vault.  
 
3.c. The Sceptical Academy 
The Sceptical Academy was founded in the 260s BCE by Arcesilaus after he became head of 
the Academy – although ‘initiated’ may better describe Arcesilaus’ actions, since his 
philosophy represents the start of a phase in which older Platonic doctrine was assimilated 
 
97 Diog. Laert. 7.43. 
98 See p. 73-4. 
99 Sext. Emp. Math. 7.373, specifically, a storing-up of cataleptic impressions. 
100 Ierodiakonou (2007) 48, n. 3. 
101 Rhet. Her. 3.28, Cic. De or. 1.18. 
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and reinterpreted along Sceptical lines.102 A number of notable Sceptics, including Carneades 
and Philo (whom Cicero heard in person), had a major influence on the shape of 
philosophical debate well into the first century BCE.103 That said, despite Cicero’s enthusiasm 
for the school and his assertion that its arguments (adapted in his own works for a Latin-
speaking audience) could be of benefit to the Roman way of life, the philosophy of the 
Sceptics diverged, fragmented, and died out in the decades following the death of Philo in the 
late 80s.104 
 One difficulty facing any attempt to reconstruct the Sceptics’ stance on a given topic 
is, once more, the lack of surviving source material and (especially in the case of Scepticism) 
the overwhelming predominance of Cicero’s work, in particular his Academici libri, upon 
which our basic understanding of the school is based.105 To compound this difficulty, Cicero 
produced two editions of the Academici libri, of which essentially just the second book of the 
first edition and a partial section of the first book of the second edition have survived.106 A 
further difficulty is the very nature of Scepticism itself, which entails, in its most radical 
formulation, the assertion that nothing can be known, and hence demands the complete 
suspension of judgement and the rejection of a doctrinal stance on anything.107 Consequently, 
following the example of Socrates, neither Arcesilaus nor Carneades left any writings. In the 
case of Carneades, the result seems to have been that whenever he defended a position, no 
one could be sure whether he actually believed in what he was arguing. The Index 
academicorum, for example, cites one Zeno of Alexandria, who listened to Carneades as a 
student and took diligent notes – but when Carneades saw these notes, he apparently denied 
 
102 For Arcesilaus, see Thorsrud (2010) 58-62. 
103 For Carneades’ visit to Rome, see p. 14. For Philo, Cic. Brut. 306. Thorsrud (2008) xv-xvi provides a useful 
timeline of the Academy’s history. 
104 Cicero asserts his preference for Scepticism at Inv. rhet. 2.9-10 and its potential usefulness for his fellow 
countrymen at Luc. 6-7. For the decline of the Sceptical Academy, see Lévy (2010) 81-104. Cappello believes 
Cicero wrote about the Academic Sceptics at a point of institutional crisis to legitimise his own claim to be the 
inheritor and interpreter of the school for a Roman future: Cappello (2019) esp. Ch. 8, p. 337-9.  
105 In particular, Philo’s works were lost; the indications are that Cicero misrepresents Philo’s Scepticism to 
some extent. For issues associated with the Ciceronian evidence, see Görler (1997) 36-57, Brittain (2001) 173-
191.  
106 For the different versions, see Griffin (1997) 1-35. Note that I refer throughout to the surviving book of the 
Academica priora as the Lucullus/Luc., and the surviving book of Academica posteriora as Acad. 1. 




they bore any resemblance to what he had actually said.108 Similarly, Clitomachus, a later 
head of the school, reportedly produced hundreds of volumes (none of which survive) in an 
attempt to grasp the essence of Carneades’ thought, before ultimately admitting defeat.109 
Carneades’ ambivalence was not simply contrarianism for its own sake, however: his 
insistence on the suspension of judgement was aimed at avoiding what Thorsrud neatly dubs 
the ‘epistemic arrogance’ of dogmatic assent.110 Thus, by attempting to avoid definition, the 
Sceptics rather came to define themselves through their opposition to other schools – chiefly, 
the Stoics. 
As mentioned in section 1.b., we have no full exposition of a Sceptical theory of 
memory formation. Instead, we must rely on Cicero’s rendering of the Sceptical objections to 
the Stoic theory of catalepsis. To recap, the Stoic theory posited the existence of two 
distinguishable types of impressions, cataleptic and non-cataleptic. The truly wise man could 
detect the differences between these two types of impressions and thus separate truth from 
untruth. The Sceptics’ key criticism of catalepsis was that detecting differences is sometimes 
impossible. They asserted that two impressions, one true and one false, could be practically 
identical to one another, with no distinguishing marks. Cicero presents various instances 
when our senses might mistake a non-cataleptic impression for a cataleptic impression: 
identical twins, replica statues, similar eggs, and two seals stamped by the same ring in 
similar blocks of wax.111 Given the Stoic suggestion that the impressions stored in the soul 
are similar to the imprints left by seal rings in wax, Cicero’s ‘identical seals’ example is 
leading, opening up the possibility that we might be deceived not only by indistinguishable 
external sensible objects, but also by indistinguishable internal impressions after they have 
been stamped upon the soul. When these indistinguishable impressions, akin to seals in wax, 
are re-presented as memories, how can the veracity of those memories ever be taken as 
absolute, when we cannot be certain which impression is which? 
Having established that true and false impressions might appear identical, the 
Sceptics’ argument against catalepsis simply invokes the Stoic axiom that if two impressions 
 
108 Phld. Index academicorum 22.37-42: this is the normal interpretation, although the text is fragmentary. See 
Mekler (1902) 83 ad loc. For newly-reconstructed fragments of the Index relating to Carneades and his 
successors, see Fleischer (2019) 116-24. 
109 Cic. Luc. 139; Diog. Laert. 4.67. 
110 Thorsrud (2010) 74. 
111 Cic. Luc. 84-6. Cicero renders the Greek philosophical vocabulary of impressions, catalepsis, apprehensions, 
etc. using various Latin phrases: for a helpful table of equivalents, see Brittain (2006) xli. 
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are identical, it is impossible for one to be cataleptic and the other to be non-cataleptic; 
following this argument, the Sceptics concluded that cataleptic impressions could not exist.112 
The Stoic response was to criticise such a proposition as untenable on the grounds that it led 
to perpetual aporia.113 But Carneades, says Cicero, found a solution to all such objections 
when he developed the doctrine of the ‘probable’ (τὸ πιθανόν): the belief that there exists not 
only cataleptic and non-cataleptic impressions, but also impressions that are probable 
(probabilia visa).114 Thus, the wise man can suspend his judgement as to the absolute truth of 
an impression, while still formulating a judgement of probability; he will, moreover, make 
use of probable impressions to avoid aporia, so that he can continue to lead his everyday 
life.115 As illustration, Cicero gives the practical scenario of a wise man trying to decide if it 
is safe to sail onboard a ship. He cannot know whether he will arrive safely, but if the voyage 
is short, the crew competent, and the weather fair, it is probable, and so he can act rationally. 
The Sceptics’ pragmatic approach to the question of the reliability of impressions is 
also apparent when Cicero, in the Lucullus, responds to Lucullus himself regarding the Stoic 
theory of memory formation: 
‘Unde memoria, si nihil percipimus?’ sic enim quaerebas. quid meminisse visa nisi 
comprensa non possumus? […] atqui falsum quod est id percipi non potest, ut vobismet ipsis 
placet. si igitur memoria perceptarum comprensarumque rerum est, omnia quae quisque 
meminit habet ea comprensa atque percepta; falsi autem comprendi nihil potest; et omnia 
meminit Seiron Epicuri dogmata; vera igitur illa sunt nunc omnia. Hoc per me licet; sed tibi 
aut concedendum est ita esse, quod minime vis, aut memoriam mihi remittas oportet et fateare 
esse ei locum etiam si comprehensio perceptioque nulla sit. 
Cic. Luc. 106.116 
“What is the source of memory, if we apprehend nothing cataleptically?” – that’s what you 
were asking. What, can we remember no impressions save those that we have apprehended 
 
112 The argument is outlined by Lucullus at Luc. 40. For further exposition, see Obdrzalek (2006) 245-6. 
113 The argument that some impressions must be cataleptic to avoid aporia is stated most clearly at Luc. 37-9, 
where Lucullus argues for the necessity of assent (συγκατάθεσις/adsentio) for action. 
114 Carneades’ procedures for arriving at what is probable (τὸ πιθανόν) are outlined in Sext. Emp. Math. 7.166-
84. For Cicero’s equation of φαντασία with visum, see Luc. 18. 
115 Cic. Luc. 99-101. Cicero cites Clitomachus as his source. Whether Carneades’ notion of the ‘probable’ 
demanded ongoing suspension of judgement even in relation to ‘persuasive’ impressions, or whether it conceded 
that such impressions might be accepted as ‘probably true’, is still debated. For contrasting views, see Frede 
(1997) 127-51, and Obdrzalek (2006) 243-80. The factors affecting the initial inherent persuasiveness of such 
impressions are considered by Reinhardt (2019) 218-53. 
116 Latin text: Straume-Zimmermann, Broemser, and Gigon (1990). 
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cataleptically? […] And, as you [Stoics] yourselves are of the opinion, “It is impossible to 
apprehend cataleptically what is untrue”: so if memory consists of things that have been 
apprehended cataleptically, everything that anyone remembers has been apprehended 
cataleptically; and yet nothing untrue can be apprehended cataleptically. Now, Siro 
remembers all of Epicurus’ doctrine: therefore, all that doctrine is true! This is alright by me; 
but either you must concede it is so, which you certainly don’t want to do, or you need to 
return memory to me and admit that there is a place for it, even if there is no cataleptic 
apprehension.117 
Here, Cicero makes clear the fundamental difference between the Stoic and Sceptic theories 
of memory: the Sceptics have no problem with the idea that the impressions that constitute 
our memories can be non-cataleptic and, therefore, that they might be misleading or untrue. 
Just because Siro – a very wise Epicurean – had memorised Epicurus’ entire doctrine, it does 
not follow that all of that doctrine, because it could be memorised, was comprised of 
cataleptic impressions and was therefore true.118 Indeed, for Cicero’s Stoic ambassador, 
Lucullus, the idea that Stoic philosophy might imply the truth of Epicurean doctrine would 
have been unconscionable.119 The Sceptics, on the other hand, by leaving room in their 
definition of memory for non-cataleptic impressions, allowed for mnemonic content to which 
they could attach a value other than that of absolute truth. The wise man, according to them, 
would still be able to determine truth value if required, based on a judgement of 
probability.120 
I observed earlier that the Stoics conceptualised memory as a storing-up of 
specifically cataleptic impressions; and also, that fabricated mental images could have only 
been classified, according to Stoic doctrine, as non-cataleptic impressions. Combining these 
observations, it is difficult to see how Stoics could have treated the imagines and loci of the 
MOL as anything other than non-cataleptic impressions – they might even have viewed them 
as akin to the hallucinations induced by inebriation or dreams.121 This potential doctrinal 
objection to the MOL may have been part of the reason why memoria does not feature 
 
117 I have translated comprehendere and percipere as ‘to apprehend cataleptically’ to clarify that Cicero uses 
these verbs to render the Stoic καταλαμβάνειν; likewise, comprehensio perceptioque equates to the Stoic 
κατάληψις, i.e. ‘cataleptic apprehension’. 
118 Cicero elsewhere mentions Siro (who apparently tutored Virgil) in the same breath as Philodemus, both 
homines doctissimi: Fin. 2.119. 
119 Lucullus represents the views of Sceptic-turned-Stoic Antiochus: see Ch. IV, p. 170-1. 
120 Or at least, he would determine whether the memories were ‘persuasive’. 
121 See p. 74. 
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alongside the other four traditional subdisciplines in Diogenes’ division of Stoic rhetoric.122 
The Academic Sceptics, on the other hand, were much more comfortable with the idea that 
we can remember things that do not represent reality. It follows that there may have been 
scope in their conceptualisation of natural memory for the formation and retention of 
artificial memories – the imagines and loci of the MOL. The Sceptics’ definition of memory 
could have conceivably incorporated memoria as ars since, in accordance with Sceptical 
principles, this ars memoriae would be classified as one of the artes that simply follow our 
impressions, having no means (nor any need) to judge whether or not those impressions are 
true.123 As for the question of whether an ars memoriae was actually included among the 
rhetorical techniques utilised by the Sceptics, there are two highly suggestive sets of 
evidence. The first concerns the Sceptics’ apparently positive stance towards teaching 
rhetoric to their followers; the second involves the few Sceptics-cum-rhetoricians who, 
according to Cicero, specialised in mnemonic techniques. 
 
4. The Sceptical Academy: Where philosophy embraced rhetoric? 
Carneades, according to Cicero’s Antonius in De oratore, was a paragon of oratorical skill 
among philosophers.124 As discussed in the Introduction, Carneades’ eloquence struck a 
chord (and a nerve) at Rome when he arrived in 156 BCE, and his epistemic approach, that the 
truth might be sought by scrutinising the ‘probable’, was no doubt made more persuasive by 
his rhetorical skill.125 While there is no evidence that Carneades prescribed, or even advised, 
that his students undertake rhetorical training, from his scholarchate onwards the school 
appears to have become increasingly engaged with the rhetorical method. As for rhetorical 
 
122 See p. 91-2. The obvious counterargument is that Cicero’s Lucullus, a professed Stoic, is proficient in the 
MOL (for full discussion of which, see Ch. IV, p. 168-72); then again, Cicero’s Lucullus is hardly a model of 
Stoic doctrinal consistency. 
123 Cic. Luc. 107: [artes] quae tantum id quod videtur secuntur nec habent istam artem vestram qua vera et 
falsa diiudicent. Cf. Ierodiakonou (2007) 64-5, who frames the (Ciceronian) Sceptical take on memory as ‘an 
ordinary, non-technical, non-philosophical’ conceptualisation designed to explain the function of certain artes, 
giving Empiricist medicine as another example of such an ars. Full treatment of the (irredeemably hypothetical) 
question ‘Can memoria be classified as an ars in any strict philosophical sense?’ is beyond the scope of this 
thesis: as has been mentioned, rhetoricians like the Auctor avoided it entirely (Rhet. Her. 3.28). The matter is 
addressed by Wisse (2002b) 389-92. 
124 Cic. De or. 2.161, see also Cicero’s Crassus at 3.68. 
125 Diogenes Laertius, 4.62, states that even professional rhetoricians would take the afternoon off to go and hear 




mnemonics, there is no suggestion that Carneades influenced the development of the MOL, 
although the resemblance between Carneades’ conditions for optimal perception of external 
objects and the rules for the creation of effective loci is striking (see above, p. 76-7). 
Carneades explained how φαντασίαι might be distinguished from their surrounding τόποι; 
later mnemonists, how imagines might be distinguished from their surrounding loci. 
Carneades inspired a number of pupils and successors, each of whom had his own 
take on Academic Scepticism: of significance to this study are the aforementioned 
Clitomachus, Metrodorus of Stratonicea, Charmadas of Athens, and Philo of Larissa.126 
Cicero’s Crassus reports that, when he visited Athens circa 110, the school was at its height –  
Clitomachus, Charmadas, and Metrodorus were all present.127 We know very little about the 
marginal Metrodorus of Stratonicea, although he may have proposed an alternative 
interpretation of Carneades’ Scepticism, incorporating a mitigated version of the principle 
that one must suspend all judgement, thereby allowing for particular ‘probable’ impressions 
to be accepted as truth.128 Metrodorus remains important because of his likely influence on 
both Charmadas and Philo, who in turn directly influenced Cicero’s presentation of the 
Sceptical stance on various topics, including rhetoric.129  
Moving swiftly on to Charmadas, in De oratore, Cicero presents two views of the 
man. One comes from Crassus, who says that he studied Plato’s Gorgias with Charmadas.130 
The other comes from Antonius, who heard the philosopher debate in Athens, and who gives 
an outline of the arguments Charmadas made when ‘often, he was carried away by his own 
discourse to the point that he wholly disputed the existence of any ars dicendi’.131 At first 
sight, Charmadas’ stance might appear to provide confirmatory evidence of second-century 
philosophers directing hostility towards rhetoricians – we might even group it with the 
 
126 The relationships between many of the philosophers discussed in this section are presented clearly in a 
phylogenetic tree, detailing the successions of philosophers according to Cicero’s Crassus in De oratore, 
compiled by May and Wisse (2001) 243. 
127 Cic. De or. 1.45. For the date, see Leeman and Pinkster (1981) 137. 
128 See Brittain (2001) 73-128; but the issues are hotly contested, e.g. Glucker (2004) 118-33. 
129 Brittain (2001) 212-9, 312. 
130 Cic. De or. 1.47. 
131 De or. 1.82-93, quoted at 1.90: saepe etiam in eam partem ferebatur oratione, ut omnino disputaret nullam 
artem esse dicendi. Charmadas based his argument on Plato’s refutation of rhetoric. Sextus also attributes an 
argument against rhetoric to Charmadas, although the line of attack is this time ethical (i.e. rhetoric is malicious) 
rather than technical: Sext. Emp. Math. 20-40. 
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attacks made against Hermagoras of Temnos’ newly-formulated rhetorical doctrine.132 Yet, 
the situation is not that simple, since Charmadas himself appears to have embraced certain 
rhetorical techniques in the dissemination of his own philosophy.133 He was, after all, a true 
pupil of Carneades, and used contrarianism as a heuristic method.134 In his refutation of the 
existence of an ars dicendi, rather than making the blunt assertion that all rhetorical 
techniques are useless, Charmadas seems to advocate a different brand of ‘philosophical’ 
rhetoric, which he contrasts with the (inferior) offering of the rhetorical schools.135  
Cicero’s Antonius explains that Charmadas’ first attack was against rhetoricians 
rather than rhetoric per se: 
significabat eos, qui rhetores nominarentur et qui dicendi praecepta traderent, nihil plane 
tenere neque posse quemquam facultatem adsequi dicendi, nisi qui philosophorum inventa 
didicisset. 
Cic. De or. 1.84. 
He suggested that those who were called rhetoricians, and who gave instruction in the rules of 
speaking, had no intelligible grasp on anything, and that no one could attain skill in speaking 
unless he had learnt about the discoveries of the philosophers. 
Charmadas, according to Cicero, was arguing against the practices of teachers who called 
themselves rhetores and dictated lists of rules without any real understanding of the essence 
of eloquence. This accords perfectly (and unsurprisingly) with one aspect of Cicero’s agenda 
in De oratore, to provide a fresh, less prescriptive and more universal formulation of the 
rhetorical skills required by the ideal orator; it also accords with the stance against Greek 
rhetores adopted by the self-professed philosophy-afficionado, the Auctor ad Herennium. 
Thus, Cicero’s Charmadas has more of a problem with contemporaneous rhetoricians than 
with rhetoric as a discipline – once you have been taught proper philosophy, he says, then 
you can move on to rhetoric, well-equipped to learn and apply the discipline in the best 
possible fashion.  
 
132 See n. 81 above.  
133 Brittain (2001) 312-9 even speculates that when Charmadas opened his own school, in the Ptolemaeum, it 
was a school of Sceptical rhetoric. 
134 See Cic. Orat. 51. 
135 A strong case for this interpretation is made by Reinhardt (2000) 532-3. 
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Charmadas’ second line of attack against rhetoric as ars was, according to Antonius, 
technical: 
artem vero negabat esse ullam, nisi quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum 
spectantibus et numquam fallentibus rebus contineretur. 
Cic. De or. 1.92. 
He denied that anything was a true ars unless it consisted of matters that were known and 
thoroughly comprehended, that targeted a single end, and that were never fallible. 
These criteria for ars cannot – according to the rest of Charmadas’ speech – be fulfilled by 
oratory. The speaker does not know that everything he puts forward is certain and true (even 
in a less-than-rigorous non-philosophical sense); and he does not impart true knowledge to 
his audience, but only fleeting opinion, using persuasive techniques that have no guarantee of 
success. For Charmadas, then, the orator decides on his truth before he begins arguing and 
uses rhetorical techniques in a fallible attempt to make that truth seem probable; the Sceptic, 
on the other hand, accepts fallibility at the outset, before using a rigorous method of arguing 
pro and contra to finally determine what is truly probable, i.e. what is πιθανόν or 
probabile.136  
Charmadas’ apparent acceptance of the possibility that probable truth might be 
determined by arguing pro and contra, which follows from the modified Carneadean position 
potentially advocated by Metrodorus, is considerably at odds with the (earlier) radical 
formulation of Academic Scepticism, whereby discourse – however rhetorically persuasive – 
was directed ultimately towards the suspension of all judgement. As Cicero portrays the 
school’s development, Charmadas (and subsequently Philo) began to transform Carneades’ 
ever-equivocal approach into a new method, a Sceptical approach to philosophical questions 
that they evidently considered a valid ars, which incorporated certain rhetorical precepts, but 
which was superior to and more universally applicable than the superficially-similar 
Hermagorean doctrine and the methods of contemporaneous rule-loving rhetoricians.137 This 
rather vague notion of a distinctly ‘philosophical’ rhetoric may be all we can safely deduce 
about the rhetorical practices of the pre-Ciceronian Sceptics. Brittain, however, has gone 
 
136 For similarities and differences between philosophical and rhetorical notions of πιθανόν/probabile, see 
Glucker (1995) 122-35. 
137 The Hermagorean approach to ὑποθέσεις involved developing forensic arguments on either side of a 
contested issue, but did not tackle the more general θέσεις, which was traditionally considered the province of 
philosophy. For the use (and non-use) of hypotheses and theses in Roman rhetorical schools of the period, see 
Wisse (2002a) 359-61.  
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further, asserting that Charmadas ‘turned the ordinary practices of Sceptical philosophy into a 
reflective procedure for the perfection of rhetorical skills’.138 This is perhaps one speculative 
step too far. To return to more solid ground, we can say that, for Charmadas, eloquence was 
not the true rule-bound ars that the schools of rhetoric professed; it was, however, a capacity 
(facultas), that could be grounded on and enhanced by philosophical training.  
To complete this outline of the developing incorporation of rhetoric into Sceptical 
practice, it is necessary to mention Philo of Larissa, who succeeded Clitomachus as the head 
of the school in 110/9 and, after fleeing Athens in 88/7, arrived in Rome.139 This is where 
Cicero heard him talk, which in turn means that Philo probably had the most influence on 
Cicero’s rendering of the philosophy and history of Academic Scepticism; Philo also wrote 
two controversial volumes, the so-called ‘Roman books’, a manifesto for the unity of the 
Academy.140 Much more can be said with certainty about Philo than his slightly older 
contemporary Charmadas, but in relation to the integration of rhetoric and philosophy, one 
key fact stands out: Philo is the first Academic Sceptic to whom the practice of teaching 
rhetoric can be attributed directly.141 Cicero states that it was Philo’s custom to give 
instruction in the praecepta of the rhetoricians at one time and those of the philosophers at 
another, and presents this approach as innovative.142 This means that Philonian Sceptics were 
most likely disseminating a method of ‘rhetorical philosophy’ from at least 110/9, when Philo 
became scholarch.143 The Academic Sceptics of the late second century, then, seem to have 
practised what Cicero’s Charmadas preached, teaching a productive programme of rhetoric 
grounded on philosophical wisdom. 
We might argue that there was nothing particularly revolutionary in the Sceptics’ 
approach. The argument that philosophical knowledge (especially knowledge concerning 
moral questions of good and bad, just and unjust, etc.) was a prerequisite for a true rhetorical 
 
138 Brittain (2001) 325. 
139 For Philo’s life, see Brittain (2001) 38-72.  
140 Morford (2002) 37-9, Reinhardt (2000) 535. On the possible nature of Philo’s ‘Roman books’, see Brittain 
(2001) 129-68, Glucker (2004) 134-43.  
141 Leeman and Pinkster suggest that Charmadas’ view of philosophy as a prerequisite for eloquence may have 
persuaded Philo to teach rhetoric: Leeman and Pinkster (1981) 173.  
142 Cic. Tusc. 2.9: Cicero’s phrasing, instituit alio tempore rhetorum praecepta tradere, alio philosophorum, 
indicates novelty (text: Douglas (1990)); Crassus at De or. 3.110 implies, with the phrase nunc enim apud 
Philonem…, that Philo’s rhetorical practice was a recent innovation (relative to 91 BCE). See also the 
commentary of Wisse, Winterbottom, and Fantham (2008) 74. 
143 For the possible nature of ‘Philonian’ rhetoric, see Reinhardt (2000) 535-47, Brittain (2001) 298-342. 
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τέχνη had a legacy that went all the way back to Plato’s Gorgias (on which, we should not 
forget, Charmadas was ostensibly an expert).144 Similarly, other schools held that only the 
wise man (i.e. a philosopher) could truly be a good speaker.145 On the other hand, the 
evidence we do have seems to indicate that, as the practice of rhetorical schooling spread 
towards Rome, the Academic Sceptics distinguished themselves by embracing the study and 
teaching of rhetoric to a greater extent than other philosophical schools, especially during the 
late second century. In this period, the Sceptical Academy provided an intellectual 
environment that was open and amenable to rhetorically-inclined philosophers, including 
Philo, Charmadas, and his coeval Metrodorus of Scepsis.  
 
4.a. Charmadas of Athens as mnemonist 
The first sections of this chapter analysed in detail how multiple philosophical concepts of 
natural memory were invoked by rhetoricians to underpin, explain, and even justify the rules 
governing the MOL. I also raised the questions of when and where this fusion of natural and 
artificial mnemonic theory first occurred. Now, I posit the hypothesis that it was philosophers 
of the late-second-century Sceptical Academy who promoted (and perhaps even pioneered) 
these philosophically-grounded explanations of the MOL, in accordance with the 
propaedeutic principles espoused by Charmadas (Cic. De or. 1.84). According to this 
hypothesis, students would have been encouraged to first learn the inventa philosophorum 
(namely, theories of natural memory formation and retention, such as the wax tablet model); 
subsequently, when the students were being introduced to the MOL, those inventa 
philosophorum would have been used as an exegetic framework for the praecepta rhetorum 
(to explain why the rules for the creation of loci and imagines work). As for the identity of 
the Sceptics who engaged most fully with artificial mnemonics, I propose two likely 
candidates: Charmadas himself, and Metrodorus of Scepsis. These two individuals are 
examined below. 
The hypothesis outlined above is not as radical as it might at first appear – other 
scholars have come to similar conclusions. As mentioned, Yates identified Metrodorus of 
Scepsis as a key figure in the development of the MOL; and Marastoni, in her monograph on 
 
144 E.g. Pl. Grg. 459c-460c. For discussion, see Wisse (2002b) 389-96. 
145 Such as the Stoics, though the evidence is fragmentary: see Reinhardt (2007) 376. 
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Metrodorus, suggests that the Sceptics took a keen interest in memory and recollection.146 
Marastoni’s reasoning is, however, flawed. She posits that the Sceptics were particularly 
interested in the ‘exercise of memory’ (‘l’esercizio della memoria’, p. 63) because it could (in 
accordance with the Platonic theory of ἀνάμνησις) bring to light the Platonic forms, of which 
the soul had knowledge before it descended into the body. This is a very curious hypothesis 
indeed. Platonic ἀνάμνησις concerns the unpremeditated rediscovery of knowledge 
inaccessible to sense perception, acquired by the soul before birth when it was in a previous 
state of being; ἀνάμνησις is (for the sake of simplicity) a theoretical explanation of the 
learning process.147 It has nothing to do with the active retrieval of premeditated information, 
like lists of items or the topics of a speech, consciously encoded in memory at some point 
earlier in this life by means of a τέχνη such as the MOL. Metrodorus, and the Academic 
Sceptics at large, were astute enough to recognise that mnemonic techniques, however 
intricate, were not going to grant them direct access to the omniscient memories of the divine.  
My more prosaic suggestion is that Sceptics like Charmadas utilised and perhaps even 
taught mnemonic techniques, firstly, because their philosophical doctrine was flexible enough 
to allow room for the concept of an ars memoriae; secondly, because mnemonic techniques 
helped them to disseminate their philosophical doctrine in a coherent, persuasive lecture 
format (just as the same techniques might help an orator deliver a speech in the forum); and 
thirdly, because learning mnemonic techniques genuinely appealed to rhetorically-inclined 
students (such as Cicero) who might be attracted to study Scepticism. 
 
Charmadas, then, is the first Academic Sceptic whom we know utilised mnemonic 
techniques. According to Cicero, the orator Marcus Antonius wrote a libellus on the ars 
dicendi, in which he stated, on the basis of Charmadas’ arguments concerning rhetoric, that 
the truly eloquent speaker was someone whose animus and memoria contained all the sources 
of everything that pertained to speaking.148 This sentiment, regardless of its partisan origin, 
sets a high bar for mnemonic capacity – and it was a bar that Charmadas had a reputation for 
 
146 Marastoni (2007) 63-4. 
147 Most famously encapsulated by Plato’s Socrates at Meno 81d: τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν ἄρα καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀνάμνησις 
ὅλον ἐστίν. For proper discussion of ἀνάμνησις, start with Scott (1995) 13-85. 
148 Cic. De or. 1.94: omnisque omnium rerum, quae ad dicendum pertinerent, fontis animo ac memoria 




raising. At least (and this must be stressed once again) Cicero accorded Charmadas this 
reputation, and superlative mnemonic skill became a trait for which he was subsequently 
known in the Roman world. As mentioned in the first chapter, in the section of De oratore 
that deals with the rhetorical theory of memory, Antonius introduces Charmadas as an 
exemplum to demonstrate the practical efficacy of the MOL and to refute those who say that 
memorising using imagines and loci is overly burdensome: 
vidi enim ego summos homines et divina prope memoria, Athenis Charmadam, in Asia, quem 
vivere hodie aiunt Scepsium Metrodorum, quorum uterque, tamquam litteris in cera, sic se 
aiebat imaginibus in iis locis, quos haberet, quae meminisse vellet, perscribere. 
Cic. De or. 2.360. 
For I saw with my own eyes most prominent figures, men with almost superhuman memories, 
Charmadas in Athens and, in Asia, Metrodorus of Scepsis (who, they say, is still alive today), 
each of whom affirmed that he recorded completely what he wished to remember thus, by 
using imagines in the loci that he retained just as if he were using letters in wax. 
We shall return to Charmadas’ coeval, Metrodorus of Scepsis (not to be confused with 
Metrodorus of Stratonicea), shortly. For now, it is essential to note that, according to Cicero’s 
Antonius, Charmadas confirmed that he enhanced his memory by depicting imagines in loci 
in a fashion analogous to that of inscribing letters in wax: that is to say, he utilised the MOL. 
This suggests (a) that Charmadas recognised in the MOL a technique that could reliably 
improve his natural capacity to retain information, i.e. a technique that met his definition of a 
true ars (from De or. 1.92); and (b) that Charmadas talked about the MOL in terms of a 
philosophical analogy of natural memory formation, likening imagines and loci to 
impressions left in wax. 
In Tusculanae disputationes, Cicero introduces a list of men who reputedly utilised 
artificial mnemonic techniques to clarify that his subsequent argument does not concern 
individuals who utilise the artes memoriae – the list comprises Simonides (poet and 
legendary inventor of the MOL), Theodectes (tragedian and rhetorician), Cineas (diplomat, 
ambassador of Pyrrhus), Charmadas (philosopher), Metrodorus of Scepsis (briefly a 
philosopher, but known primarily as a rhetorician), and Hortensius (orator).149 Charmadas’ 
 
149 Cic. Tusc. 1.59. Connections between the named individuals and memoria artificiosa (or other mnemonic 
techniques) are discussed elsewhere: for Simonides, see Ch. I p. 47-52; Theodectes, see above, p. 80; Cineas, 
Ch. IV, p. 163-5; Metrodorus, below, p. 106-10; and Hortensius, Ch. III, p. 138-44, plus Ch. IV, p. 171. The 
anaphoric repetition of quanta (non quaero quanta memoria Simonides […] quanta Theodectes […] quanta 
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inclusion in the list of mnemonists, and his explicit exclusion from the group of men Cicero 
goes on to discuss (experts who possess superior memoria naturalis), reiterates Charmadas’ 
reputation as a practitioner of the MOL. Beyond that reiteration, the passage is interesting for 
its context. Cicero eliminates the mnemonists from his subsequent discussion of the 
extraordinary mnemonic capacities of men who are incredibly skilled in specialist 
professions: he observes that the superlative mnemonic powers of these other (unnamed) 
experts, who are not themselves expert practitioners of the ars memoriae, is a good indication 
of the incalculable natural capacity of the human mind.150 This observation introduces an 
argument against Platonic ἀνάμνησις, in the course of which Stoic ideas concerning the 
‘corporeality’ of memories, whereby wax-like mnemonic impressions take up space in the 
soul, are also rejected, on the grounds that a corporeal soul containing a vast agglomeration 
of corporeal memories would demand a correspondingly (and impossibly) vast physical 
space.151  
Charmadas was first and foremost a philosopher; he styled himself as an inheritor of 
Plato’s Academy. It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that Cicero, in a passage of the 
Tusculanae disputationes that deals with Platonic ἀνάμνησις, ignores Charmadas’ philosophy 
entirely and only cites him because of his reputation as a mnemonist. It is worth noting that 
Philodemus, also writing in the first century BCE, described Charmadas as a skilled and 
learned individual, φύσει μνήμων: he makes no mention of artificial mnemonics.152 The 
‘natural’ mnemonic ability Philodemus attributed to Charmadas does not of course preclude 
the idea that he also utilised the MOL – but it is Cicero who highlights this usage as one of 
the defining aspects of Charmadas’ character and practice. According to the Ciceronian 
rendering of Academic Scepticism, it was Charmadas’ use of artificial mnemonics that made 
him, and his teachings, stand out. If this portrayal is accurate, the precepts of the ars 
memoriae may well have been a feature of Charmadas’ novel style of philosophical rhetoric; 
 
nuper Charmadas […etc.]) once for every mnemonist, emphasises the sheer size and power of the individuals’ 
memoria artificiosa (text: Douglas (1985)). 
150 Cicero is apparently referring to experts who have acquired expertise through many years of experience: see 
‘Concluding remarks’, p. 185-7, for discussion.  
151 Cic. Tusc. 1.59-61. For Cicero’s discussion of the problem of souls, within which this passage appears, see 
Gildenhard (2007) 242-4, Douglas (1985) 110-2. Re corporeality, the Stoics asserted that impressions (and 
therefore memories) were corporeal; if this were true, said their critics, older corporeal impressions (and 
memories) of an object would be obliterated by the formation and superimposition of new impressions. 
Chrysippus seems to have developed a sophisticated response to this criticism, with which Cicero never engages 
(deliberately or otherwise): see Ierodiakonou (2007) 52-9. 
152 Phld. Index academicorum 32.5.  
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and he may have explained those artificial precepts using philosophical theories of natural 
memory. 
The ostensible mnemonic prowess of Charmadas’ coeval Philo warrants brief mention 
here. Cicero states that Philo possessed summa memoria and could reproduce philosophical 
sententiae verbatim (iis ipsis verbis quibus erant scriptae).153 This statement does not reveal 
anything about whether Philo utilised memoria artificiosa, but it does indicate that both of 
these prominent Academic Sceptics, Charmadas and Philo, recognised the importance of 
memorisation in their philosophical practice, whether via natural or artificial means. The 
instructional method they developed (whether we call it a special brand of ‘philosophical 
rhetoric’ or not) had a place for memorisation, and a locus for the method of loci. 
 
4.b. Metrodorus of Scepsis as mnemonist 
Charmadas’ reputation as a mnemonist endured and, as we have seen, his name was often 
mentioned alongside that of Metrodorus of Scepsis. It appears that this Metrodorus, who 
Cicero tells us was renowned for his mnemonic ability, had a remarkable life.154 Born in the 
140s BCE, he appears to have been a student of the Sceptical Academy at the time when 
Charmadas and Philo were in their prime, and to have then returned to Asia, where he 
became a prominent figure at the court of Mithridates VI.155 Although schooled in Academic 
Scepticism, he abandoned philosophy and devoted himself to rhetoric, such that Cicero’s 
Crassus calls him ‘a rhetorician of the Academic school’; while Strabo states that ‘he used a 
novel style of speaking and astounded many’.156 In the late 70s, however, Metrodorus appears 
to have met an untimely end, after unwisely betraying Mithridates to Tigranes.157  
Metrodorus’ notably novel brand of rhetoric was no doubt influenced by the 
philosophically-oriented approach of Charmadas and Philo, although his later reputation 
suggests that he put their teachings to a much more practical use than perhaps intended, in the 
 
153 Cic. Nat. D. 1.113. Text: Dyck (2003). The sententiae in question are those of Epicurus. 
154 Attribution is sometimes problematic. Marastoni has collected all the testimonia concerning Metrodorus; she 
also provides a timeline for his life: see Marastoni (2007) 5-6. 
155 Strabo 13.1.55 is the main source for Metrodorus’ life; Metrodorus’ allegiance to Mithridates would explain 
his alleged hostility towards Rome (see Plin. HN 34.34 and possibly Ov. Pont. 4.14.37-40). 
156 Cic. De or. 3.75, ex Academia rhetor; Strabo 13.1.55, ἐχρήσατο δὲ φράσεώς τινι χαρακτῆρι καινῷ καὶ 
κατεπλήξατο πολλούς. Greek text: Radt (2004). 
157 Plut. Vit. Luc. 22. 
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court of Mithridates. Metrodorus’ application of artificial mnemonic techniques seems to 
reflect a shift in focus away from philosophy. Cicero’s Antonius, in the passage at De or. 
2.360 quoted above, states that Metrodorus, like Charmadas, employed mnemonic imagines 
and loci, i.e. that he utilised the MOL. There are suggestions, however, that Metrodorus went 
considerably further than Charmadas and other rhetoricians, developing techniques even 
more sophisticated and involved than the oratorically-oriented MOL. Quintilian provides the 
clearest evidence. As an addendum to Cicero’s rules for the creation of loci (that they should 
be numerous, clearly defined, etc.) and imagines (which should be active, striking, etc.), he 
writes: 
Quo magis miror quo modo Metrodorus in XII signis per quae sol meat trecenos et sexagenos 
invenerit locos. Vanitas nimirum fuit atque iactatio circa memoriam suam potius arte quam 
natura gloriantis. 
Quint. Inst. 11.2.22. 
This makes me wonder even more how Metrodorus found 360 loci in the 12 signs through 
which the sun passes.158 Evidently this was the vanity and ostentation of a man who, when it 
came to his memory, took more pride in ars than natura. 
Quintilian then proceeds to reject Metrodorus’ method, which he considers overcomplicated, 
on the grounds that it is not useful for memorising oratio perpetua – continuous, expository 
speech.159 This reference to Metrodorus’ zodiac-based mnemonic method and the implication 
that he associated one locus with each of the zodiac’s 360 degrees has been used as evidence 
of Metrodorus’ meticulous knowledge of astrology.160 Fine. More pertinent to the role of 
artificial mnemonics within Metrodorus’ novel brand of rhetoric, however, is the fact that he 
took one technical aspect of the method of loci – specifically, the rules for the creation of loci 
– to what was considered (at least by Quintilian) an absurd degree of complexity. The 
practices of modern mnemonists clearly indicate that the MOL can be extended and/or 
adapted to incorporate an apparently limitless number of loci (assuming you have the time, 
patience, and seemingly single-minded zeal).161 Accordingly, when considering how 
Metrodorus’ zodiac-mnemonics may have worked, we might envisage a system that 
designated twelve major loci arranged in order of the astrological signs, with the imago of a 
 
158 I.e. the ecliptic plane of the zodiac. 
159 Quint. Inst. 11.2.24-6. 
160 Marastoni (2007) 62. 
161 On modern mnemonists’ extensive utilisation and adaptation of loci mnemonics, see Foer (2011) 97, 163-8. 
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ram (Aries) to mark the first, a bull (Taurus) for the second, and so on, before subdividing 
each of those major loci into thirty minor loci, demarcated as the Auctor ad Herennium 
advises, by means of suitable imagines, such as a golden hand (with, presumably, five golden 
digits) placed conspicuously in the fifth locus.162 Metrodorus took zodiac-mnemonics to their 
zenith, elaborating the MOL to create extremely complex subdivisions of loci; his approach 
was not, however, one that rhetoricians recommended for the practical business of 
speechmaking. His technique was so far above and beyond the complexity involved in the 
standard MOL that Quintilian not only rejected its practical value but accused those who 
practice it of vain arrogance. 
Pliny the Elder also has something to say about Metrodorus’ contribution to memoria 
artificiosa. He includes both Charmadas and Metrodorus at the end of his list of famous 
mnemonists: 
Charmadas quidam in Graecia quae quis exegerit volumina in bibliothecis legentis modo 
repraesentavit. ars postremo eius rei facta et inventa est a Simonide melico, consummata a 
Metrodoro Scepsio, ut nihil non iisdem verbis redderetur auditum. 
Plin. HN 7.89.163 
A certain Charmadas in Greece recited, on demand, any work from the libraries as if he were 
reading it aloud. Finally, an ars of this substance was created, invented by the lyric poet 
Simonides and perfected by Metrodorus of Scepsis, whereby one might repeat anything one 
had heard using exactly the same words. 
There are several intriguing points about this passage. The origin of Pliny’s anecdote 
concerning Charmadas’ ability to quote passages from texts at length is unclear. It does not 
appear in Cicero: there, Charmadas only ‘reads’ from memory inasmuch as he explains how 
his mnemonic technique works using the wax tablet metaphor, in which imagines correspond 
to litterae. Typically, as we have seen, students relied on their natural mnemonic ability (and 
not the MOL) to learn texts verbatim.164 Hence, in mentioning Charmadas’ memory for texts 
rather than his utilisation of the MOL, Pliny is not necessarily making the same connection as 
Cicero and Quintilian between Charmadas and artificial mnemonics.165 Charmadas is 
 
162 Rhet. Her. 3.31. See also Yates (1966) 39-42. 
163 Latin text: Rackham (1942). 
164 See p. 28-32. 
165 Quint. Inst. 11.2.26, referring to Cic. De or. 2.360. 
109 
 
separated from the sentence that begins ars postremo; Pliny admires his memory for texts but 
does not state that it was aided by ars. 
When it comes to the origins of memoria artificiosa, however, Pliny apparently 
accepts the ‘Ciceronian’ chronology fully, attributing the invention of a mnemonic ars to 
Simonides. He then credits Metrodorus with its technical perfection. Can we, therefore, 
conclude that it was Metrodorus who completed the codification of memoria artificiosa, the 
oratorical MOL, as it appears in first-century-BCE rhetorical handbooks? I have my doubts. 
As discussed above, Quintilian rejected Metrodorean mnemonics because they were too 
complex – even more complex than the MOL (of which he was no ardent adherent) and 
entirely unnecessary for the orator. Further, Pliny states that Metrodorus’ ars enabled the 
repetition of ‘anything one had heard using exactly the same words’. On the one hand, an ars 
that enables you to remember what you have heard is reminiscent of the MOL as it was used 
in the forum by the orator who wanted to make a mental note of all his opponent’s talking 
points, in order that he might refute them in a coherent, though largely improvised, 
response.166 On the other, the oratorical MOL was seldom, if ever, used for verbatim 
memorisation – so if Pliny does mean to imply that Metrodorus helped codify the oratorical 
MOL, then he is vastly overexaggerating the efficacy of the method in relation to word-for-
word repetition.167 
Combining the available evidence leads to the conclusion that Metrodorus took 
significant, potentially novel steps in the advancement and codification of sophisticated 
artificial mnemonic techniques involving imagines and loci.168 Yet if Quintilian’s assertion 
that Metrodorus effectively broke the normal rules for the creation of loci by adding 
astronomical complexity reflects the truth of his mnemonic practice, then we can say with 
certainty that he did not use the MOL in the way that the Auctor ad Herennium advises. So 
what was the purpose of Metrodorus’ intricate ars consummata? My own view is that the 
answer probably lies in his professional life as a rhetor in the court of Mithridates. Quintilian, 
referring to a passage of Cicero that no longer survives, states that Metrodorus, like 
Hortensius, was adept at using mental instead of written preparation to deliver a speech from 
 
166 For detailed explanation of this usage, see Ch. III, p. 139-42. 
167 Alternatively, Pliny’s concept of verbatim reproduction may simply be less exacting than modern standards: 
see Harris (1989) 32. 
168 Based on the Pliny passage, the OCD5, s.v. Metrodorus (5), even asserts that Metrodorus ‘wrote a treatise 
expounding his system’: see Scullard and Badian (2016). There is no solid evidence for such a conclusion. 
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memory.169 The key difference between the two speakers is obviously that Hortensius was a 
forensic orator while Metrodorus was a court rhetorician. We should therefore envision 
Metrodorus employing mnemonic techniques in the production and delivery of epideictic 
speeches – royal encomium even – rather than defence speeches on behalf of a cliens.  
Metrodorus could have even used his skills to impress the Mithridatic court with 
astonishing feats of memory in much the same way as modern professional mnemonists still 
impress audiences today; after all, we know that Hortensius, an upstanding Roman orator, 
was not averse to showing off the strength of his memoria artificiosa occasionally outside of 
the forum.170 In order to perform bravura feats of memory for his royal audience, just as 
modern mnemonists take the ‘simple’ oratorical MOL and add complexity to perform more 
esoteric tasks, so Metrodorus could have adapted the MOL to incorporate his 360 astrological 
loci. Thus, we might say that Metrodorus created a true ars consummata in the same way as a 
modern mnemonist who adapts the MOL to memorise the order of several thousand playing 
cards might be said to have ‘perfected’ the technique. The feats of memory that modern 
mnemonists perform are astonishing in part because they lack real-world application; because 
most people would never dream of putting in the effort required to memorise such a 
superfluity of meaningless information.  
Metrodorus’ methods were most likely at the extreme end of a spectrum of techniques 
used by more oratorically-inclined practitioners of the discipline, a spectrum that included 
basic word- and place-association mnemonics as well as what became the standard oratorical 
MOL. That said, the basic premise of Metrodorus’ practice of using astrological signs to 
denote the order of loci was probably in more widespread use.171 Most importantly for this 
study, the fact that Metrodorus developed his advanced mnemonic techniques either during or 
subsequent to his time as a philosopher of the Sceptical Academy is another strong indication 
that a rhetorical theory of memory resembling the Auctor’s MOL may have featured among 
the praecepta rhetorum disseminated by the Sceptics in this period. 
 
 
169 Quint. Inst. 10.6.4. 
170 I allude to the ‘auction’ episode: full discussion, Ch. III, p. 139. 
171 Astrological symbolism may feature in the Auctor’s exemplar imago at Rhet. Her. 3.33: see Ch. I, n. 17. 
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5. A new chronology of memoria artificiosa 
This chapter has attempted to assimilate many centuries of developing and divergent 
philosophical and rhetorical theories of memory into a multifaceted narrative by unpicking 
the patchwork testimonia that, combined, represent our knowledge of the Greco-Roman 
discourse on mnemonics, before re-weaving common threads. The result is, perhaps 
inevitably, still a patchwork, but one that I hope retains coherent form. This final section 
summarises the findings and ties up certain loose ends, although the precise details of when 
and where the fully-fledged oratorical MOL was integrated into the ars rhetorica cannot, 
based on the evidence we have, be ascertained with absolute certainty. Fig. 3, p. 116, 
represents what we can ascertain, in graphical format, based on the analysis presented in this 
chapter and a certain amount of interpolation on my part, as explained below. 
My chronology begins with a revocation of the Muse: although Mnemosyne may have 
inspired the poets, she did not inspire rhetoricians and orators to develop the MOL.172 The 
notion that Simonides had anything to do with the invention of the technique is misleading; 
the MOL was not invented by a poet faced with too much written material, nor was its 
development driven by the spread of ink, parchment, literacy, and libraries.173 If we are to use 
the lexicon of memory in relation to the transmission of early Greek written poetry, then 
conceptualising the texts of poets as vehicles of that transmission is probably best done 
through the theoretical framework of communicative and cultural memory.174 There is no 
evidence, however, that the MOL was utilised by poets or storytellers to preserve and then 
disseminate their texts in poetic or any other form, and we should avoid framing memoria 
artificiosa as a mechanism of cultural transmission. Oral poetry certainly demonstrates 
features that render it memorable and the ‘mnemonics of poetry’ are a worthy subject of 
study in their own right, but they concern structures of language – of formulae and scripts and 
meter and sound – rather than the imaginary visual constructs, the imagines and loci, of the 
 
172 The question of why Mnemosyne, Memory, was originally installed as mother of the Muses (and hence the 
Arts) is an interesting one: see e.g. Ahearne-Kroll (2014) 103-6; Castagnoli and Ceccarelli (2019) 9-12, 17-20. 
My own view is that the Mnemosyne-Muse link probably originated with ritual invocations of the goddess, 
performed to confer rights of authoritative speech onto the invoker – be he poet, priest, or judge – as a guardian 
of orally-transmitted knowledge: we are thus straying into the realms of communicative and cultural memory. 
173 Per Small’s chronology: see my summary, p. 65-6. 
174 À la Agócs, who starts from the premise that early poetic texts were defined by their role in a ‘culture of 
memory’ based on the spoken word, and that poets who composed in writing (e.g. Pindar) continued ‘the 
ancient ideology of song as commemoration and memorialisation’: Agócs (2019) 69-71 (quoted p. 69). 
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MOL.175 The MOL was, from the outset, the province of rhetoricians and orators. That is not 
to say rhetoricians and orators were uninterested in what rendered poetic language 
memorable – they were heavily invested in discovering what made some linguistic 
constructions intrinsically more memorable than others. Ancient orators, like modern 
speechwriters and advertisers, wanted their words to stick in the minds of the audience. But 
slogans are no substitute for substance. Sometimes orators needed to talk in prose, to move 
systematically through a series of topics, making their own arguments or refuting their 
opponent’s arguments one-by-one. To help them remember the structure and arrangement of 
those arguments, the MOL was devised. 
The MOL combined two groups of mnemonic techniques in what eventually came to 
be a standardised set of rules. The first group involved the principles of associative 
mnemonics – that is, the simple association of words, objects, or abstract concepts with 
mental images. Associative mnemonics were employed by Sophists at least as far back as the 
era of Hippias; our earliest evidence is probably the Dissoi logoi. The second group of 
techniques might be described collectively as ‘τόποι-mnemonics’ – by which I mean 
techniques based on the principle that the incorporation of place and space into simple 
associative mnemonics can improve the retention of mnemonic content dramatically. When 
Aristotle was writing on natural memory, some of his contemporaries appear to have been 
using some form of τόποι-mnemonics. The fact that there is a large blank area in the left 
(blue) portion of Fig. 3, however, which would otherwise feature individuals who are key to 
our understanding of how τόποι-mnemonics developed, demonstrates the sparseness and 
uncertainty of our evidence for artificial mnemonics in this period. 
At some point after the two groups of mnemonic techniques described above were 
fused into what we now know as the fully-fledged MOL, a system of instruction was devised. 
The result was a standardised set of rules designed for pedagogic dissemination in the 
rhetorical schools of the late second and early first centuries BCE – the set of rules for the 
creation of imagines and loci that we see in the Rhetorica ad Herennium. Our understanding 
of where and why this set of rules emerged can be supplemented by turning to the 
philosophical models of memoria naturalis presented in the middle (green) portion of Fig. 3. 
The analogy of memory as a wax block or tablet, which influenced both Plato and Aristotle, 
was adopted and adapted by multiple later philosophical schools. Eventually, when it came to 
 
175 The intrinsically memorable features of meter are discussed by Aristotle, Rh. 3.1409b. For other examples of 
memorable poetic structures, see Rubin (1995) Ch. 9 (Homeric epic), Ch. 10 (counting-out rhymes). 
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the place of memory within philosophy and rhetoric, a divergence appears to have occurred, 
between the Stoics, who excluded artificial memory from their conceptualisation of rhetoric, 
and the Academic Sceptics, who gradually incorporated it into their teaching. Certain 
Sceptics, like Charmadas of Athens, believed all rhetorical disciplines should be well-
grounded on proper philosophical principles. Consequently Charmadas, as illustrated in Fig. 
3, was most likely influenced by, and had influence upon, conceptualisations of both 
memoria naturalis and memoria artificiosa. The Sceptics’ insistence that rhetorical precepts 
be preceded by philosophical knowledge may have led them to invoke theoretical concepts – 
the wax tablet, the mind’s eye, the ars/natura axiom – to explain and justify the rules for the 
creation of loci and imagines in the MOL.  
As for the development and incorporation of architectural elements into the MOL, 
with loci featuring rooms, columns, and corners, although we have no evidence for them in 
Greek texts, there is no reason to suppose that they were unique to a Latin codification.176 
Most probably, these ‘architectural’ loci developed as a logical extension of the rules for the 
creation of loci, which the Auctor explains using the concept of the mind’s eye: to be 
perceived properly, mental objects, just like physical objects, had to be placed at an 
appropriate distance, in an uncluttered environment, in good light, and so on. For 
mnemonists, fabricating imaginary architecture that possessed these ‘Goldilocks’ properties, 
rather than relying on their own memories of real places that possessed them by chance, 
would have been an obvious step. 
Further, the role of individual mnemonists in the development of the MOL should not 
be overlooked. It seems likely that the evolution of mnemonic techniques was iterative, each 
mnemonist adopting, discarding, adapting, or elaborating the techniques developed by 
previous practitioners to create more sophisticated techniques, or techniques designed for a 
specific purpose, just as modern-day mnemonists adapt and develop their techniques today.177 
This iterative developmental process created hybrid offshoots of the MOL that were utilised 
by some practitioners but dropped by others, such as Metrodorus’ complex zodiac-
mnemonics. Accordingly, in the case of the MOL, recognising that spatial associations can 
 
176 Cf. Baroin (2007) 135-60, who sees something uniquely Roman in the architectural vocabulary sometimes 
attached to loci in Latin sources, chiefly Quintilian; yet even Quintilian states that there is no requirement for 
loci to include architectural elements, and an iter longum or other imaginary regiones will suffice (see Quint. 
Inst. 11.2.20-1). Regardless, in the absence of Hellenistic mnemonic treatises, the contention is ultimately 
unprovable. 
177 Foer (2011) 165-6. 
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improve mnemonic retention of imagines may have led practitioners to place imagines in an 
individual locus; then, to string together multiple loci to improve sequential recall; then, to 
develop detailed rules for creating those loci with optimal dimensions and for populating 
them with memorable features; and so on and so forth, with the result that multiple iterations 
of personalised mnemonic methods were produced and, at various points, there existed a 
range of artes memoriae. It is probable that Metrodorus’ zodiac-mnemonics, as one of these 
artes memoriae, coexisted alongside multiple different variations of less complex loci-
mnemonics that were being used by contemporaneous rhetoricians. The ars memoriae that 
we know as the MOL thus represents the codified result of generations of practitioners 
reiterating and developing what they knew had worked before.178 
As for the question of exactly when the final codification of the MOL occurred, 
circumstantial evidence points towards the end of the second century BCE, around the same 
time as Charmadas and Metrodorus were building their reputations as innovators in the 
discipline. Such a dating is compelling, but ultimately speculative. The Sceptical Academy, 
through the incorporation of current rhetorical teaching practices into its philosophical 
method, provided the intellectual environment to make such developments possible; this does 
not mean that they occurred. Nevertheless, with the fusion of natural and artificial, the 
pedagogic codification of the MOL was complete. This codification laid the groundwork for 
subsequent Latin treatments of memoria artificiosa, including those in the Rhetorica ad 
Herennium and De oratore.179 
It is worth stressing, for a final time, that our perception of the developing 
conceptualisation of memoria as ars is, by and large, Cicero’s.180 Although Simonides’ 
reputation as a mnemonist no doubt existed beforehand, the invocation of Simonides to 
justify rules that had previously been explained via the wax tablet metaphor, the ars/natura 
axiom, and so on, represents a Ciceronian innovation. The picture we have of the 
development of the MOL in the second century, populated by figures such as Charmadas and 
 
178 Interestingly, Cicero (via Crassus) posits a similar iterative model for the development of the rules of the ars 
dicendi at large: Cic. De or. 1.107-9. 
179 Calboli hypothesises that Marcus Antonius’ rhetorical libellus may also have dealt with all five 
subdisciplines, including memoria. He argues that many elements connect the historical Antonius to the Auctor 
ad Herennium, including their treatments of memoria artificiosa and their (inferred) preference for the 
philosophical principles of Academic Scepticism. His arguments are not unproblematic but, if the Auctor did 
prefer the philosophy of the Academic Sceptics, it may add weight to the idea that his codification of the MOL 
was drawn at least in part from Sceptical rhetoric. See Calboli (1972) 120-77, esp. 144-9. 
180 Wisse even believes that the innovative brand of ‘philosophical rhetoric’ Cicero attributes to Charmadas and 
Philo was, in fact, largely his own: see Wisse (2002b) 396-7. 
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Metrodorus, is Ciceronian. The very events of Crassus’ and Antonius’ lives, concerning their 
visits to Athens, Asia, and their studies with Charmadas and Metrodorus, could (for all we 
know) be Ciceronian inventions.181 As Long puts it, reflecting more broadly on Cicero’s 
rendering of the philosophy of Plato, Aristotle, Philo, and Antiochus: ‘It all fits together a bit 
too well’.182 As the format of Fig. 3 on the next page suggests, one of the main results of the 
analysis presented in this chapter – perhaps even the most important – is the introduction of 
complexity into that satisfyingly-coherent, but probably misleading, Ciceronian chronology. 
If we are to understand how the MOL was utilised in practice, we must do away with 
Cicero’s Simonidean invention and see the MOL for what it really was: a sophisticated 
mnemonic system designed to aid a speaker when memorising either the main talking points 
of his own speech prior to delivery (to aid what remained a largely improvised performance) 
or the main points of an opponent’s speech during delivery (in order that he might produce a 
targeted response). To this end, the next chapter moves away from the theory of memoria 




181 May and Wisse (2001) 17-8 raise this possibility.  







Memory in the forensic process 
The first two chapters of this thesis explored how the theory of memoria artificiosa 
developed to meet the didactic requirements of rhetoricians and the practical needs of orators. 
This chapter shifts focus away from theory to the MOL in practice, examining the role of 
memory in the activities of late-republican orators. It explores the utilisation of mnemonic 
skills (natural and/or artificial) in the practical business of oratory, in the preparation of 
speeches before trial and in the performance of speeches during trial.1 Accordingly, I divide 
the ‘forensic process’ into two stages: first, the preparation phase, when the orator was 
compiling his arguments and composing his speech outside of the forum; and second, the trial 
phase, when he was delivering a pre-prepapost reditumred speech and/or devising a response 
speech to counter his opposition live in front of an audience.  
Cicero provides our main evidence of how various orators utilised their mnemonic 
skills as they dealt with these two phases; as becomes clear from works such as Brutus and 
(to a lesser extent) De oratore, there was a considerable diversity of approach. Nevertheless, 
common themes emerge. The MOL was implemented by some (though by no means all) 
orators in the late Republic in various specific instances, at least one of which – when an 
orator executed the MOL while his opponent was speaking – has so far gone unrecognised in 
modern scholarship. Outside of the forum, during the preparation phase, there are two basic 
scenarios in which the MOL was used: the commonly cited scenario involved an orator 
encoding prepared material in his memory for a set-piece speech; but there are some 
indications that an orator may have utilised the MOL in other instances, when he was talking 
to his cliens or a witness, to memorise key facts for later reference. Not dissimilarly, inside 
the forum during the trial phase, two uses of the MOL are apparent: the first, again well-
known, was when the orator was in the act of delivering a speech, to retrieve pre-prepared 
material from his memory; the second was when he was listening to witness testimony and 
the arguments of his opposition, to memorise the key points for a subsequent largely 
improvised response and/or refutation. 
 
1 I deal here with forensic speeches. The different demands of speaking before the senate or contio may have led 
to different approaches, notably greater utilisation of prepared statements and less improvisation: for senatorial 
speeches, see below, p. 125-7; for contional speeches, Mouritsen (2013) 63-82. 
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We might add a third phase to the typical forensic process in addition to the two 
outlined above: namely, ‘publication’, the process by which the orator set down the 
individual words of his speech for circulation to a wider audience (which of course includes 
us).2 Although I have considered the role of memory, broadly defined, in this phase in some 
depth, I do not discuss it in this chapter for several reasons. First, space and scope: memoria 
artificiosa was of little use during the publication phase, whether the orator had used the 
MOL to memorise the broad outline of his speech during the preparation phase or not. During 
the writing-up process, the emphasis switched from an orator’s own mnemonic capacity to 
consideration of what the audience had found most memorable about his speech, as well as 
how the orator wanted the speech to be remembered (or, indeed, forgotten) by a wider 
audience in the long term.3 These are fascinating areas of study, but do not concern the 
exercise of mnemonic theory in practice; rather, they relate to the transformation of a live 
performance into text. A second reason is simply that the publication phase has long been the 
most studied stage of forensic oratory, with many scholars addressing the thorny question of 
the extent to which the words in certain oratorical speeches, almost exclusively Cicero’s, 
reflect those that were delivered live.4 Even though the publication phase was not necessarily 
one that orators typically undertook (Cicero gives us a list of reasons why other orators did 
not pursue his own practices of publication), paucity of evidence means that less work has 
been devoted to the preparation and trial phases of the forensic process.5  
My contention is that memoria was, like actio, an inherently performative discipline, 
unique because it had necessarily to be enacted both before and during the performance of a 
speech.6 Consequently, focussing on how memoria enabled and aided an orator’s preparation 
 
2 I use the anachronistic ‘publication’ as convenient shorthand for writing-up and circulation. Starr advises that 
the term’s unavoidable modern implications mean it should never be used: Starr (1987) 215, n. 18. I tend to 
agree, but an alternative is yet to catch on. For what it meant to ‘publish’ a speech, see Crawford (1984) 2 and 
Phillips (1986) 228. 
3 We see this shift in focus in Cicero’s written speeches. For recent book-length studies on Cicero’s apparent 
desire for memoria sempiterna, an ‘everlasting posthumous reputation’, see Bishop (2019), esp. Ch. 6 and 
Conclusion; and La Bua (2019), esp. Ch. 1. For further thoughts, see my ‘Concluding remarks’, p. 191-2. 
4 Contributions to this debate include Humbert (1925), esp. 13-20; Stroh (1975) 31-54; Lintott (2008) 15-32. 
There are many more. I highlight Alexander, however, who notes the role that memory played in Cicero’s 
process of ‘reconstructing’ a speech post-delivery: Alexander (2002) 15-26, esp. 19. 
5 Cic. Brut. 91-2. Crawford enumerates 80 extant, fragmentary, and lost Ciceronian speeches versus 83 
unpublished: see Crawford (1984) 11, with broader discussion p. 1-21. 
6 Although we might also expect orators to have rehearsed gesture and movement pre-trial. Balbo approaches 
the discipline of actio in a similar fashion to this chapter, likewise emphasising the diversity of late-republican 
practice: see Balbo (2018) 227-246. 
119 
 
and delivery can provide additional insights into the practical stages of the forensic process 
that cannot be gleaned from the text of an oration, however complete. In current scholarship, 
it is not unreasonably assumed that the advice given by Quintilian in the late first century CE 
holds good for orators of the Ciceronian period also.7 That advice highlights the important 
mediating role of memoria in the process of moving from preparation to trial: crucial parts of 
speeches, says Quintilian, especially the openings, should be written out and memorised for 
delivery; as for the rest, it should be planned as fully as practicable, while leaving plenty of 
room for possible improvisation, as circumstances dictate.8 But what and how much material, 
exactly, did the orator memorise before a trial? And how did he prepare himself, while 
listening to the speeches of his opponents in the forum, to deliver a largely improvised 
response?  
 
1. The preparation phase 
For a Roman orator, the preparation phase of the forensic process lasted from the moment he 
took on a case to the commencement of his first speech at trial.9 As well as collecting the 
relevant facts, he would work out what he was going to say using methods outlined by the 
preparative rhetorical subdisciplines: inventio (‘invention’, the discovery of arguments), 
dispositio, (‘arrangement’, the structure of the speech), and elocutio (‘linguistic style’, the 
type of language to be used in the speech).10 He may also have planned and rehearsed his 
delivery, actio, which encompassed both modulation of the voice and movement of the 
body.11 Consequently, to retain all of this extensive preparative work in his mind, ready for 
trial, the orator relied upon memory, whether natural or artificial, meaning that the 
preparation phase also involved a significant amount of mnemonic encoding. In what follows, 
I first investigate the type and quantity of material that an orator typically had to memorise 
pre-trial, as well as asking how much of that material (if any) was written. Second, I examine 
whether there is any evidence to suggest that some late-republican orators flouted forensic 
 
7 E.g. Small (2007) 203, Alexander (2002) 16-7.  
8 Quint. Inst. 10.7.30.  
9 For procedural details of forensic trials, from the bringing of charges to the structure of the trial itself, see 
Alexander (2002) 7-8. 
10 For definitions, see May and Wisse (2001) 29-38. It should be emphasised that elocutio refers to the ‘style’ of 
the orator’s spoken language, rather than written style: see Kirchner (2007) 181-94. 
11 See Hall (2007) 218-34. 
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‘best practice’ by composing a written speech and reading from a script aloud, rather than 
relying on memory. Finally, I consider two of Cicero’s exemplary orators, Crassus and 
Antonius, and how their ostensibly superior mnemonic abilities are depicted as enhancing 
their oratory overall. 
 
1.a. How did an orator prepare for his speech? 
I begin my discussion of the preparation phase with a story Cicero tells us about Servius 
Sulpicius Galba, who, with only one day to prepare for a case, stayed up all night and 
continued working until the last possible minute cum servis litteratis, to whom he would 
dictate his thoughts in turn. His enslaved assistants emerged exhausted, while Galba himself 
went on to perform at trial with the same passionate intensity that he had displayed during 
preparation.12 Galba’s method is highlighted as atypical because he got so worked up while 
preparing the case, rather than saving himself for the forum.13 The incident suggests that the 
preparation phase was ideally construed as one of considered deliberation. Indeed, the verbs 
commonly used by Cicero to denote the activities undertaken in this period, such as 
commentari and the closely-related meditari or cogitare, imply as much – the preparative 
process was not one of emotion-driven action but of mental reflection, during which an orator 
might gather his resources rather than expend them.14  
As for the activities pursued during the preparation phase, the distinction between 
verbs like meditari and cogitare on the one hand and commentari on the other, while by no 
means a strict or exclusive one, is broadly indicative of two different preparative modes, the 
former relating to mental preparation and the latter including some written element: that is to 
say, in an oratorical context, commentari implies the production of preparatory 
commentarii.15 The nature of these commentarii, which we might rather vaguely refer to as 
 
12 Brut. 85-8. Galba’s oratorical style was notorious for playing on the emotions of his audience: see Brut. 89-90 
and De or. 3.28, plus commentary on the latter passage in Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse (1996) 161. Notably, 
Cicero says Galba’s case-winning passion was not evident from his published orations: Brut. 91-4. For Galba’s 
fragmentary orations, see ORF3 109-15. 
13 Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.55: Cicero always maintains his inner calm(!). 
14 Both commentari and meditari are used in the Galba passage. As well as denoting preparation, they are 
sometimes used in the context of regular extra-forensic practice exercises: e.g. [Hortensius] meditaretur extra 
forum, Brut. 302; magister hic Samnitium […] cotidie commentatur, De or. 3.86. See also discussion of the use 
of commentatur in the Galba passage in Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse (1996) 296. 
15 The TLL, s.v. 1. commentor 1.a-b, lists meditari (alongside comminisci, commemorare, etc.) to define 
commentari (hence, it is comparable with Greek μελετάω). I would argue, however, that many of the 
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‘preparatory material’, is important when it comes to the question of what precisely an orator 
would write down and subsequently memorise during the preparation phase.16 Did a 
commentarius include complete paragraphs of a speech, or only the briefest of notes? As 
discussed in the first two chapters, there is a big difference between attempting to memorise a 
complete speech verbatim and memorising the outline, the main ‘headers’ or ‘topics’: the 
latter is a task for which the rhetorical MOL is ideally suited; the former is not.  
A little too much emphasis has, I think, been put on the idea that cases were worked 
out in great detail in writing before trial in the republican period. Although various oratorical 
commentarii from the late Republic survived into the Principate, they tend to be 
overshadowed by the now lost commentarii of Cicero, which were probably circulated after 
his death.17 If we trust Quintilian’s report that Cicero’s commentarii contained ‘especially the 
essentials and, at the very least, the introductions’ (maxime necessaria et utique initia) for his 
speeches, we might envision a wide range of written material in these texts, from one-word 
reminders, to carefully-crafted phrases, to multiple opening sentences.18 Asconius, who also 
had access to Cicero’s commentarii, supports this notion with the suggestion that they might 
sometimes include a principium (a ‘preface’, in some form or other).19 Cicero’s commentarii 
certainly did not resemble anything approaching complete scripts – those were composed 
after delivery, if at all.20  
Quintilian does recommend the budding orator compose speeches more fully in 
writing, but not in order to memorise them; the purpose is (perhaps counterintuitively) to 
improve his facility for improvised expression when speaking extempore (Inst. 10.7.28-33). 
Without wanting to repeat my discussion of Quintilian’s discourse on cogitatio in Inst. 10 
(see Ch. I, p. 34-5), in the context of written versus mental preparation, it is worth 
highlighting that when Quintilian returns to the theme of cogitatio in Inst. 11, he highlights 
how written composition is an inefficient method of preparing for a speech (11.2.10). 
 
subsequently cited instances of Ciceronian usage certainly indicate the production of something written, esp. 
Brut. 87, 305, and Fam. 12.2.1. Cf. TLL s.v. meditor I.B1.a.  
16 The written works Latin authors referred to as commentarii are many and varied: I refer to the oratorical 
commentarius, which falls within the categories defined at TLL s.v. commentarius I.B1-2. 
17 For Tiro’s conjectured role in the publication of Cicero’s commentarii (among other works), see McDermott 
(1972b) 277-86. 
18 Quint. Inst. 10.7.30-1.  
19 Asc. Tog. cand. 87C. Text: Clark (1907). 
20 See Cic. Brut. 91, pleraeque enim scribuntur orationes habitae iam, non ut habeantur; also, Tusc. 4.55, cum 
iam rebus transactis et praeteritis orationes scribimus… (text: Fohlen (1931)). 
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Quintilian advises nothing be written that is not to be memorised; and, if longer chunks of 
prose must be memorised verbatim, he states that the MOL is of little use and that less 
sophisticated techniques, mainly rote repetition, work best (11.2.23-8). Ultimately, while 
confessing that he does not personally possess the strongest natural mnemonic capacities, 
Quintilian asserts that if he had enough time to devote to memoria, written preparation would 
be rendered entirely unnecessary (11.2.39, 11.2.45). Thus, we observe again how rhetorical 
memoria is designed to liberate the orator from written scripts both prior to and during his 
oratorical performance. Finally, Quintilian stresses that during delivery the orator must avoid 
at all costs the appearance that he has written out a speech and learnt it by rote beforehand 
(11.2.46-7). 
To return to the late Republic, the advice given by the Auctor ad Herennium is 
essentially in agreement. As discussed in the first chapter (p. 23-4), although the Auctor gives 
an extremely laboured explanation of how one might theoretically go about memorising a 
single line of poetry verbatim using the MOL, he makes three things clear: first, we must rely 
on ingenium, natural ability, more than on ars to memorise passages word-for-word; second, 
even if we use the MOL, it will not work unless combined with rote repetition; and third, 
memoria verborum is of little use in the forum.21 Cicero likewise denotes memoria rerum (in 
the form of the MOL) as the orator’s special skill, in opposition to memoria verborum.22 This 
observation, that the MOL was considered the most useful memorisation technique for the 
practical business of speechmaking and of little use for memorising text verbatim, is itself a 
good indication that the amount of text late-republican orators typically memorised was 
extremely limited and, hence, that relatively few words of their eventual speeches were 
composed in advance.23 
Such a conclusion is further supported by the evidence we have for the contents of 
commentarii produced by orators other than Cicero. Quintilian tells us that there exist other 
commentarii ‘found by chance, just as the orator had composed them before he was about to 
speak’ (inventi forte, ut eos dicturus quisque composuerat); he distinguishes the commentarii 
of the republican orator Servius Sulpicius Rufus from these chance discoveries on the 
 
21 Rhet. Her. 3.34, 3.39.  
22 Cic. De or. 2.359. 
23 Cf. McDonnell (1996) 489: ‘Roman orators were often called upon to memorize long passages or whole 
speeches verbatim’. The passages cited by McDonnell (from the Auctor, Quintilian, and the elder Seneca) fail to 
support this statement, since they all refer to exercises of rote memorisation undertaken by boys and young men 
in the ludus, not by professional orators. 
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grounds that they appear so ‘finished’ (exacti) they must be the product of revision post-
delivery, collected in a book for posterity.24 A typical commentarius, by contrast, was brief, 
undeveloped, and unpolished.  
I note that, although we have no proper surviving examples of oratorical commentarii 
from the late Republic, it seems likely the practice of producing them was carried over into 
the imperial period, though it was no doubt transformed somewhat outside of the forensic 
sphere by the growing popularity of declamation. This hypothesis is borne out by the 
production of collections of eminently-quotable material such as the elder Seneca’s 
Controversiae and Suasoriae.25 In his preface to these declamatory extracts, Seneca laments 
the lack of commentarii maximorum declamatorum – by which he means the preparatory 
notes produced by the great declaimers included in his collection, a number of whom were 
respected orators of the late Republic in their own right.26 These speakers presumably 
continued the practice of preparing their speeches with commentarii and, like their earlier 
counterparts, most saw no good reasons to publish. As a result, Seneca took it upon himself 
to collect memorable sayings, witticisms, and sententiae of all forms from these speakers, as 
they were recorded during or after delivery, in a manner not dissimilar to Sulpicius Rufus, 
who collected his rough commentarii and worked them up post-delivery into polished 
oratorical gems. Both he, and later the elder Seneca, thus attempted to provide something 
more than a cursory commentarius for posterity, a work that possessed literary worth – or (if 
that is too grand) at least a work that others considered worth reading for pedagogic purposes.  
In this connection, to posit an earlier example of a commentarius that underwent such 
a transformation from rough notes to polished extracts, I turn to the remnants of an oration 
delivered in 106 in defence of the lex Servilia (a law aimed at abolishing the exclusive right 
of equites to act as iudices in certain courts) by Cicero’s former mentor and role model, 
Lucius Licinius Crassus, whom Cicero set on a pedestal as the orator par excellence of his 
generation.27 A good deal has been written about this speech, especially since Cicero, in the 
 
24 Quint. Inst. 10.7.30-1. 
25 For the increasing popularity of declamation in this period, see Bloomer (2007) 297-300. 
26 Sen. Contr. 1.pr.11. The careers of the Senecan orators-cum-declaimers are discussed in turn by Bornecque 
(1902). 
27 Cicero states that he and his brother were educated by Crassus’ favoured instructors and had frequent 
interactions with Crassus, since they were often at his home: De or. 2.1-3. We may, however, doubt the extent 
of this interaction, given that Crassus died before Cicero was sixteen. For the surviving fragments of Crassus’ 
orations, see ORF3 237-59; for a summary of Crassus’ career, Steel (2007) 242-3; and for Crassus as Cicero’s 
personal role model, van der Blom (2010) 226-30, 251-4. 
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Brutus, tells us it was so celebrated that it was preserved and used as a model text, quasi 
magistra.28 Yet, it seems that even this exemplary speech was only partially recorded: much 
was left out, as Cicero infers ‘from certain headers, which are set down but not developed’ 
(ex quibusdam capitibus expositis nec explicatis).29 It is possible that the text simply 
represented Crassus’ preparatory material, circulated post-trial. Alternatively, Crassus may 
have undertaken to polish the text, choosing which capita to develop more fully.30 Hence, the 
circulated text would represent a fleshed-out commentarius, containing the juiciest sections of 
the speech, while the original preparatory material only contained the barest bones – those 
capita, maybe, and nothing more. Another possibility is that the initial circulation of the 
speech was beyond Crassus’ control – perhaps some eager listener got hold of the original 
commentarius and elaborated it with highlights heard in person. This seems less likely but, 
again, would imply a minimalistic commentarius. Yet another (more remote) alternative is 
the expansion of Crassus’ original commentarius as a rhetorical exercise by a third party who 
had not heard the original; this possibility is conceivable if, as Cicero claims, the 
commentarius was being used as a teaching text. 
As Cicero continues his lament for the fact that Crassus wrote so little, he tells us that 
another speech, the significant attack that Crassus had made during his censorship against his 
fellow censor Domitius, ‘is not a speech, but hardly any more than, as it were, the headers for 
talking points and the commentarius of the speech’ (non est oratio, sed quasi capita rerum et 
orationis commentarium paulo plenius).31 This assessment reinforces the idea that Crassus 
typically composed very little in writing before delivering an oration, and we must conclude 
that his commentarii were customarily skeletal, mere lists of talking points. Much of Crassus’ 
preparatory work was presumably conducted mentally; his approach is a good illustration of 
 
28 Cic. Brut. 164. Cicero’s Brutus has a lower opinion of the speech, although Cicero reasserts its merits: Brut. 
296-8. Fantham asserts that the text was being ‘circulated and memorized among student orators’: Fantham 
(2004) 27. The speech was clearly controversial and influential (see Morstein-Marx (2004) 235-7), but I see no 
evidence of widespread memorisation, unless we count the various fragments quoted by Cicero – and he could 
have been consulting a copy. 
29 Cic. Brut. 163-4.  
30 Interestingly, Pliny seems to have concluded, from the existence of undeveloped tituli in a number of 
Ciceronian speeches (including Pro Murena and the now-lost Pro Vareno), that Cicero sometimes omitted 
chunks of his speeches in a not dissimilar fashion, although there are certainly other plausible explanations: see 
Plin. Ep. 1.20.7, and Dyck (2012) 54. My own view is that Cicero was on rather the opposite end of the 
spectrum to Crassus – if Cicero decided a speech was worth circulating post-delivery, instead of releasing a 
revised commentarius, he generally elaborated every talking point fully (unless there were good reasons for 
omission). 
31 Cic. Brut. 164. 
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why we should not attach too much weight to Cicero’s own habits of post-delivery 
publication, nor assume orators memorised chunks of material in the preparation phase. 
To sum up, in the republican period oratorical commentarii were generally the 
roughest of notes – key words and simple reminders of what to talk about. These notes served 
essentially the same purpose as the imagines in the MOL, but in written form. They acted as 
mnemonic triggers. We might envision an orator transforming the bullet points contained in 
his commentarius into imagines and subsequently memorising them using the MOL: whether 
a given orator did this was, however, no doubt a case of training, personal preference, and 
individual mnemonic skill. Cicero gives us several examples of orators who clearly did make 
use of the MOL during the preparation phase; but before introducing them, I want to briefly 
consider the alternative possibility, that an orator might sometimes deliver his speech with 
text in hand. 
 
1.b. The alternative to the MOL: composing a script 
The question of whether an orator in the late Republic would ever write a script and then read 
it aloud before his audience has provoked considerable debate in relation to Cicero himself, 
and to one speech in particular: Post reditum in senatu. At Pro Plancio 74, Cicero cites Red. 
sen. as evidence that he had publicly declared the depth of his gratitude to Plancius (who was 
standing trial accused of electoral corruption) for the help that Plancius had given him when 
he was in exile. Cicero makes the following key statement: ‘Let the speech be read aloud – a 
speech that, because of the importance of the affair, was delivered from a script’ (recitetur 
oratio quae propter rei magnitudinem dicta de scripto est).32 The implication seems clear: 
here is a situation where we know Cicero wrote out a speech in full beforehand and recited it 
word-for-word on delivery. Bücher and Walter, however, have argued both on textual 
grounds, and on the grounds that a script would have constrained Cicero’s ability to speak 
freely, that Cicero never performed ‘mit Manuskript’.33 Vössing, in direct response, has 
explicitly rejected their thesis, arguing that Cicero mentions this instance when he read from 
a script precisely because it was exceptional; it only happened once, in a crucial period after 
 
32 The statement refers directly to Red. sen. 35. For the phrase de scripto, cf. Phil. 10.5, where Cicero criticises 
Q. Fufius for a statement he read from a script in the senate. The bibliography on Planc. is extensive: see Grillo 
(2014) 216, n. 8. 
33 Bücher and Walter (2006) 237-40. 
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his return from exile.34 I tend to agree – Red. sen. was a set-piece speech, Cicero’s ‘comeback 
moment’ in the senate, while the occasion and setting afforded him the chance to perform an 
epideictic oration of the highest polish (although we obviously cannot rule out the idea that 
he used a text on other equally stage-managed occasions).  
We are still left with the question of why Cicero did not memorise the script word-
for-word as, given enough time, he presumably could have done. I have no answer, only a 
possible analogy. It is common practice for modern politicians to circulate the text of a 
speech pre-delivery and to then deliver it using a teleprompter. If they are not going to use a 
teleprompter, preparing a full written version of their speech in advance is (as certain high-
profile mishaps have illustrated) unwise, since as and when that written version is released or 
leaked to the press, deviations or (worse) major omissions will be noticed.35 The politician’s 
mnemonic failings become the story, rather than the content of the speech. Walters has 
suggested that Cicero pre-circulated the contional oration Post reditum ad populum.36 We 
should not rule out the possibility that Cicero did the same with the corresponding senatorial 
speech, Red. sen., to stoke anticipation and for the benefit of those senators who could not 
attend on the day. A pre-circulated text would have enabled Cicero to broadcast his return to 
the political stage as widely as possible in advance, while eliminating any delay between 
delivery and ‘publication’.37 As in the modern political scenario, however, a pre-circulated 
text could also have drawn attention to any deviations or omissions, even if (as in the case of 
the gratitude Cicero expressed to Plancius) they were minor. The need to avert such pitfalls 
on this rare and highly-anticipated occasion may have prompted Cicero to speak from a 
script.  
Further, to return to a less speculative line of reasoning, in the context of Cicero’s 
defence of Plancius, the broader argument at Planc. 74 would be completely undermined if 
Red. sen. had in fact only been written up after delivery. Cicero references the earlier speech 
in the senate as evidence precisely because it bears witness to the exact words of a public 
declaration. Hence, as evidence, the reference can only have been probative if Cicero’s 
 
34 Vössing (2008) 143-50 
35 The plight of Ed Miliband, lambasted for stilted delivery and forgetting the national deficit in a ‘memorised’ 
speech of 2014, provides a suitably cautionary exemplum: see Wintour (2014) and Watt et al. (2014). 
36 Walters makes this suggestion during an interesting attempt to explain inconsistencies in the speech that seem 
to suggest it was never delivered: Walters (2017) 79-99. 
37 Mouritsen thinks it likely that Cicero would have desired to avoid delays in the circulation of his post-
consular speeches too: Mouritsen (2013) 66. 
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listeners knew that Red. sen. represented a premeditated version of the speech, rather than a 
published revision, which may have included additional votes of thanks that had originally 
gone unvoiced. If it were widely known that Red. sen. had been delivered extempore and its 
contents revised before publication, Cicero would have opened himself up to accusations of 
falsification or disingenuousness. Indeed, considerable importance was attached to the 
difference between what one was willing to say in public and what one wrote down for 
subsequent circulation. Take the case of the orator Asinius Pollio (a notorious detractor of 
Cicero, even after Cicero’s death): in the revised and published version of his speech Pro 
Lamia, Pollio apparently included the statement that Cicero had been willing to renounce the 
Philippics, yet he had been too afraid to tell such a barefaced lie when delivering the same 
speech at trial.38 This incident illustrates how an orator could include all kinds of statements, 
however controversial, in the published version of a speech, which he had not uttered in the 
original, with few (if any) immediate consequences. The process of revising an oration 
delivered extempore in the forum allowed, effectively, for the subtle massaging or reshaping 
of history because written oratorical composition freed the orator from the possibility of 
immediate protest or refutation by anyone present. In his argument at Planc. 74, Cicero 
needed to neutralise the possible counterargument that his gratitude towards Plancius was a 
retroactively applied revision. Consequently, he made sure to highlight the fact that he had 
departed from his typical preparation-delivery-publication routine in the case of Post reditum 
in senatu. 
To move the focus of debate away from Red. sen. and back to the forensic sphere, 
while Planc. 74 indicates that Cicero was speaking with a script in the formal environment of 
the senate, conversely, it suggests that he was speaking extempore when defending Plancius, 
since the statement is designed to magnify the significance of the earlier senatorial occasion 
by highlighting Cicero’s divergence from his normal (and present) forensic practice. We can 
glean from Cicero’s letters that Pro Plancio was only written up for circulation after the 
event, which all but confirms it was originally delivered sine scripto.39 Here, then, we have 
an instance of two speeches with very different modes of preparation: one written, and one 
conducted using commentarii and cogitatio.  
 
38 See Sen. Suas. 6.14-5. The date of Pollio’s speech is unknown: see Treggiari (1973) 249-51.  
39 Cic. QFr. 3.1.11, written September 54 (the exact date of Plancius’ trial is unknown, but is estimated at late 
August/early September: see Marinone (2004) 132, ad loc. B9). 
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As for the difference between speeches composed in writing and those delivered 
extempore, in De oratore Cicero has Crassus tell us that the preparative act of writing out a 
speech in full will make it strongest, which means written exercises are crucial – but they do 
not reflect conditions in the forum, where the orator must rely on his extempore speech to 
carry the day: 
caput autem est quod ut vere dicam minime facimus – est enim magni laboris, quem plerique 
fugimus – quam plurimum scribere. […] nam si subitam et fortuitam orationem commentatio 
et cogitatio facile vincit, hanc ipsam profecto adsidua ac diligens scriptura superabit.  
[…] et qui a scribendi consuetudine ad dicendum venit, hanc adfert facultatem, ut etiam 
subito si dicat, tamen illa quae dicantur similia scriptorum esse videantur; atque etiam, si 
quando in dicendo scriptum attulerit aliquid, cum ab eo discesserit, reliqua similis oratio 
consequetur.  
Cic. De or. 1.150; 1.152. 
But the principal activity is one that, to tell the truth, we do the least (since it is really hard 
work, which most [orators] avoid): writing as much as possible. […] For if careful 
preparation and premeditation easily beat an improvised speech made on the spur of the 
moment, an assiduous and careful written composition will undoubtedly outclass that 
premeditated speech.  
[…] And he who comes to make a speech via a habit of writing brings this ability to bear, so 
that even if he is improvising, nevertheless the words spoken appear much like those written; 
and further, if he ever makes use of some written text while he is speaking, when he departs 
from that, the rest of his speech will proceed similarly.  
When Cicero delivered the highly stage-managed, set-piece Red. sen., he needed to avoid 
omissions and to ensure that he expressed gratitude to all who had helped him, so he 
composed it beforehand. This scenario was unrepresentative of his typical forensic practice.40 
Nevertheless, in the passage above, Cicero recommends that the diligent orator still do plenty 
of composition practice so that, when giving a typical extempore speech – a scenario in 
which the orator will rely only on commentatio et cogitatio to carry his words – he will 
instinctively reproduce the superior written style; and if he composes a few choice phrases in 
writing beforehand, likewise, the rest of the speech will match their tone. This advice is 
effectively in accordance with Quintilian’s, mentioned above, p. 121-2. Yet, as is made clear 
 
40 For Cicero’s perception of the different tone and content required in senatorial (as opposed to forensic) 
oratory, see Lopez (2013) 291-2. 
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from Crassus’ introductory statement, Cicero did not consider that his advised approach 
actually reflected the standard practices of his contemporaries. The majority work exclusively 
on improvisation exercises, which only reinforces their bad habits; the labour involved means 
written composition is a neglected skill. In other words, most orators tended to prepare by 
simulating live performance, training themselves to memorise the outline of a speech rather 
than its minutiae, improvising the details rather than painstakingly writing them out. 
For Cicero, then, speaking with a script was a departure from the norm; he resorted to 
the practice only when he wanted to be witnessed reproducing premeditated texts like Red. 
sen. verbatim. For the initial delivery of a forensic speech in the forum, he could rely on his 
specific preparation for the case (probably including the production of a commentarius) and 
his rigorous rhetorical training (which included exercises in written composition) to render 
his improvised words both persuasive and eloquent. By way of an addendum, I note that the 
perception of speaking with a script appears to have changed somewhat in the early imperial 
period. At the end of the first century CE, Quintilian, at least, accepts that ‘brief annotations 
and little notebooks’ (brevis adnotatio libellique) might be held while speaking, to be referred 
to occasionally (although this still excludes the possibility of recitation from a full script).41 
Whether we can identify a narrower period in which a substantial shift in practice occurred is 
an open question. According to Suetonius, Augustus was famously reluctant to speak 
extempore after he came to power, despite being a proficient improviser in his youth. 
Augustus made it his practice to recite everything from a script, ‘so that he might not fall foul 
of the hazard of memory or waste time learning things by heart’ (ne periculum memoriae 
adiret aut in ediscendo tempus absumeret).42 Did Augustus instigate a trend for watching 
one’s words? The elder Seneca describes the approach of the (eventually exiled) Augustan 
orator-cum-declaimer Cassius Severus, who never spoke sine commentario, and ‘was not 
satisfied with the kind of commentarius that contains the bare bones of a case, but used one in 
which the case is written out more or less in full’.43 Yet at the same time, when speaking live 
in a trial scenario, Seneca tells us that Cassius felt quite happy improvising, and in fact spoke 
at his best when doing so. Why Cassius therefore felt any need to have his commentarius to 
 
41 Quint. Inst. 10.7.31. 
42 Suet. Aug. 84.2. Latin text: Kaster (2016). 
43 Sen. Contr. 3.pr, quote from 3.pr.6: nec hoc commentario contentus erat in quo nudae res ponuntur, sed ex 
maxima parte perscribebatur actio. Cassius’ defamatory writings appear to have made him many enemies. He 
was apparently tried for maiestas, exiled, and had his works burnt (though not every copy was lost), before 
dying circa 35 CE. See Tac. Ann. 1.72, and Rutledge (2002) 89. 
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hand is a matter for speculation; more significant is the fact that he felt it acceptable to take a 
substantial commentarius with him into the forum in the first place. For Seneca, the practice 
is neither a target for criticism, nor is it entirely unremarkable. He highlights it as unusual, 
but it does not in his eyes diminish the other praiseworthy points of Cassius’ eloquence.  
I have picked Cassius Severus here as an exemplar for the noteworthy reason that 
Tacitus later identified him as a transitionary figure, who was at the vanguard of the move 
away from the ‘old-fashioned’ republican style of oratory to a more directed, purposeful one, 
which did away with constant digressions and a lack of brevity.44 It is notable that Tacitus 
also aligns a change in oratorical practice with the introduction of the lex Pompeia de vi et 
ambitu of 52 BCE, which imposed strict limits on the amount of time for which a defendant or 
prosecutor could speak; Cicero also highlights this change, explaining how it meant the orator 
had to prepare and dispatch more cases in a shorter time, a challenge that could only be met 
by speakers (such as himself and Hortensius) who maintained rigorous discipline and trained 
constantly.45 From 52 onwards, therefore, the length of time an orator had to persuade his 
audience was restricted and, consequently, speeches had to become more direct. With this 
change in mind, Cassius’ habit of having a fuller commentarius to hand may even 
demonstrate that he, like Augustus, simply wanted to stick to the point, to avoid the 
periculum memoriae and the risk of engaging in verbose, time-consuming, circumlocutory 
meandering, until he recalled and arrived at the next major talking point in his speech.  
 
1.c. Cicero’s exemplary orators and superior mnemonic ability 
Many of the orators whom Cicero most admires in works such as Brutus and De oratore are, 
perhaps by way of deliberate contrast with more mediocre speakers, portrayed as relying on 
their memoria rather than on commentarii, notae, or scripta. We must, of course, remain 
aware that, at this point, we enter the land of Ciceronian exemplary fiction. Although Eckert 
puts great faith in Cicero’s assurance that the speakers in De oratore were presented 
authentically, given how freely Cicero shaped his interlocutors’ views in other dialogues, I 
see no reason to hold fast to the notion that the text represents ‘what each individual would 
 
44 Tac. Dial. 19.  
45 Tac. Dial. 38; Cic. Brut. 324. The law prescribed a maximum of three hours for the defence and two for the 
prosecution. For discussion, see van den Berg (2019) 596-7. 
131 
 
have said’.46 Likewise, Cicero’s attribution of superior memoria to any given orator in the 
Brutus may, to some extent, represent the manipulation of historical reality to strengthen the 
overall probative force of an individual exemplar.47  
Lucius Manlius Torquatus, as portrayed by Cicero’s brief character-sketch in the 
Brutus, is a case in point. He provides an example of a speaker who, in Cicero’s estimation, 
could apply his general knowledge and intelligence, including superior (natural) memory, to 
compensate for a lack of formal training. Cicero states that Torquatus was not someone to 
whom you would have applied the term rhetor but, rather, πολιτικός (‘a statesman’); he was 
still able to make a good speech since he was well-read, he possessed superhuman memoria, 
and his words were extremely powerful and well-chosen.48  In reality, however, Torquatus’ 
‘amateur’ oratory was evidently not good enough to convict Sulla, who was defended 
successfully by Cicero and Hortensius in 62 BCE.49 Consequently, if readers of the Brutus 
knew the details of Torquatus’ career, they would be drawn to conclude that even noble birth, 
plentiful natural talent, and superhuman mnemonic ability (divina memoria) were not enough 
to overcome a professionally-trained dream team (consisting, of course, of Hortensius and 
Cicero himself). 
A more complex exemplary model of an orator who relied more on natural talent than 
on rhetorical technique is Cicero’s Crassus, whose character is developed throughout De 
oratore. Crassus’ superior memoria appears, according to Cicero’s portrayal, to be the result 
more of natura than ars. Perhaps most notably, Cicero’s Antonius groups Crassus with 
Themistocles, who is said to have rejected the ars memoriae entirely on the grounds that his 
unaided memory was already so powerful that it came close to ‘total recall’.50 This rather 
suggests that Crassus’ ingenium was likewise so great that did not need ars to enhance his 
natural ability. When it comes to Crassus’ view of the rhetorical artes in general, Cicero 
portrays him as indifferent to Greek theory (De or. 2.4) and has him lambast rhetoricians as a 
group (3.75-6). This is apparently in line with the more conservative actions of the historical 
 
46 Eckert (2018) 22-3, esp. n. 20 and 21. 
47 In his introduction to the Brutus, Kaster notes that memoria generally goes unmentioned in the dialogue ‘since 
it is regarded as a given’: Kaster (2020) 13, n. 26. Perhaps this is, generally, true – making the instances when 
Cicero focusses on memoria, discussed in the following sections, all the more interesting. For non-rhetorical 
usage of the term memoria in the Brutus, see Gowing (2000) 42-51. 
48 Cic. Brut. 265: erant in eo plurimae litterae […] divina memoria, summa verborum et gravitas et elegantia… 
See also Fin. 2.113, where Torquatus’ memoria is described as infinita. 
49 For the historical circumstances of Pro Sulla, see Berry (1996) 14-42. 
50 Cic. De or. 2.298-300. For Themistocles’ exemplary memoria, see Ch. IV, p. 172-4. 
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Crassus, who issued the infamous censorial edict condemning Latin rhetorical ludi (see De 
or. 3.93, and Introduction, p. 15-6). Somewhat incongruously, however, the Crassus of De 
oratore elsewhere accepts that rhetorical praecepta and ars, while requiring a great deal of 
practice, certainly can be used as a powerful aid to natural talent, especially in the 
performative subdisciplines of actio and memoria – and he says he has even (unlike 
Themistocles) learnt the basic rules of the MOL (1.144-5). This view is more in line with 
what we know of the fundamentals of Latin rhetorical pedagogy from the 80s onwards, 
chiefly in relation to the principle that ars, although no substitute for ingenium, can always 
enhance natura, so long as you are prepared to put in the work.51 
The ambivalence of Cicero’s Crassus towards artificial techniques is encapsulated in a 
passage at De or. 3.74-5. In the same breath as he states that his own disciplina was the 
forum, and that his magister was usus et leges et instituta populi Romani mosque maiorum, 
he admits that he had a great longing for certain artes, only getting a taste of them when he 
was in Asia, from the brilliant mnemonist Metrodorus of Scepsis no less. In this sense, Cicero 
wants to have his cake and eat it. His Crassus encapsulates both the proud Roman orator 
whose natural ability needs no Greek τέχναι and the new wave of practitioners who 
recognised the utility of those τέχναι. Cicero’s Crassus professes to resolve the contradiction 
as follows: 
petam a vobis, ut ea, quae dicam, non de memet ipso, sed de oratore dicere putetis. ego enim 
sum is, qui […] non possim dicere me haec, quae nunc complector, perinde ut dicam discenda 
esse, didicisse… 
Cic. De or. 3.74. 
I shall ask of you that you consider what I am saying not to be said about me personally, but 
about the orator generally. For I am myself a man who […] cannot say that he studied these 
subjects that I am now embracing in the same manner as I shall say they should be studied… 
Thus, Cicero’s Crassus is in no way inferior to the Greeks with their manifold τέχναι, but he 
does not reject them entirely. To focus on the ars memoriae specifically, he does not, like 
Themistocles, refuse to learn it, and he understands how to use it, yet he proudly epitomises 
the virtues of aristocratic Roman ‘amateurism’: because Crassus is exceptional, he can rely 
on his natural memory instead. Overall, Cicero’s portrayal of Crassus as a Roman orator born 
and bred, a speaker who could rival the greatest Greeks without the aid of ars, strengthens his 
 
51 See e.g. Rhet. Her. 3.28-9, 3.40. 
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overarching argument that the ‘ideal orator’, whoever he may be, will be a Roman, steeped in 
Roman virtues, but one who has grasped a diverse range of subjects (many of them 
‘imported’ from the Greek-speaking world), who uses ars judiciously to enhance his 
ingenium. Unsurprisingly, Cicero himself seems to fit the bill. Does Cicero’s portrayal mean 
that the historical Crassus was in any way exceptional at using his memory to prepare for his 
speeches? Naturally, it does not (and if Crassus’ commentarii were indeed as sparse as 
suggested on p. 124-5, above, they may not have taken much memorising at all). 
Nevertheless, the balance Cicero attempts to strike in De oratore between wholeheartedly 
endorsing Greek-inspired mnemonic techniques and maintaining a certain façade of old-
school, noble Roman amateurism comes to the fore in his portrayal of Crassus’ view of Greek 
τέχναι, including the ars memoriae.  
 
In De oratore, Cicero seems to strive for an ideal balance between natural mnemonic talent 
and technical training: normal orators should not, like the superhuman Themistocles, dismiss 
memoria artificiosa entirely; and even orators of vast natural talent, like Crassus, might wish 
to learn about and benefit from mnemonic techniques. The balance is illustrated well by his 
depiction of Marcus Antonius (the consul of 99 BCE), whom he often places alongside, and in 
juxtaposition with, Crassus.52 It is through the voice of Antonius that Cicero delivers his 
exposition of the MOL. At De or. 2.350, Antonius rounds off his discussion of the rhetorical 
subdisciplines inventio and dispositio and states that he will add something about memoria. 
Cicero’s Crassus expresses delight that Antonius has finally exposed himself as an expert 
practitioner (artifex) of mnemonic techniques, stripped bare of the cover of pretence.53 Thus, 
by allocating the exegesis of memoria to Antonius, Cicero reaffirms his portrayal of Crassus, 
who is no expert in the rules of the ars memoriae, and with Crassus’ comment also reveals 
the most important aspect of his portrayal of Antonius’ attitude towards the MOL: that it is a 
useful ars, but that its use should be concealed. This is consistent with the attitudes of 
Cicero’s Crassus and Antonius to rhetorical techniques based on Greek learning throughout 
De oratore. Cicero asserts that while both men were well-versed in Greek rhetorical τέχναι, 
 
52 For Antonius’ speeches, see ORF3 221-36.  
53 De or. 2.350: libenter enim te, cognitum iam artificem aliquandoque evolutum illis integumentis 
dissimulationis tuae nudatumque perspicio. 
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they used them to enhance their oratory covertly – in public, they either disparaged Greek 
theory (Crassus) or claimed to be ignorant of it entirely (Antonius).54 
The extent of the disparity between the views of the historical Antonius and Cicero’s 
fictional Antonius is no doubt considerable – although there are few non-Ciceronian sources 
for Antonius’ life on which to base any judgements, and he is yet another orator who did not 
publish his speeches.55 In Brutus, Cicero ranks Antonius in the same tier as Crassus; he says 
that Antonius was Crassus’ equal in the subdisciplines of inventio, dispositio, and memoria, 
that he excelled in actio, but that when it came to putting them all together into an oratio, 
Crassus shone more brightly.56 Cicero also gives us some particularly pertinent information 
regarding Antonius’ use of memoria in the preparation phase of the forensic process: 
Erat memoria summa, nulla meditationis suspicio; imparatus semper aggredi ad dicendum 
videbatur, sed ita erat paratus ut iudices illo dicente non numquam viderentur non satis parati 
ad cavendum fuisse. 
Cic. Brut. 139.57 
His memoria was supreme, there was no suggestion of premeditation; he appeared always to 
approach his speeches unprepared, but was in fact so prepared that the judges, upon hearing 
him speak, frequently seemed insufficiently primed to be on their guard. 
Here, then, we have the successful result of Antonius’ ability to conceal his use of the 
mnemonic techniques that Cicero had him describe in De oratore. Cicero says that Antonius 
managed to embrace everything relevant to the case within his memory, while giving the 
impression that he had not done so, that he was speaking imparatus. The sentences quoted 
above sit in the middle of a string of military metaphors, in which Antonius the orator is 
likened to an imperator (this metaphor is discussed fully in Chapter IV, p. 175-7). Antonius 
gave his listeners the impression that he was unarmed – his weapons being, in this case, the 
orator’s artes. The iudices are implicitly placed in the position of an opposing army, even, 
insufficiently on their guard to defend against Antonius’ attack. Significantly, Cicero 
highlights how it is Antonius’ superlative mnemonic ability that enables him to execute this 
act of dissimulation; his memoria allows him to perform a speech into which he has sunk a 
 
54 De or. 2.1-4. 
55 For Antonius’ rationale for non-publication, see Cic. Clu. 140. 
56 Cic. Brut. 138, 215. 
57 Latin text: Hendrickson (1962). 
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great deal of preparative effort as if he were speaking extempore. Cicero thus uses Antonius 
to exemplify a key tenet of how the orator should use his mnemonic skills, natural or 
artificial, as a preparative tool: their use must be hidden and directed always towards the 
ultimate goal, winning over the audience.  
This audience-centric concern for outward appearance in fact provides a specific 
rationale for the orator’s concealment of the ars memoriae, over and above the idea that he 
should maintain a façade of the ‘noble amateur’, which is a nebulous notion, difficult to pin 
down, and bound up with Roman aristocratic hostility towards mercenary Greek 
professionalism.58 The Auctor ad Herennium refers to the need for concealment when 
discussing enumeratio – referring, in this context, to recapitulation of the main points of a 
case at the end of a speech. He states that special care must be taken in order that the whole 
oratio might not appear to have been fabricated ‘for the purpose of demonstrating one’s craft, 
advertising one’s natural talent, and showing off one’s memory’ (artificii significandi, ingenii 
venditandi, memoriae ostendendae causa).59 Thus, in the eyes of an audience, an orator 
making an overt show of his powerful memory, natural or artificial (it was presumably all the 
same from the spectator’s point of view), was bad form, to the extent that it might even be 
injurious to a case. One potential risk was that the orator might reveal his enthusiasm for 
techniques that were still (in Wisse’s words) ‘too Greek’ for the tastes of the average Roman 
audience.60 Another, as hinted at by my earlier discussions of memorisation in the ludus, that 
he might appear wet behind the ears. Cicero warns his readers about this risk explicitly at 
Part. or. 59-60, again with reference to enumeratio. On the one hand, says Cicero, the 
practice of enumeratio (which relies on displaying a certain mnemonic prowess) can 
sometimes be extremely useful: he specifies one of the situations where an orator should 
recap his arguments, namely in a long speech, when he mistrusts the memories of his 
listeners.61 Care must be taken, however, ‘so that undertaking a display of memory does not 
appear childish’ (ne ostentatio memoriae suscepta videatur esse puerilis).62 ‘Childish’ here is 
evidently a reference to the memorisation exercises undertaken by the youngest students; and 
 
58 Eckert makes sound points about how perceived enthusiasm for Greek paideia could damage an elite 
Roman’s auctoritas in the late Republic: Eckert (2018) 19-32.  
59 Rhet. Her. 2.47.  
60 Wisse (2013) 183. 
61 Cicero shows similar awareness of the limits of an audience’s memory when discussing how to summarise 
arguments at Inv. rhet. 1.99. 
62 Part. or. 60. Latin text: Bayer and Bayer (1994). 
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perhaps also to the kinds of exercises recommended for budding orators learning the MOL in 
rhetorical ludi.63 It was unbecoming for an experienced orator to be seen enjoying such 
mnemonic games during a speech, showing off how much he could remember as if he were a 
child in the ludus proudly reciting reams of poetry.64 Cicero explains that the speaker can 
avoid the danger of mnemonic ostentation by touching lightly upon the main facts of the case, 
rather than assiduously repeating all the minutiae.  
The recurring themes in these passages are, firstly, an awareness of the audience’s 
mnemonic limitations and, secondly, the need for an orator to avoid flamboyant feats of 
memory, which carry the suggestion of ars memoriae gratia artis.65 As discussed in Chapter 
I, Cicero’s treatment of memoria in De oratore is designed to move the focus away from the 
technical rules of the MOL, and hence elevate the subdiscipline above the ludus. 
Accordingly, as we have seen, Cicero buries the technical rules within Antonius’ discourse at 
De or. 2.358, dispatching them in a few brief sentences, such that they are overshadowed – if 
not concealed entirely – by his retelling of the Simonidean origin myth, his discussion of men 
with excellent memories (such as Themistocles, Charmadas, and Metrodorus), and even 
philosophical propositions concerning the intrinsic relationship between memory, vision, and 
space. Thus, although Cicero’s Crassus is initially delighted (at De or. 2.350) by Antonius’ 
stated intent to reveal the technical details of his ars memoriae, in many respects, Cicero has 
Antonius maintain the façade of concealment throughout. Cicero’s Antonius continues, in 
short, to play the role of the consummate orator addressing an audience, distracting the 
attention of his listeners (or in this case, his readers) from the rhetorical praecepta that 
apparently underpin his mnemonic prowess, just as the consummate orator should displace 
the attention of his audience from his feats of memory during a speech. With this discussion 
of the orator’s audience, however, I have slipped from the ‘preparation phase’ into the ‘trial 
phase’. Accordingly, I now move on to discuss how the orator utilised his mnemonic skills 
during live performances in the forum. 
 
 
63 See Ch. I, p. 28-32. 
64 Pace the elder Seneca, who boasts as much at Contr. 1.pr.2. 
65 Cf. Quintilian’s objections to Metrodorus’ ‘ostentatious’ zodiac mnemonics, Ch. II, p. 107.  
137 
 
2. The trial phase 
The worked examples of loci- and imago-creation presented by the Auctor and Quintilian 
illustrate how the MOL enabled an orator to encode and retrieve loci and imagines in a 
predefined sequence to remind himself of the main talking points of his speech.66 Based on 
these expositions, it is generally assumed that, if a Roman orator used the MOL at all, he used 
it to memorise a pre-prepared speech before trial and, subsequently, to recall and deliver that 
speech. In this scenario, the encoding process – by which I mean the creation and initial 
memorisation of imagines in loci – occurs in private, where the orator has plenty of time to 
rehearse the sequence. It is only the retrieval process – the recalling of the imagines in their 
loci – that occurs in public, during final delivery at trial. The MOL was certainly designed to 
be used in this situation. The technique was also, however, ideally suited to meet the 
requirements of a second scenario, which demanded the orator undertake both the encoding 
and the retrieval processes in public, during the trial itself. This second scenario, despite 
being relatively well-attested in our sources, has been underappreciated in modern 
scholarship, if not overlooked entirely. In this section, therefore, I focus on memoria 
artificiosa as a performative discipline, analysing how the MOL was utilised to enhance an 
orator’s performance during trial. 
In De oratore, Cicero’s Antonius provides a list of reasons why superlative mnemonic 
skill is useful to the orator. First in this list is the idea that superior memoria enables you (the 
notional orator) to ‘retain that which you learnt when being briefed about the case, and what 
you personally thought about it’.67 Hence, this use of memoria occurs during the preparation 
phase, as the orator encodes, stores, and retrieves his initial impressions of the case. After 
listing generic uses of memoria (in sum, the well-structured retention of vocabulary and 
ideas), Antonius then goes on to state that strong memoria enables you ‘to listen either to the 
individual by whom you are instructed [i.e. the cliens] or to the man to whom you must reply 
[i.e. the opposing advocate], such that he seems not to pour [infundere] his speech into your 
ears but to inscribe [inscribere] it in your mind’.68 Here, then, we have evidence that, in 
theory at least, the MOL might have been used in two ‘live’ scenarios: during the preparation 
 
66 Rhet. Her. 3.33, Quint. Inst. 11.2.20-1. 
67 De or. 2.355: tenere quae didiceris in accipienda causa, quae ipse cogitaris. 
68 De or. 2.355: ita audire vel eum, unde discas, vel eum, cui respondendum sit, ut illi non infundere in auris 
tuas orationem, sed in animo videantur inscribere. 
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phase, to memorise the words of a cliens; or, during the trial phase, to memorise the speech of 
an opponent as he was speaking.69 The verbs Cicero chooses create a deliberate contrast 
between the fallibility of natural mnemonic capacity, with the fluid infundere, which puts the 
information heard at risk of flowing in one ear and out of the other, and the retentive potential 
of mnemonic ability enhanced by ars, with the more permanent inscribere, a verb 
immediately reminiscent of the wax tablet metaphor, which Cicero has just introduced at the 
end of the previous passage.70  
Cicero provides us with a fictional representation of Antonius’ theory in practice in 
the dialogue De natura deorum, where, in response to Balbus, he has Cotta proclaim, ‘I have 
committed to memory not only the number but the order of your arguments’.71 Cotta then 
proceeds to address each of the arguments posited by Balbus in turn, in just the same way as 
we might imagine an orator addressing each of his opponent’s arguments in the forum. The 
question of whether the MOL was used by some orators for on-the-fly memorisation at trial 
in this same manner is trickier, but can, I think, be answered in the affirmative, since we have 
multiple attested instances of the MOL being used for real-time memorisation, to encode 
information presented orally and in public, rather than in writing and in private. The most 
detailed accounts of the MOL in action involve Quintus Hortensius Hortalus. 
 
2.a. The practical application of the MOL 
Hortensius is perhaps most famous for his rivalry with Cicero, although, as with other late-
republican orators, few non-Ciceronian sources concerning his life survive.72 As mentioned 
previously, in the Brutus, Cicero compares Hortensius favourably to the oratorical greats of 
past eras, but there is one area in which he seems to surpass everyone: memoria. When it 
comes to the application of the MOL at trial, Cicero’s portrayal of Hortensius is probably our 
 
69 Cf. Quintilian, whose explanation of why memory is so vital for the orator also lists memorising everything 
an opponent has said (he does not mention interaction with the cliens): Inst. 11.2.2-3. 
70 De or. 2.354. I note that the ‘fluidity’ Cicero associates with an unretentive memory is reminiscent of the 
philosophical notion that the wax-like fabric of memory must be of the correct consistency: see Ch. II, p. 72-3. 
71 Cic. Nat. D. 3.10: mandavi enim memoriae non numerum solum sed etiam ordinem argumentorum tuorum. 
Text: Gigon and Straume-Zimmermann (1996). 
72 Hortensius (cos. 69) was some eight years Cicero’s senior. For instances where the two variously clashed and 
collaborated, see Dyck (2008) 149-67; for Hortensius’ prominent position in the Brutus, van der Blom (2010) 
254-6; and for Hortensius’ speeches, ORF3 310-30. 
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most lucrative source. I begin, however, with an anecdote that is not found in Cicero, but the 
elder Seneca: 
Hortensius, qui a Sisenna provocatus in auctione persedit per diem totum et omnes res et 
pretia et emptores ordine suo argentariis recognoscentibus ita ut in nulla re falleretur 
recensuit. 
Sen. Contr. 1.pr.19.73 
Hortensius, challenged by Sisenna, sat through the whole day in an auction and then 
enumerated every item and its price and its buyer in order, while the bankers certified that he 
was not mistaken in any detail. 
This story is repeated by Quintilian, who had read Seneca.74 Both treat the feat as something 
of a party trick, Seneca dismissing the skill (and thus the MOL) as quick and easy to learn 
(Contr. 1.pr.19: hoc […] non operosa arte tradi potest). From our perspective, however, the 
interesting point is that Hortensius memorised information (items, prices, buyers) while the 
auctioneer was speaking; he did not write notes and then memorise them from the page. The 
auctioneer presumably delivered extraneous information that Hortensius did not bother to 
memorise (like full descriptions of the items and other losing bids). Instead, Hortensius 
selected the important details as he heard them, linked imagines to those details, and then 
encoded them in loci, memorising what was essentially a list of res. Modern mnemonists 
perform similar feats, encoding orally-presented information spontaneously at the start of a 
performance and reproducing it at the end.75 Whether or not the auction anecdote is 
apocryphal, and whether or not Hortensius actually won his bet, a skilled practitioner of the 
MOL could certainly have accomplished the auction challenge successfully. 
An ability to memorise using the MOL in real time would have proved extremely 
useful in a trial scenario, to help an orator prepare for the altercatio (the stage after the set-
piece speeches, when orators would engage with each other’s arguments in point-by-point 
 
73 Latin text: Winterbottom (1974). 
74 Quintilian references the elder Seneca explicitly twice, Inst. 9.2.42, 9.2.98; and reproduces the auction story at 
11.2.24. Dyck views the anecdote as independent (i.e. non-Ciceronian) confirmation of Hortensius’ mnemonic 
prowess: Dyck (2008) 145. His statement that Hortensius had ‘what today would be called a photographic 
memory’ is, however, thoroughly misleading. Hortensius was using the MOL, an artificial technique, while the 
(supposedly natural) phenomenon of ‘photographic memory’ has never been shown to exist (although it remains 
widespread in today’s popular culture): see Foer (2006). 
75 E.g. Harry Lorayne, for whom see Ch. IV, n. 51; the World Memory Championships also demand 




exchanges).76 As an orator was sitting listening to his opponent’s set-piece speech, thinking 
about how to respond to each of the arguments presented in turn, he could have used the 
MOL to memorise those arguments in a list. This would have enabled him to then address 
them all comprehensively in a response speech, or to bring them up during the altercatio 
itself.77 The difference, of course, is that extracting a list of salient features from a lengthy 
and rhetorically complex oratio sounds like it might be considerably less straightforward than 
extracting a list of items, prices, and buyers from an auction. The MOL, however, can be 
utilised to meet the challenge. Demonstrative proof of this comes from the same modern 
studies discussed in the first chapter, which show that the MOL works well when subjects are 
asked to memorise the salient features of expository prose passages, and especially well when 
the passages are presented orally rather than in writing.78 Test subjects appear capable of 
condensing a large amount of information into its key details, which they then memorise 
using the MOL. Note that the participants who take part in these modern experiments must be 
trained in the MOL – they are not proficient beforehand. Expert orators, however, could 
spend years practising their mnemonic skills and using them in live performance. 
Consequently, even if they did not devote themselves to the MOL with the same intensity as 
professional mnemonists and modern ‘memory athletes’, we might expect the capacities of 
ancient practitioners to vastly exceed those of inexperienced modern test subjects. 
The encoding process would run as follows: during a trial, an orator would listen 
intensely to the set-piece speech of his opponent; while doing so, he would mentally reduce it 
to what was essentially a sequential list of talking points, just as before trial he had reduced 
his own set-piece speech; next, he would memorise the resulting list of talking points using 
the MOL, by creating imagines associated with each point in turn, and placing them in loci. 
The retrieval process would work in the same way as when he delivered his own set-piece 
speech, the imagines acting as mnemonic triggers that enabled him to recall each point in 
turn. Finally, once he had recalled a point, the orator could then elaborate upon it, delivering 
an extempore response. 
 
76 Some high-profile orators apparently only delivered the initial set-piece speeches, leaving the scrappier 
altercatio to their less-prestigious co-counsel: see Quint. Inst. 6.4.6-7.  
77 Note that Quintilian states (quite logically) that memoria is not an issue during the altercatio proper, since it 
comprises a set of immediate back-and-forth exchanges, where there is no chance of forgetting what has just 
been said: Inst. 6.4.1. 
78 See Ch. I, p. 25. 
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That Hortensius was capable of utilising the MOL during trial in this way is indicated 
by Cicero’s description of his mnemonic prowess: 
Primum memoria tanta quantam in nullo cognovisse me arbitror, ut quae secum commentatus 
esset, ea sine scripto verbis eisdem redderet quibus cogitavisset. Hoc adiumento ille tanto sic 
utebatur ut sua et commentata et scripta et nullo referente omnia adversariorum dicta 
meminisset.  
Cic. Brut. 301. 
Firstly, he [Hortensius] had memoria of such magnitude, the power of which I believe I have 
not seen in anyone else, that he could reproduce material that he had prepared by himself in 
the same words he had thought it out, without a written prompt. He would utilise this great 
means of support to memorise his own material, things he had prepared both mentally and in 
writing, and, without referring to any notes, everything his opponents said.  
Cicero’s first observation relates to set-piece speeches. Hortensius was able to use his 
memory such that, after he had thought through his speech, he stored it mentally rather than 
in writing, before reproducing it sine scripto. Cicero in fact states that Hortensius could 
reproduce his material ‘in the same words’ (verbis eisdem) as he had initially thought it out – 
an odd statement, given that Hortensius prepared mentally and in private, and no one save 
Hortensius himself could know exactly which words he had originally planned to use. The 
phrasing is perhaps deliberately hyperbolic, to stress the accuracy of Hortensius’ recall. 
Cicero then qualifies this initial statement somewhat, by indicating that Hortensius also 
memorised some written material (et commentata et scripta).  
So much for the preparation phase. During the trial phase, Hortensius would 
memorise everything his opponents said, without external assistance. I think we must 
interpret omnia adversariorum dicta rather loosely, reading dicta as a reference to ‘talking 
points’ or ‘arguments’, rather than as a synonym for verba.79 Cicero is here describing a 
scenario in which Hortensius is memorising on the fly, as his opponents are speaking, while 
preparing to respond to their arguments: in this situation, verbatim retention of the 
opposition’s every word would have been entirely unnecessary. If Cicero does mean to imply 
that Hortensius could reproduce his opponents’ speeches word-for-word, he was probably 
overexaggerating. Aside from the sheer difficulty of the task, it is highly unlikely that anyone 
could have verified the flawless accuracy of Hortensius’ rendition of his opponents’ exact 
 
79 Cf. ad loc. 301, Hendrickson (1962) ‘all that was said by the other side’; Kaster (2020) ‘everything his 
opponents said’.  
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verba. We should envision Hortensius memorising at trial in much the same way as he 
memorised during the auction, but instead of memorising a list of the auctioneer’s sales, he 
would have been reducing his opponent’s speech to its salient points and memorising them in 
order. Yet, Hortensius’ mnemonic ability is portrayed as something quite exceptional: 
accordingly, we should conclude that while a skilled practitioner of the oratorical MOL such 
as Hortensius might utilise the technique for spontaneous memorisation during trial, others no 
doubt resorted to notetaking when listening to their opponents and working out a response. 
Cicero continues, giving us information about Hortensius’ approach that reinforces 
the notion that his methodology was somewhat unusual and in parts innovative:  
Attuleratque minime vulgare genus dicendi; duas quidem res quas nemo alius: partitiones 
quibus de rebus dicturus esset et collectiones eorum quae essent dicta contra quaeque ipse 
dixisset.80 
Cic. Brut. 302. 
He [Hortensius] brought to bear a brand of speechmaking that was far from common; two 
things, in fact, which no one else used: divisions of the topics about which he was going to 
speak and recapitulations of what had been said by the other side, and of what he himself had 
said. 
The historical accuracy of the idea that Hortensius’ practices of topical adumbration (in 
partitiones) and recapitulation (in collectiones) were rare is doubtful – both were standard 
components of contemporary rhetorical theory.81 Nevertheless Cicero’s exaggeration of 
Hortensius’ (almost overly) methodical approach contributes to the portrait of an orator who 
was extremely focussed on careful dispositio.82 It is even plausible that the partitiones 
Hortensius delivered to his audience in fact represented a list of talking points that he had 
memorised using the MOL – a possibility I raise because of the nature of oratorical 
partitiones. Contemporaneous and later rhetorical treatises stress that partitiones should be 
strictly ordered, clear, and complete.83 Quintilian, for instance, explains that a good partitio, 
devised carefully in this way, makes the ‘path of one’s speech’ (via dicendi) itself the greatest 
 
80 Note that the Teubner text (Malcovati (1970) 93, ln. 30) reads conlectiones, memor et quae essent… I follow 
Jahn (1962) and Hendrickson (1962) with eorum quae. 
81 For details, see Kaster (2020) 156, n. 462. 
82 To the extent that Cicero, according to Quintilian, teased Hortensius for counting off his partitiones on his 
fingers: Quint. Inst. 4.5.24. I note also that Hortensius’ ‘innovative’ collectiones are another instance of an 
orator’s awareness of the mnemonic limitations of his audience. 
83 For Cicero’s definition of and stipulations for partitiones, see Inv. rhet. 1.31-3. 
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aid (auxilium) to memoria.84 Subsequently, when discussing the subdiscipline of memoria, he 
refigures and reiterates this idea, stating that (apart from practice) divisio and compositio are 
the most important aids to the retention of a speech: if you have arranged your arguments 
logically, they remain well-ordered in memory, enabling progression from one to the next 
without error.85 At this point, it is worth reintroducing Moè and De Beni’s modern cognitive 
study, which found that the MOL was most effective at aiding the retention of expository 
passages, as opposed to descriptive or narrative passages – the difference being that 
expository passages follow ‘some logical processes such as induction, classification and 
comparison’.86 Partitiones, along with the genera into which they are divided, fall under this 
definition of ‘expository’: they structure a case by creating logical and sequential 
classifications of the relevant material. Hence, the process by which an orator would arrange 
and divide the arguments in his speech resulted, if done properly, in the production of 
information that was ideally suited for memorisation using the MOL.  
During the preparation phase, then, when Hortensius had devised his partitiones, he 
might well have memorised them using the MOL. Afterwards, by rapidly rehearsing the 
sequence of loci and imagines in his mind, he could quickly summarise an entire speech for 
his listeners. The advantage that such a method conferred would have been significant. In 
memorising and summarising not only his own arguments, but those of his opponents, 
Hortensius would have been able to spin and counter his adversaries’ words, giving his 
audience the impression that he had covered the case from every angle. Similarly, by 
cultivating a reputation for infallible mnemonic expertise, an orator such as Hortensius could 
no doubt bolster his authority in the forum, encouraging jurors to be ultimately persuaded by 
his version of what had been said. 
Cicero’s portrayal of Hortensius’ memoria and his innovative application of ars to 
Latin oratory in general remains largely consistent in works other than the Brutus. Hortensius 
is numbered among Cicero’s list of expert practitioners of the MOL at Tusc. 1.59. In 
Lucullus, Cicero states that Hortensius possessed unrivalled memoria verborum.87 As 
discussed previously, in contrast to memoria rerum, the subdiscipline of memoria verborum 
was, in the minds of Cicero’s contemporaries, a somewhat ostentatious practice, suited to the 
 
84 Quint. Inst. 4.5, quoted at 4.5.3. 
85 Quint. Inst. 11.2.36-8. 
86 Moè and De Beni (2005) 97. 
87 Luc. 2: full discussion, Ch. IV, p. 171-2. 
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ludus rather than the forum; and if an orator’s mnemonic performance appeared too artificial, 
he risked alienating his audience. In this sense, by highlighting how Hortensius practised 
memoria verborum as well as the more oratorically-justifiable memoria rerum, Cicero’s 
depiction of Hortensius’ use of the ars memoriae accords with his general criticisms of 
Hortensius, that he utilised certain artes to a somewhat excessive degree, notably in the 
performative discipline of actio.88 Overall, however, Hortensius (in his prime) conforms to 
the Ciceronian paradigm of an expert orator whose skills are based on both great natural 
talent and unremitting technical practice, that is, on both natura and ars. Consequently, this 
depiction of Hortensius’ skills may tell us as much about Cicero’s vision of the oratorical 
ideal as it does about the historical Hortensius: in highlighting his skilful application of 
mnemonic theory, Cicero manipulates Hortensius’ oratory so that it conforms with his own 
gold standard and is raised ever closer towards his notional ideal.  
Interestingly, the legend that Cicero constructed around Hortensius’ memoria seems 
to have spawned a later literary legacy, which might justifiably be compared to the legacy of 
Cicero’s Simonidean origin myth: this legacy is explored further in Chapter IV.89 Here, I note 
only that even if some of Hortensius’ writings survived beyond the classical era, his 
reputation as an exemplary practitioner of the MOL could not have been created by the text 
of his speeches alone.90 That reputation was down to the influence of Cicero. 
 
Excellent mnemonic skill was, of course, only one of the abilities that Cicero believed a good 
orator should possess: in Brutus, he makes a point of evaluating every aspect of a given 
orator’s performance, usually by commenting on his proficiency in the five subdisciplines of 
inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and actio. The well-rounded orator should be 
competent in all these subdisciplines, of course, although Cicero appears to see some skills as 
more interdependent than others. This is the case with memoria. An orator’s mnemonic skills, 
however impressive, cannot ever carry his performance in the same way that certain other 
skills might. Specifically, Cicero never gives us an example of an orator who makes up for 
 
88 E.g. Brut. 303: motus et gestus etiam plus artis habebat quam erat oratori satis. Garcea and Lomanto argue 
that Cicero’s criticisms of Hortensius’ limits, while never overly harsh, are intended to align Hortensius’ own 
decline with the diminishing effectiveness of his style of oratory, while juxtaposing Cicero’s own (increasingly 
effective and superior) approach: Garcea and Lomanto (2014) 141-60, esp. 152-5. 
89 See p. 183-4. 
90 We know that some of Hortensius’ speeches were preserved until at least Quintilian’s day: Inst. 11.3.8-9. 
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his deficiencies in other subdisciplines with his expertise in memoria; but he describes 
multiple speakers who manage to conceal manifold flaws by impressing their listeners with 
their performances, by means of dazzling delivery (actio) or superficially erudite expression 
(elocutio).91 Turning this observation on its head, while Cicero praises some orators for actio 
or elocutio and nothing else, as a rule, he never attributes superlative memoria to an orator if 
that orator does not also possess ability in the subdiscipline of dispositio: Cicero’s portrayal 
of Hortensius is a case in point. 
The end goal of the rhetorical theory outlined in treatments of dispositio is the optimal 
arrangement and division of talking points to create a well-structured and persuasive speech. 
As we know, order and structure are crucial components of the MOL. I concluded above that 
Hortensius could utilise the MOL effectively in part because he maintained a strict, ordered 
sequence of talking points in his speeches. It follows that, for Hortensius to demonstrate his 
proficiency in the MOL, he had also to be proficient in the prerequisite subdiscipline of 
dispositio. Cicero confirms this when describing Hortensius’ skills, stating that ‘he would 
embrace the case accurately in his memory, divide it intelligently’.92 The two acts, 
memorising the case and dividing the case, balance each other. Cicero, utilising asyndeton to 
stress the connections, closely aligns the intelligent division and organisation of arguments 
with their memorisation.  
The idea that Cicero saw positive correlation between good dispositio and effective 
application of memoria is reinforced by his portrayal of Publius Antistius.93 As with 
Hortensius, when describing Antistius, Cicero implies a close association between the careful 
construction of an argument and its memorisation; but in this case, he adds on another skill, 
inventio. Antistius ‘would discern the matter at hand keenly, construct his argument carefully, 
his memory was strong’.94 Here, there is a progression through the three subdisciplines of 
inventio, dispositio, and memoria: Antistius observes the salient points, he arranges them 
effectively, he memorises them accurately. Again, the asyndetic association implies some 
degree of sequential interdependency. Proficiency in inventio is a prerequisite for effective 
 
91 Such as Gnaeus Lentulus and Publius Lentulus, whose impressive delivery (actio) covered for their general 
lack of ability, Brut. 234-5; or Curio, who relied on linguistic style (elocutio), see below, p. 146-51. 
92 Brut. 303: rem complectebatur memoriter, dividebat acute… 
93 For analysis of Antistius in the Brutus, see Balbo (2018) 240-1, and for the little we know of his speeches, 
ORF3 283-4. 
94 Brut. 227: rem videbat acute, componebat diligenter, memoria valebat. 
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dispositio, since if the orator has not discerned his arguments clearly, he cannot hope to 
arrange them in a percipient and logical manner. Good dispositio is in turn a prerequisite for 
effective memoria, for the same reasons outlined above. Of the five rhetorical subdisciplines, 
then, memoria (and the MOL) was arguably the most dependent on the effective execution of 
the preparative subdisciplines inventio and dispositio, which preceded it in the process of 
moving from the preparation of a speech to the delivery of that speech at trial. 
 
2.b. Cicero’s exemplary orators and inferior mnemonic ability 
So far, I have discussed the numerous orators Cicero lauds for memoria. His portrayal of 
Gaius Scribonius Curio (pater) is particularly intriguing for the opposite reason: Curio is the 
only orator whom Cicero highlights for a lack of mnemonic ability. We must be appropriately 
sceptical when it comes to trusting Cicero’s portrayal of Curio’s abilities, since it seems that 
Cicero bore him a considerable grudge. The origins of this enmity are somewhat obscure.95 
Probably relatively early in his career, Cicero had successfully defended a woman named 
Titinia against Curio; the two clashed again when Curio attempted to defend Cicero’s 
archenemy Publius Clodius Pulcher in the Bona Dea trial by discrediting Cicero’s sworn 
testimony; shortly afterwards, in 58 BCE, Curio appears to have circulated a fierce criticism of 
Cicero, to which Cicero replied in a heated Invectiva in Curionem.96 In his correspondence, 
Cicero implies this invective was never intended for public consumption, but ‘leaked’ when 
he was in exile, causing him considerable regret and embarrassment when it transpired that 
he needed Curio’s support to be recalled.97 Cicero’s portrayal of Curio in De oratore (55 BCE) 
is, conversely, relatively positive.98 Curio died in 53, a number of years before Cicero wrote 
the Brutus (46 BCE) – so this time, Cicero could portray Curio as he wished, without fear of 
needing subsequent favours.99  
 
95 For Curio’s life up to his clash with Cicero, see McDermott (1972a) 381-94. 
96 The Titinia case is tentatively dated to 79 BCE: see McDermott (1972a) 395. For further discussion of Cicero’s 
motives for disliking Curio, see Tatum (1991) 369-70. 
97 Att. 3.12.2, 3.15.3, 3.20.2. 
98 De or. 2.98. 
99 See Douglas (1966) ad loc. 216, p. 156. Lopez suggests that this negative change in attitude towards Curio 
pater may even be attributable to Cicero’s disappointment with Curio filius (died 48), for siding with Caesar: 
Lopez (2013) 294-5. 
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It is with this background in mind that we must interpret Cicero’s depiction of Curio’s 
oratory, which begins at Brut. 213-4 with an estimation of the depths of Curio’s ignorance: he 
had no knowledge of poetry, history, law; he did not even read published speeches.100 Thus, 
Cicero highlights how Curio made no effort to acquire knowledge to remember in the first 
place. At Brut. 216, Cicero evaluates Curio’s oratorical prowess. He was ‘both slow in 
thinking things through and disorganised in arranging them’, hence, he was poor at both 
inventio and dispositio.101 Further, when it came to actio and memoria, Curio was so lacking 
in ability that ‘he would provoke the derisive laughter of his ridiculers’.102 Curio’s only 
saving grace, says Cicero, was his elocutio, for which he received a disproportionate level of 
praise: this, Cicero believes, proves that an orator is esteemed above all for the ‘abundance’ 
(copia) and ‘brilliance’ (splendor) of his words.  
Cicero clearly considered Curio’s reputation for being a good speaker unwarranted, 
founded on style rather than substance. As Cicero’s hypercritical portrait develops, its focus 
narrows to Curio’s lack of mnemonic ability: 
Memoria autem ita fuit nulla, ut aliquotiens, tria cum proposuisset, aut quartum adderet aut 
tertium quaereret. 
Cic. Brut. 217. 
Moreover, his memory was so non-existent that sometimes, when he had proposed three 
talking points, he would either add a fourth or go searching for the third. 
Curio, then, is presented as the antithesis of Hortensius, an exemplum to illustrate the 
detrimental effects of poor memoria on an orator’s speech. Whereas Hortensius devised, 
ordered, and memorised the sequence of his arguments so effectively that he could rapidly 
run through the partitiones of his speech at both its start and finish, by contrast, Curio seems 
to begin his orations by merely hazarding a guess at the division and number of his 
arguments, before meandering blindly through the rest. This remarkable ineptitude stems 
 
100 The phrase at Brut. 214 that I have glossed as ‘history’ reads [ille] nullam memoriam antiquitatis collegerat, 
rather literally, ‘he [Curio] had accumulated no memoria of ancient times’. Here, rather than the rhetorical 
subdiscipline, memoria denotes a certain type of mnemonic content – the semantic knowledge of the past that 
the Roman orator might draw on to provide exempla when making his argument. Cf. Brut. 322: memoria rerum 
Romanarum, which denotes knowledge that the orator can draw on to produce the most credible witnesses 
(locupletissimi testes) from the dead to support his case. 
101 Brut. 216: cum tardus in cogitando tum in struendo dissipatus fuit. 
102 Brut. 216: cachinnos irridentium commovebat. Curio earned the nickname ‘Burbuleius’ for his gestures, 
which apparently resembled those of an eccentric actor of that name: Sall. Hist. bk. 2, fr. 25 (Maurenbrecher); 
Val. Max. 9.14.5. 
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from his failure to encode the information relevant to the case in his memoria during the 
preparation phase; in the trial phase, he can retrieve nothing.  
We cannot know, of course, whether listeners who were less technically critical than 
Cicero cared about Curio’s inability to deliver the number of arguments he had promised. 
Wisse believes that the emphasis rhetoricians placed on the need to stick to the number of 
points outlined at the start of a speech implies audiences regarded deviations as ‘serious 
faults’.103 Possibly; they certainly seem to have been deemed so by experts.104 I think it 
probable, however, that one such fault alone is unlikely to have been a cause of major 
criticism for a less-discerning audience; but if that fault were followed by further lapses, it 
doubtless would have contributed to undermining trust in the orator. This gradual and 
insidious effect, whereby flaws compound to weaken an audience’s confidence in a speaker, 
is exactly what Cicero suggests happened in the case of Curio’s forgetful rambling: in one 
speech, it became so bad that the whole contio simply got up and left.105 This anecdote, then, 
represents the worst case scenario: Curio’s inferior memoria made him appear so 
incompetent, it robbed him of the title orator, for what is an orator without an audience? 
Cicero rounds out the picture of Curio’s inferior memoria with several further 
anecdotes, including one concerning the Titinia case, when his lack of mnemonic capacity 
not only made him look incompetent, but actually (as Cicero would have us believe) lost him 
the trial. When making a speech in response to Cicero, Curio allegedly forgot all of his 
talking points and then blamed the defendant, saying she had poisoned or bewitched him.106 
This suggests that Curio’s memoria proved defective not only when he was preparing for a 
set-piece speech, but also in this live trial scenario, when he should have been paying 
attention to and memorising the sequence of Cicero’s arguments, in order to improvise a 
response and be ready for the altercatio. Instead of the well-ordered rebuttal speech of a 
skilled oratorical mnemonist such as Hortensius, Curio met Cicero’s arguments with silence 
engendered by forgetting (oblivio), and then a lame excuse.107  
 
103 Wisse (2013) 186-7, citing e.g. Rhet. Her. 1.17. 
104 E.g. Quintilian, who calls deviation from set order turpissimum, Inst. 4.5.28. Cicero would also have us 
believe that, as regards good speakers, the opinions of vulgus and intelligentes coincide: Brut. 190. 
105 Brut. 192, 305. On this incident, see Wisse (2013) 176. 
106 Brut. 217. 
107 Cf. Orat. 129, where Cicero presents this anecdote in a somewhat different light, implying that it was the 
force of his own oratory that left Curio dumbstruck, though Curio still blamed potions for erasing his memory. 
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Finally, Cicero lambasts Curio’s attempts at writing dialogues, citing his disordered 
composition and his inclusion of anachronisms to prove that his memory was so poor, he 
could not even recall what he had written down shortly beforehand.108 Tatum views this 
passage as an attempt by Cicero to ameliorate the ‘literary embarrassment’ of his Invectiva in 
Curionem, with Cicero stressing not only his own rhetorical superiority but also Curio’s 
‘literary carelessness’ – that is to say, we should construe Curio’s lack of memoria, in this 
context, as a simple lack of concern for narrative consistency (and for the need to 
proofread).109 Cicero certainly wants to criticise Curio’s composition skills, but his primary 
objective here is to build on the previous anecdotes and bring the attack on Curio’s inferior 
mnemonic ability to a head: Cicero highlights how Curio’s inexcusable mnemonic failings 
when performing live run so deep, they can even be witnessed in his literary compositions. 
Thus, Curio is incompetent as both orator and auctor. Consider the concluding sentence of 
the anecdote: 
Iam, qui hac parte animi, quae custos est ceterarum ingeni partium, tam debilis esset ut ne in 
scripto quidem meminisset quid paulo ante posuisset, huic minime mirum est ex tempore 
dicenti solitam effluere mentem. 
Cic. Brut. 219. 
Now, if the man was so weak in that part of his mind, which is the guard of all the other parts 
of his intelligence, that he could not even remember what he had set down a little earlier in his 
writings, it is no wonder that his intellect usually vanished when speaking extempore. 
Cicero’s point is evident: if an orator cannot utilise his memoria effectively when composing 
in private, what hope does he have when speaking extempore in the heat of the forum? Again, 
we see how Cicero stresses the importance of memoria to successful execution of the orator’s 
duties during the trial phase, when the pressure is on, in addition to its role during the calmer 
preparation phase. 
In this same passage, Cicero also introduces the role of memoria as custos, guardian 
or protector, of the rest of one’s abilities. The interdependency of an orator’s faculties is, in 
the case of Curio, clear: he was poor at inventing and arranging arguments and, even if he did 
manage to find some, his memory was so bad that he would fail to retain them for 
 
For comparison, see Tatum (1991) 364-71. Equally, Curio’s quip about the potions could have been intended as 
a joke, presented literally by Cicero to make Curio look pathetic. 
108 Brut. 218-9.  
109 Tatum (1991) 371. 
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deployment in the forum. As is explored fully in the next chapter, Cicero’s use of the 
metaphor of memoria as custos singles out memory as the defensive element in the ideal 
orator’s arsenal.110 For now, we can observe that whereas, at Brut. 139, the exemplary orator-
imperator Antonius utilised his superior mnemonic ability to enhance his offensive capacities 
and conceal the nature and strength of his verbal attacks from the opposition, by contrast, 
Curio’s mnemonic failings undermine his capacity to both attack and defend. The starkest 
example is again the Titinia trial, when Curio failed, as oratorical imperator, to spearhead 
attacks and, as oratorical custos, to defend his cliens: his inability to respond to Cicero left his 
own arguments and Titinia herself exposed to the full force of Cicero’s oratory. 
Did Curio’s mnemonic defects prevent him from pursuing a successful career? On the 
one hand, if the achievement of high office is any measure of success, they did not: he was 
consul in 76, was granted a triumph in 73 for fighting in Macedonia, and became censor in 
61.111 On the other, if his oratorical achievements are the basis for our judgement, we have 
little to go on save Cicero’s word, at Brut. 220, that ‘very few cases were allotted to him’ 
(perpaucae ad eum causae deferebantur).112 Yet, in the same passage, Cicero admits that in 
terms of ranking Curio on the oratorical tier list, propter verborum bonitatem, Curio’s 
contemporaries classed him as belonging to the A-rank, if not the S-rank.113 Cicero even 
grudgingly concedes that Curio’s speeches might be worth a look, if only for the strength of 
his elocutio, the faculty that gave him the ‘façade of an orator of some sort’ (speciem oratoris 
alicuius effecerit). Consequently, if we are to conclude anything from Cicero’s portrayal of 
Curio about how much mnemonic ability mattered to an orator in the late Republic in reality, 
there are two options. One is that if an orator did not bother to cultivate his memoria (natural 
or artificial), he could nevertheless ‘wing it’ in the forum, perhaps relying on written 
memoranda and the fluency of his speech to impress his audience, even if he had little idea of 
what to say. This option, while nonsensical if taken to the extreme, must contain some degree 
of truth, at least to the extent that mnemonic skills on a par with those of Hortensius cannot 
have been the determining factor in an orator’s ability to win a case – not every speech had to 
be made sine scripto of any sort. The cultivation of memoria clearly was important to the 
 
110 See Ch. IV, p. 175. 
111 Holding important offices such as these appears to have required some oratorical skills, even if they were not 
of the highest calibre: see Lopez (2013) 287-8, 297. 
112 This is not necessarily the conclusion one would draw from other authors’ allusions to Curio’s oratorical 
activity: see ORF3 297-302. 
113 This impression of Curio’s reputation is reinforced by Cicero’s Antonius at De or. 2.98. 
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production of a good performance in the scenarios I have described, both before and during 
trial; but in the case of Curio, it did not matter as much as Cicero would have us believe.  
The alternative option is that Cicero’s whole account of Curio’s absolute lack of 
mnemonic ability is a fiction, another line of attack by which Cicero could denigrate the 
reputation of a longstanding (and safely deceased) opponent. This, in my view, certainly 
seems plausible: perhaps Curio was somewhat scatter-brained, an orator who placed style 
over substance, but in order to effect the victories we know he achieved (whether by fair 
means or foul), he cannot have been quite as unlearned and mnemonically incompetent as 
Cicero suggests.114 The key point is that Curio did not possess the abilities that Cicero 
considered a competent Roman advocate should possess. In terms of superlative memoria, 
therefore, Curio provides the counterexample to the rest of Cicero’s brilliant speakers with 
brilliant memories. Curio’s mnemonic failures denied him, in Cicero’s estimation, the right to 
call himself a proper orator. 
 
In summation, the analysis presented in this chapter reinforces the argument made in Chapter 
I regarding the goal of memoria artificiosa in late-republican oratory: namely, that the MOL 
was designed to free the orator from the need for a script. Superior mnemonic ability meant 
that the orator had no need to compose his speech fully in writing before delivery, nor to keep 
any kind of script to hand when he took to the oratorical stage. Instead, during the preparation 
phase, he would mentally arrange and rehearse his arguments (signified in oratorical texts by 
deliberative verbs such as meditari/cogitare) before memorising them using the MOL; he 
may also have produced limited written preparatory material, an oratorical commentarius, 
typically a list of topics, talking points, or arguments (a list of loci, in fact), which was ideally 
suited to memorisation via the MOL. During the trial phase, relying on the MOL to negate 
the risk of forgetting any crucial points, the orator could then elaborate the detail of the loci in 
his speech as he retrieved each one from memory in turn, utilising his extensive 
improvisational experience and practice. He had no need to worry about retrieving the words 
of his speech verbatim, since a written version had never existed.  
 
114 As for Curio’s learning, note that, as well as the dialogue to which Cicero refers, Pliny the Elder lists Curio 
pater among his authorities for the third book of Historia naturalis, which perhaps suggests he wrote on 
geographical themes.  
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The MOL was (and remains) a technique ideally suited for on-the-fly use in time-
pressured scenarios. Some orators took advantage of this strength of the MOL during forensic 
performances to memorise the arrangement and/or details of the arguments covered by their 
opponents, ready for response or rebuttal. There is also limited evidence that orators may 
have used the MOL when listening to clientes (although I suspect it may have been easier for 
most to use scriptores or librarii to take notes). While speaking in front of a live audience, 
whether the orator chose to utilise artificial mnemonic techniques or not, he had to ensure that 
his performance maintained a natural air. He did not want to look like a child reciting his 
lessons in the ludus. This requirement for ‘artful artlessness’ obviously extended beyond the 
subdiscipline of memoria, into the similarly performative realm of actio. Further, in his 
assessment of orators’ skillsets, Cicero seems to have observed a positive correlation between 
the subdisciplines of dispositio and memoria, which might be explained quite 
straightforwardly, since it was commonly understood that intelligent division and 
arrangement of arguments could aid structured mnemonic retention. More broadly, this 
chapter has highlighted a considerable number of orators to whom Cicero attributed superior 
mnemonic ability: Torquatus, Crassus, Antonius, Hortensius, and Antistius; and also, how 
Cicero exemplified the perils of poor mnemonic ability using Curio. Curio is an important 
exemplar because he is the antithesis of Cicero’s model of the ideal orator who possesses 
superior memoria. Cicero’s grudging admission that Curio was relatively successful, despite 
his ostensible mnemonic deficiencies, is a suitable reminder that attainment in late-republican 
oratory was not predicated upon superhuman powers of memory. Accordingly, my final 
chapter examines the extent to which Cicero’s portrayals of individuals with superior 
mnemonic ability have skewed our perceptions of memoria in the late Republic and beyond. 
  
IV 
Cicero’s memory men 
Throughout this thesis, I have made references to a wide range of individuals who 
purportedly possessed superior mnemonic skills, either natural or artificial. Most of these 
references come from Cicero, who attributes impressive powers of memory to no fewer than 
fifteen named individuals across his surviving works.1 The purpose of this final chapter is to 
examine Cicero’s approach to memoria as a personal attribute or skill by considering these 
many ‘memory men’ as a group: who they were; what they have in common; and why Cicero 
chose to single out their powers of memoria as worthy of praise. Cicero portrays many of 
these men and their characteristics as exemplary – though not necessarily as exempla in the 
technical rhetorical sense.2 Consider the Simonidean origin myth.3 The story fulfils many of 
the requirements of a technical exemplum: it is probative, proving the value of the ars 
memoriae; it is didactic, ostensibly explaining why the MOL works; and, while it is more 
myth than history, it is historical in the sense that it is based on historical figures (like 
exempla drawn from the mythic history of early Rome). Whereas the traditional exemplum 
contains moral teaching, however, the lesson Cicero draws from the Simonidean myth is 
technical in nature. That is not to say that the narrative does not contain potential moral 
teachings (“do not be like Scopas, respect the gods”; “be like Simonides, remember the 
dead”) but they are ignored by Cicero and later rhetoricians. Similarly, whereas traditional 
exempla were familiar, oft-repeated stories, when Cicero first told the Simonidean origin 
myth, it was unfamiliar to his Roman audience. Cicero himself helped establish Simonides’ 
status as the inventor of the ars memoriae. 
Another traditional role of the exemplum was as a model of behaviour, to be emulated 
by current or future generations. A few of Cicero’s memory men fall into this category. In the 
first section of this chapter, I lay the groundwork for the argument that, in general, Cicero 
invoked the legendary mnemonic skills of certain men because he believed superior memoria 
 
1 Orators (see Ch. III): Torquatus, Crassus, Antonius, Hortensius, Antistius (plus Curio, who cannot be included, 
since he is criticised for inferior memory). ‘Intellectuals’ (see Ch. II, and below): Simonides, Theodectes, Philo, 
Charmadas, Metrodorus, Trebatius. Leaders (see below): Themistocles, Cineas, Caesar, Lucullus. 
2 For technical definition, see Cic. Inv. rhet. 1.49; discussion, van der Blom (2010) 65-72. For the purposes of 
this study, I subscribe to Roller’s general model of Roman exemplarity: Roller (2018) 4-23. 
3 See Ch. I, p. 47-8. 
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enhanced leadership and that it was, therefore, a capacity worthy of cultivation. To use van 
der Blom’s terminology, Cicero construed some leaders from the past as ‘personal’ exempla, 
selecting exemplary aspects of their characters to inform and illustrate his own views on good 
leadership.4 More specifically, according to the Ciceronian paradigm, superior memoria 
contributes to the ideal leader’s capacity to acquire, store, and act on information about the 
people he governs; it is often epitomised in the leader’s ability to recall and address 
individuals by name. A combination of factors can explain Cicero’s philosophy of memoria 
and leadership, including the influence of Xenophon’s Cyropaedia on Cicero’s thought, and 
the significance that was attached in Roman politics at large to the practice of remembering 
and greeting individuals by name (nomenclatio). 
The second section of this chapter examines Cicero’s powerful leaders with powerful 
memories in greater detail. After positing possible explanations for Cicero’s attribution of 
superior memoria to Julius Caesar, I identify two of Cicero’s memory men, Lucius Licinius 
Lucullus and Themistocles, as case studies of special importance. Set in the context of 
Cicero’s broader discourse on the relative merits and similarities of the orator and the 
imperator, Cicero’s attribution of superior memoria to orators and military generals alike 
illustrates his conflation of various exemplary ideals – the ideal speaker, the ideal statesman, 
the ideal general – into a single persona, a civilian leader who could use his oratory to effect 
action, and who was therefore worthy of as much praise and renown as any military 
commander. 
The final section of this chapter examines, in brief, the legacy of Cicero’s 
conceptualisation of memoria as an attribute of the ideal leader. Although a full study is 
outside of the scope of this thesis, I suggest that superior memoria became an identifiable (if 
relatively rare) topos of imperial praise. Various authors throughout the Principate highlight 
the superior memoria of different emperors to illustrate great intellect, quasi-omnipotence, 
and/or leadership skills in much the same way as Cicero had highlighted memoria as a 
praiseworthy attribute of powerful men in the late Republic. In certain cases, the references to 
Cicero’s memory men are explicit; in others, we may simply be witnessing the persistent 
influence of Ciceronian precedents on the traditions of encomiastic rhetoric. 
 
 
4 See van der Blom (2010) 175-286. 
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1. Superior memoria as an exemplary attribute 
To begin, it is worth briefly reviewing the numerous instances discussed in the previous three 
chapters where Cicero attributes superior memoria to specific individuals. For the purposes of 
this study, I have divided these individuals into three broad categories. Unsurprisingly, given 
Cicero’s proclivities, the first, large group consists entirely of orators, including all those 
featured in Chapter III. Cicero generally invokes these speakers to illustrate how memory 
contributes to and can enhance an orator’s ability; some are credited with superlative 
memoria naturalis, some with superlative memoria artificiosa, and others with both. The 
second group of excellent memorisers includes the kind of articulate, scholarly men we might 
reasonably expect to possess good mnemonic capacity – a group that I have gathered under 
the suitably non-specific rubric of ‘intellectuals’, consisting of poets, philosophers, and 
rhetoricians, including Simonides, Theodectes, Philo, Charmadas, and Metrodorus. Cicero 
generally credits the Greeks in this group with proficiency in the MOL – that is to say, they 
provide examples of how memoria naturalis might be enhanced using memoria artificiosa. I 
discussed the role that these Greeks may have played in the historical development of 
memoria artificiosa in Chapter II. 
As for Roman ‘intellectuals’, there is one profession that stands out. Cicero attributes 
superior memoria naturalis (unenhanced by artificial techniques) to legal experts 
(iurisconsulti) collectively. In De oratore, for instance, the idea that the mnemonic abilities of 
the legal expert were seen as something of a gold standard is suggested by Cicero’s Antonius, 
who states that the ideal orator must possess memoria iurisconsultorum.5 The proverbially 
renowned mnemonic powers of the iurisconsultus may ultimately stem from the ancient role 
of priestly pontiffs who acted as guardians of the law, and who were required to memorise 
and recite the relevant legal formulas verbatim.6 Of course, by Cicero’s day, legal texts were 
no longer kept under religious guardianship and were accessible for consultation, so there 
was no absolute need for verbatim memorisation.7 Cicero, in fact, complained that whereas 
he had himself learnt the Twelve Tables as a carmen necessarium, young men no longer 
 
5 De or. 1.128. Cf. Leg. 3.41, where Cicero stipulates that the senator, in his role as a lawmaker, must possess 
excellent memoria so that he can produce relevant legal knowledge at will. 
6 See Pharr (1939) 258-9, Riggsby (2015) 444-6. 
7 For the ‘professionalisation’ of jurists in the later republican period, see Frier (1985) 269-84. 
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bothered with such burdensome tasks.8 Good mnemonic capacity nevertheless remained a 
prerequisite for those who would specialise in the acquisition and application of legal 
knowledge (rather as it does today). We see this requirement in a letter of recommendation 
Cicero sent to Caesar in Gaul, praising the work and talents of Trebatius Testa, who would go 
on to become one of the most influential legal experts of the late Republic and early 
Principate.9 Cicero commends Trebatius’ virtues as a good and honest man, then states, ‘he is 
the cream of the crop in civil law, a man of exceptional memoria and supreme learning’.10 
The third group of exemplary men with exemplary mnemonic capacities is the main 
topic of discussion in this chapter. The group is, in my view, more surprising than either of 
the first two, in that it consists of an interesting selection of leaders (rectores) and generals 
(imperatores), including Themistocles, Caesar, and Lucullus. One obvious question arises: 
unlike orators and intellectuals, leaders and generals did not prima facie rely on the 
cultivation of mnemonic capacity to be successful in their professions, so why did Cicero 
single them out? Small has suggested that it was relatively common for leaders in ancient 
Greece and Rome to attach importance to the possession of a strong memory, especially for 
names, and believes that their motives were the same as those of modern politicians.11 Below, 
I argue that this observation, while unobjectionable, misses the uniqueness of the Roman (and 
more specifically, Ciceronian) phenomenon entirely. 
Stories about powerful men with powerful memories must have always existed in the 
Greek and Roman worlds – most frequently cited in modern scholarship is the elder Pliny’s 
list of brilliant memorisers, which stretches back to Simonides.12 References to these stories 
are, however, all post-Ciceronian and, in a surprisingly large number of cases, they replicate 
stories that first appear in the Ciceronian corpus. Obviously, Cicero predominates our texts 
and to state that no other late-republican authors attributed superior memoria to leaders or 
generals would be to risk arguing ex silentio. Nevertheless, superior memoria is not 
commented upon in those near-contemporaneous works that do survive. Cornelius Nepos, for 
instance, never mentions it in the lives of his many generals and statesmen, even when 
 
8 Leg. 2.59. 
9 For Trebatius, see Bauman (1985) 123-36. 
10 Fam. 7.5.3: familiam ducit in iure civili, singulari memoria, summa scientia. For the letter as a 
commendation, see Cotton (1985) 333-4. 
11 Small (1997) 113-4, and (2007) 203-4; see also Yates (1966) 55, Baroin (2007) ad loc. 26-7. 
12 Plin. HN 7.88-9. 
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writing about a leader such as Themistocles, whose legendary mnemonic prowess Cicero 
highlights repeatedly.13 Rather, the stories appear more frequently in texts from the early 
imperial period onwards, in which Ciceronian precedents abound.14 These initial observations 
hint at the argument outlined below: that Cicero’s attribution of superior memoria to 
powerful leaders was innovative and perhaps also unique. 
As in the case of Simonides, I am not suggesting that Cicero was the originator of 
legends regarding exemplary leaders from the Greek past (although in the case of certain 
contemporaneous Romans, like Lucullus, he is certainly the original source). Cicero 
collected, elaborated, and repeatedly cited stories of powerful men with powerful memories 
in a way that others did not. What we see across a range of Cicero’s works is the 
amplification of pre-existing stories about Greeks with fabulous mnemonic skills and the 
adaption of those Greek models to fit Cicero’s own Roman exempla. In the same way as the 
Simonidean origin myth first became widespread in the Roman world, Cicero’s works 
popularised these other legends and the stories proliferated.  
 
I begin with the only prominent (surviving) pre-Ciceronian model of the ‘powerful man with 
a powerful memory’: Xenophon’s Cyrus the Great. Plato, in the Republic, included memory 
in his lists of the attributes that should be sought in a ruler, alongside others such as diligence 
and aptitude for learning – in this context, good (natural) memory is one of the hallmarks of 
general intelligence and a quick mind, which are deemed essential leadership traits.15 The 
only surviving attribution of good memory to a leader from third- and second-century texts 
follows this Platonic paradigm: Polybius, when enumerating the virtues of Philip V, lists 
intelligence, memory, and charisma together.16 Xenophon, however, went much further than 
Plato, separating memory from the other generic intellectual attributes of an ideal ruler and 
 
13 Note that Nepos does highlight Themistocles’ impressive language-learning ability (Them. 10), in an anecdote 
that perhaps exaggerates Thucydides’ account (Thuc. 1.138.1). He does not associate Themistocles’ linguistic 
skill with superior mnemonic ability; although Quintilian (Inst. 11.3.50) and Pliny (HN 7.88) apparently assume 
a connection. Regardless, Cicero was the first to popularise specific stories about Themistocles’ powers of 
recollection. As for the absence of superior memory as a trait of good leadership in Nepos’ lives, we may 
perhaps consider Artaxerxes Mnemon an exception, simply for his name: Nep. Reg. 1.3. Nepos does not tell us 
why Artaxerxes II deserved the title Μνήμων, ‘of good memory’, although I would (cautiously) posit a link to 
the ancient official role of μνήμονες as authoritative arbiters or judges: see Thomas (1992) 69. 
14 See below, p. 179-84. 
15 Pl. Resp. 486c-487a, 535c, with the caveat of 503b-c. 
16 Polyb. 4.77.3.  
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formulating a story to explain the importance of superlative (not merely good) mnemonic 
skill. The key passage is Cyropaedia 5.3.34-51, where Xenophon explains why Cyrus was 
admired for his ability to remember the names of the men in his vast army. The episode 
occurs after Cyrus has allied himself to an Assyrian eunuch, Gadatas, as he readies his army 
to march against the Assyrian king. Cyrus calls upon Chrysantas by name, to march with the 
heavy infantry at the front; next, Cyrus names Artabazus, to lead the archers; Andamyas, the 
Median infantry; Embas, the Armenian infantry; Artuchas, the Hyrcanian infantry; 
Thambradas, the Sacian infantry; and Datamas, the Cadusian infantry. Cyrus then specifies 
that all should maintain strict formation, before beginning another similar catalogue of names 
and races, in which ‘infantry’ is replaced with ‘cavalry’. Finally, he emphasises that their 
ordered arrangement must be preserved (ἡ τάξις φυλακτέα). This speech leads Cyrus’ 
soldiers to comment upon how he named and arranged his leaders and their units 
μνημονικῶς, that is, by demonstrating good mnemonic ability, or recalling them accurately in 
an ordered fashion.17  
I have included this somewhat repetitive context for several reasons. First, Cyrus’ lists 
of infantry and cavalry are instantly reminiscent of the epic catalogues upon which the 
passage might be modelled: as mentioned elsewhere, the ordered and programmatic 
arrangement of such catalogues acts as a mnemonic device, inasmuch as the formulaic 
structure aids retention and reproduction.18 Here, Cyrus (and, I suppose, Xenophon himself) 
performs as the rhapsode, using his powerful memory to conjure and create a structured army 
out of disordered and unwieldy constituent parts.19 More prosaically, Cyrus’ well-ordered 
memory produces order in his army. There is, I should stress, no suggestion that Cyrus was 
using any kind of mnemonic device to aid his memory. Rather, the passage provides an 
illustration of how order and memory were understood to be intimately connected even 
outside of the realm of artificial mnemonics. The natural link between order and 
memorability is also highlighted elsewhere in Xenophon’s oeuvre. In the Oeconomicus, 
 
17 Although μνημονικῶς does not necessarily imply structured recollection, the context in which it appears here 
links Cyrus’ excellent memory to the well-ordered arrangement of his troops. 
18 See Ch. I, p. 31-2. Cataloguing an army in this fashion was not uncommon in prose. Herodotus provides a 
prime example when enumerating the Persian forces in book 7: he catalogues nations, captains, and generals, 
moving from the infantry (7.61-83), to cavalry (7.84-8), to navy (7.89-99). The distinct feature of Xenophon’s 
(much shorter) catalogue is that it is produced from (and retained in) Cyrus’ memory; in Herodotus, Xerxes 
instructs scribes to make written records of the arrangement of his massed troops (7.100). For other military 
catalogues, see Courtney (1988) 3-8. 
19 Cf. Tatum, who posits that Cyrus’ talent for naming is a revealing commentary on how Xenophon ‘confers 
narrative importance on a character’ by choosing ‘to name or not to name’: Tatum (1989) 176-7. 
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Xenophon’s Ischomachus asserts that men and women have been endowed with equal 
mnemonic ability because memory is equally essential for their ‘divinely-allotted’ functions. 
He says that for women, maintaining order in the household is useful for several reasons, 
most notably because order allows a wife or housekeeper to remember where things are kept. 
Ischomachus explains at length (and with the use of multiple analogies) how there should be 
a place in the household for everything, and everything should be kept in its place.20 Thus, 
extrinsic order aids intrinsic natural memory.21 The link between order and memory remains, 
but the domestic scenario in the Oeconomicus inverts the relationship exemplified by Cyrus: 
in the household, control of external order promotes the wife’s internal mnemonic retention; 
for Cyrus, excellent mnemonic retention promotes external control of the army. 
The enhancement of power and control is in fact the key benefit that superior 
mnemonic capacity – and specifically, superior mnemonic capacity for names – bestows 
upon Xenophon’s Cyrus. As modern studies have shown, putting names to faces is a mentally 
burdensome task.22 Just as today, individuals in the ancient world needed strategies to 
alleviate the difficulty; as we have seen, one of the earliest examples of basic associative 
mnemonic techniques involves name-memorisation.23 The easiest strategy for a king or 
general to keep track of his underlings would have been to employ aides. Xenophon, 
however, tells us that Cyrus retains every man’s name in his own memory. This personal 
knowledge allows him to inspire either confidence or fear in his soldiers; it promises 
individual recognition and spurs them on to greater deeds; and it forces each of them to take 
responsibility instead of seeking refuge in collective anonymity.24  
Although this lesson in leadership was the original reason Xenophon included the 
anecdote in the Cyropaedia, it seems to have been generally overlooked by Roman authors of 
the first century CE who referenced the story. Pliny and Quintilian simply cite Cyrus’ memory 
for names as one example in a list of prodigious mnemonic feats, intended both as a measure 
of the astonishing mnemonic capacity of the human mind and, in Quintilian’s case, as an 
 
20 Xen. Oec. 7.26, 8.3, 8.10-7. 
21 Purves argues that Xenophon’s oikos provides space for the categorisation of items in a similar way to ancient 
mnemonic techniques such as the MOL: Purves (2010) 196-234. While the resemblance exists, it is entirely 
incidental.  
22 Brédart provides a full review of the many studies that have shown proper names are more difficult to recall 
than common nouns, before formulating hypotheses to explain the relative difficulty: Brédart (2017) 145-54. 
23 Dissoi logoi 9.4-5: see Ch. II, p. 66-8. 
24 Xen. Cyr. 5.3.46-50. 
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inspirational precedent.25 Valerius Maximus, in an earlier retelling of the episode, reproduces 
more of the original focus, mentioning that Cyrus needed no monitor to help him greet his 
army.26 Moreover, all three authors mention Cyrus’ memory for names alongside another 
legend about the king Mithridates’ linguistic ability, stating that Mithridates knew twenty-two 
languages, which enabled him to communicate with his subjects without an interpreter. The 
repeated co-incidence of the stories is likely indicative of more than simply superficial 
similarity between the two kings and their great intellectual powers. Just like Cyrus’ 
cultivation of his memory for names, Mithridates’ language-learning enhanced his ability to 
communicate with men of lower rank without aid (or aides). The similar leadership lessons 
that can be drawn from each story therefore suggest that they were (originally at least) as 
much about celebrating superhuman powers of memory and intellect as attributes in and of 
themselves as they were about highlighting how such abilities enabled powerful rulers to 
influence and govern their subordinates effectively. 
We should treat Cyrus’ extraordinary memory for names accordingly, as a fictional 
attribute designed to illustrate certain aspects of Xenophon’s ‘ideal’ ruler.27 Although Pliny et 
al. gloss the fictional context, it is clear that Cicero read the Cyropaedia in a more nuanced, 
allegorical fashion. Although Cicero never cites the mnemonic prowess of Xenophon’s Cyrus 
explicitly, I believe we can state with relative certainty that he was the original paradigm for 
Cicero’s powerful man with a powerful memory. There are several reasons to be confident 
that this was the case. First, multiple references to the Cyropaedia appear throughout 
Cicero’s works, suggesting that he had detailed knowledge of the text. The references have 
led numerous scholars to examine the influence of the Cyropaedia on Ciceronian 
conceptualisations of the ideal ruler in works such as Pro lege Manilia and De re publica.28 
The fact that Cicero mentions the Cyropaedia in his correspondence several times suggests 
that the work was also familiar to his contemporaries. Writing to his brother Quintus (who 
was serving as propraetor in Asia), Cicero draws extensively on the Cyropaedia in a 
discussion of how one ought to exercise power as an elected official. The ideal model is, he 
says, ‘Cyrus, as described by Xenophon, not according to historical fact but as a portrait of 
 
25 Plin. HN 7.88, Quint. Inst. 11.2.50. 
26 Val. Max. 8.7.ext.16. The monitor must, in this context, indicate someone performing the role of nomenclator 
– a decidedly Roman concept (discussed further below), anachronistically applied to the Cyrus story, which 
illustrates how Valerius was adapting his material for a Roman audience. 
27 For a summative portrait of Xenophon’s ‘ideal’, see Tatum (1994) 21-4. 
28 E.g. Gruber (1986) 27-46 and (1988) 243-58; Radford (2002) 7-9; Caspar (2011). 
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just rulership’.29 He tells Quintus that Xenophon covers every duty of the scrupulous and fair 
ruler and, for that reason, the Cyropaedia was a favourite text of the great Scipio Africanus.30 
He consequently urges Quintus to use the ‘Education of Cyrus’ as an education in the art of 
governance.31 Elsewhere, in a letter (to Paetus) written around a decade later, Cicero jokes 
that he consulted the Cyropaedia so much while executing his duties as proconsul and 
imperator in Cilicia that he wore it out with reading.32 Yet another example comes in a letter 
to Atticus, where Cicero makes a pun (of questionable comedic merit) involving an architect 
named Cyrus, whose work Atticus has criticised – he has, says Cicero, criticised the 
‘Education of Cyrus’.33 So Cicero cracks bad jokes about Xenophon’s work – but they are not 
jokes made at the expense of the text. Rather, they suggest that the Cyropaedia loomed large 
in Cicero’s mind as an important point of reference in discourse with his peers. Indeed, 
Cicero’s affection for the Cyropaedia is consistent with his attitude towards Xenophon’s 
works in general, which he recommends studying in depth (studiose), on the grounds that 
they contain a wealth of the most useful information.34  
When it comes to the idea that Cicero took Xenophon’s Cyrus as a model for the 
powerful leader with a powerful memory, the evidence presented above is essentially 
circumstantial. Plutarch’s biography, however, provides an explicit indication that the 
passage about memorising names at Cyr. 5.3.46-51 left a lasting impression on Cicero. 
Plutarch gives a detailed report of Cicero’s (typically scholastic) approach to starting out in 
Roman politics. Cicero, he says, believed it a matter for reproach that, while craftsmen (οἱ 
βάναυσοι) know the name and details of every one of their inanimate tools, the statesman (ὁ 
πολιτικός) should care so little about knowing the names and details of his fellow citizens. 
Consequently, Cicero apparently made a practice of memorising not only the names of 
important men, but where they lived, who their friends were, and so on.35 This philosophy, 
taken in the context of Cicero’s emerging magisterial aspirations, is reminiscent of the advice 
 
29 Cic. QFr. 1.1.22-3: Cyrus ille a Xenophonte non ad historiae fidem scriptus sed ad effigiem iusti imperi. Latin 
text: Shackleton Bailey (1980). 
30 Cf. Rep. 1.43, where Cicero has Scipio’s character recommend Cyrus as the ‘most just’ and ‘wisest’ king 
(iustissimus fuit sapientissimusque rex, text: Powell (2006)). 
31 For discussion, see Tatum (1989) 9-11. 
32 Fam. 9.25.1, discussed fully below, p. 168. 
33 Att. 2.3. 
34 Sen. 59. Cf. Brut. 112, where Cicero suggests that lots of modern orators also like to read the Cyropaedia, 
although Scaurus’ autobiography might do them more good. 
35 Plut. Cic. 7.1-2. 
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given in certain sections of the Commentariolum petitionis (for which, see below).36 More 
closely than that, however, it mirrors the rationale for memorising names that Xenophon 
attributes to Cyrus: Cyrus, says Xenophon, believed it strange that, while craftsmen (οἱ 
βάναυσοι) know the names of all their tools (and while the doctor, ὁ ἰατρός, knows the names 
of his medicines and instruments), the general (ὁ στρατηγός) should care so little about 
knowing the names of his soldiers.37 It is easy to see how Plutarch’s formulation of Cicero’s 
analogy between οἱ βάναυσοι and ὁ πολιτικός could well be an adaptation of Xenophon’s 
analogy between οἱ βάναυσοι and ὁ στρατηγός. Assuming that Plutarch’s reproduction of 
Cicero’s view is authentic, and taking Cicero’s extensive knowledge of the Cyropaedia into 
account, I do not think the close parallel is merely coincidental. Cicero took Xenophon’s 
explanation of why a ruler should cultivate his memory to heart, transferring the skills of 
Xenophon’s ideal military general onto his own ideal civilian governor. According to this 
formulation of the Ciceronian archetype, leaders both of soldiers and of citizens need a strong 
memory for names to make best use of the (human) resources at their command.  
 
Cicero’s philosophy that a good leader ought to know the names of the men he leads must 
also be understood in the context of late-republican social and political customs, which vested 
great significance in the act of greeting people by name. In particular, nomenclatio (the skill 
and practice of greeting by name) was essential for candidates who were canvassing for 
support before magisterial elections.38 The importance of remembering names is stressed in 
the so-called Commentariolum petitionis, a text that is, or purports to be, an essay written in 
the early part of 64 BCE by Quintus Cicero, advising his brother on how to campaign for the 
upcoming consular elections.39 The Commentariolum sets out how the candidate must win 
over certain ‘men of special influence’ (homines excellenti gratia) from every walk of life, 
 
36 As observed by Lintott (2013) 142. 
37 Xen. Cyr. 5.3.46-7. 
38 Note that the technical term nomenclatio was rare: Comment. 41 is its only use in an electoral context (cf. 
Columella Rust. 3.2.31). The preferred construction is aliquem nomine salutare, vel sim. I use nomenclatio here 
as a convenient shorthand for the practice. 
39 The debate over authenticity is inconclusive and ongoing: for a summary, see Morstein-Marx (1998) 259-61. 
Gruen stresses the work’s accuracy and avoidance of anachronism: Gruen (1974) 138-9, n. 76. For this reason, 
the Commentariolum is generally understood to provide accurate information about Roman electioneering. 
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turning them into amici to advocate on his behalf with their peers in the voting assemblies.40 
If a candidate is unable to greet potential supporters by name, asks the Commentariolum, how 
will he ever get them to commit to his side?41 The size of the task is significant: the candidate 
must consider the whole of Rome, with all its districts and neighbourhoods, groups and 
colleges; then, he must map out the whole of Italy tribe-by-tribe, securing it all in animo ac 
memoria; finally, he must identify the key men in each location – that is to say, he must make 
a list of influential names.42 Nomenclatio is, according to the Commentariolum, particularly 
effective when attempting to win over homines municipales ac rusticani – a group of voters 
from outside the city, whose details and interests some candidates ignore.43 Thus, the practice 
of learning and recalling names was positioned as a prerequisite for recruiting and developing 
key supporters. 
Further, we have an intriguing anecdote (of third-century origin, but first alluded to by 
Cicero) involving an impressive feat of name-memorisation performed by the ambassador 
Cineas, which illustrates how (and perhaps also why) superior memory for names was 
considered an admirable skill and a potentially powerful political tool. Cineas was an 
ambassador of Pyrrhus who, during the Pyrrhic war (in 280 BCE), was famously dispatched to 
Rome to negotiate with the senate.44 He was a Thessalian pupil of Demosthenes and a skilled 
orator who seems to have held considerable power in Pyrrhus’ court; we know that he also 
wrote an epitome of a military handbook by Aeneas Tacitus of Stymphalus and a historical 
work, which probably involved Pyrrhus himself. Cineas’ writings were still being read in the 
first century BCE: Cicero, for instance, refers to Cineas’ military books in the aforementioned 
letter he wrote to Paetus from Cilicia, joking that Paetus must have acquired his own military 
knowledge from the treatises of Pyrrhus and Cineas.45 But more than this literary legacy, it 
was Cineas’ negotiations with the senate that made a lasting impression at Rome. Pyrrhus 
wanted Cineas to persuade the Romans to agree the terms of a peace treaty and, to aid 
 
40 Comment. 18, but see also 3-4, 16-7, 29-30. These homines were not patroni who mobilised clientes to vote, 
but ‘middlemen’ (Morstein-Marx dubs them ‘vote-brokers’) who could deliver the vote of the groups (centuries, 
tribes, sodalitates, etc.) to which they belonged. See Yakobson (1992) 32-52; Morstein-Marx (1998) 259-88. 
41 Comment. 28: the question is framed as an attack on Cicero’s rival Antonius. 
42 Comment. 30. 
43 Comment. 31-2. 
44 For the chronology of Cineas’ negotiations, see Lefkowitz (1959) 147-77, Kent (2020) 62-81. 
45 Fam. 9.25.1.  
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Cineas’ powers of persuasion, he attempted to bribe influential senators.46 Appius Caecus, 
vehemently opposed to Cineas’ presence in the city, made a speech that was so impressive it 
was handed down (according to Cicero’s chronology) as one of the earliest preserved Latin 
orations.47 The numerous later historical accounts of the negotiations tend to emphasise how 
individual senators selflessly refused the gifts that Cineas offered them on Pyrrhus’ behalf, 
while Roman historians find Cineas’ attempts to win over Roman women with presents 
particularly worthy of note.48  
As well as bribery, Cineas’ embassy to the senate apparently included an astonishing 
display of name-memorisation. Although the story is divorced from the historical narrative 
and seldom (if ever) mentioned in discussions of the Pyrrhic negotiations, that is the context 
in which it must be understood. The first full surviving version comes from the elder Seneca: 
qui missus a Pyrrho legatus ad Romanos postero die novus homo et senatum et omnem 
urbanam circumfusam senatui plebem nominibus suis persalutavit. 
Sen. Contr. 1.pr.19. 
He [Cineas] had been dispatched by Pyrrhus as ambassador to the Romans and, on the day 
after he arrived as a newcomer, he greeted in succession and by their proper names the senate 
and all the plebeians of the city who were crowded around the senate. 
First, it is important to note that this story concerning Cineas’ remarkable memory for names 
must have been current long before the elder Seneca told it. Cicero provides the first 
surviving reference, when commenting on the sheer magnitude of Cineas’ mnemonic skill.49 
It may even be the case that Cicero was one of Seneca’s primary sources.50 The story does 
not, however, appear in subsequent historical accounts of the Pyrrhic negotiations.  
Second, the nature of Cineas’ feat of memory is key. He memorised names (rather 
than a speech, or poetry, or a list of items) and this allowed him to engage in an act of mass 
 
46 Ennius’ Annales 6 focussed on the Pyrrhic war and was an influential source for later historians. For surviving 
accounts of the negotiations, see e.g. Livy Epit. 13, Plut. Pyrrh. 18-9, etc. 
47 Brut. 61. 
48 For Cineas’ gifts (to women in particular), see e.g. Livy 34.4.6-11, Val. Max. 4.3.14, Plut. Pyrrh. 18.2. 
Discussion in Lefkowitz (1959) 158-9. 
49 Cic. Tusc. 1.59: for discussion, see Ch. II, p. 104-5. Seneca seems to believe that Cineas was memorising 
using artificial techniques, since he states that the ability can be acquired by learning a relatively simple ars 
(Contr. 1.pr.19: hoc […] non operosa arte tradi potest). 
50 Cicero may have told the anecdote in a lost work, or it may have been known to Seneca from other sources. 
The esteem in which Seneca held Cicero and the plentiful Ciceronian intertexts in his work render the former a 
distinct possibility: see e.g. Sussman (1978) 32, esp. the long n. 66; Pingoud and Roller (2020) 281-3. 
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nomenclatio. As I discussed earlier, for Romans looking to win the favour of influential men, 
the practice of nomenclatio could initiate and facilitate social interactions; it was a sign of 
respect and the first building block in the construction of trust. So, when it comes to 
interpreting Cineas’ mnemonic feat, we should lay aside the speculative question of 
feasibility (difficult; not impossible) and avoid being too distracted by the impressive, though 
superficially arbitrary, size of the feat itself.51 For a Roman audience, memorising and 
greeting hundreds of people by name was more than just a party trick. As is also indicated by 
the stories regarding Cineas’ gift-giving to influential Roman men (and women, who could 
influence their husbands), Cineas was attempting to endear himself to his Roman hosts. A 
savvy orator and the ultimate diplomat, he also recognised that greeting individuals by name 
was an important practice in Roman politics – a practice that he could exploit to his own 
advantage with a demonstration of superior memoria. He even went beyond learning the 
names of only the most powerful men in the senate and (like a good magisterial candidate) 
paid attention to the lower orders as well. Thus, Cineas demonstrated that he had achieved 
mastery of a skill that was valued highly in contemporary politics. From the surviving 
sources, we can see that the anecdote survived until the late Republic, was picked up by 
Cicero, told in full by the elder Seneca, and revived again by the elder Pliny.52 Cineas’ feat of 
memory retained this lasting appeal because it was impressively grand, certainly; but more 
than this, it demonstrated an outsider’s immediate engagement with the important social 
convention of nomenclatio.53 It was not only Cicero who believed that a strong memory for 
names was a praiseworthy attribute. 
Whether Cicero, or any of the other late-republican Roman elite, devoted time to 
cultivating their ability to remember names is, however, another matter entirely – and the 
widespread presence of nomenclatores would indicate that they did not. Nomenclatores were 
specialists, typically enslaved, whose main role was to provide their master with the names 
 
51 On feasibility, the OCD5 suggests a maximum size of 300 for the senate in this period (see Momigliano and 
Cornell (2016)) – a number significantly eclipsed by the feats of modern mnemonists, e.g. Harry Lorayne, a 
professional mnemonist, who recounts meeting up to 400 audience members before a show and, as its finale, 
addressing each one by name in turn: Lorayne and Lucus (1974) xv, 66, 199. Thus, Cineas’ feat is theoretically 
within the realms of possibility, even with quite an additional crowd. 
52 Plin. HN 7.88: Cineas’ story is told alongside the Roman example of one L. Scipio (possibly the consul of 190 
BCE), who apparently knew the names of all the populus Romanus (cf. Themistocles knowing nomina omnium 
civium, Cic. Sen. 21, discussed below). How many people Pliny imagined in said populus is unclear. Harris 
(1989) 31-3 is extremely sceptical of the Scipio story. I would argue that Scipio was, like Cineas, invoked as an 
exemplum because of the importance attached to nomenclatio, regardless of how many names he actually knew. 
53 The social appeal of name-memorisation may help explain why the elder Seneca (who came to Rome as an 
‘outsider’ from the provinces) overexaggerates his own superlative memory for names at Contr. 1.pr.2. 
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and details of any influential or important men he might meet but embarrassingly fail to 
recognise.54 They were utilised especially during election season by candidates canvassing 
for magisterial offices. Cicero personally kept a nomenclator among his permanent retinue – 
whether this was normal practice is difficult to determine.55 The presence of Cicero’s 
nomenclator outside of election season is nevertheless revealing. On the one hand, it 
indicates the importance that Cicero attached to nomenclatio even when he was not 
campaigning. On the other, it suggests that the practice was, in many respects, just a façade. 
Roman ‘politicians’ did not really keep innumerable names and details in their heads any 
more than politicians do today – they used aides. The appearance of infallible memoria had 
nevertheless to be sustained, to maintain relationships and status, to give the impression of 
being well-connected and widely recognised.56  
Perhaps the social pressures created by the traditional Roman practice of nomenclatio 
were, therefore, part of the reason why Cicero considered superior memoria a useful 
leadership attribute. Xenophon’s Cyrus memorised the names of his soldiers to enhance his 
ability to communicate with them directly, to influence and control them. The 
Commentariolum stresses that the candidate must memorise the names and details of 
influential electors to influence them, to win them over, to control their votes and the votes of 
their peers. Cineas too utilised his superior memory for names in an attempt to win over the 
senators and the Roman people. Personal recognition endears support, whether for candidate 
or king, and it seems that Cicero took this tenet of leadership on board and incorporated it 
into his own conceptualisation of the ideal leader. 
 
2. Cicero’s leaders and generals 
Cicero attributes superlative memoria to two of the most powerful individuals of the late 
Republic, L. Licinius Lucullus and Julius Caesar. I shall deal with Caesar first, since the 
allusions to his memoria are brief and illustrate how Cicero might attribute strong memoria to 
a powerful individual as an incidental, not defining, character trait. One reference appears in 
Pro rege Deiotaro, where Cicero addresses Caesar directly, asking on behalf of Hieras (a 
 
54 See the monograph by Kolendo (1989). 
55 Cic. Att. 4.1.5. Quintus Cicero also kept a permanent nomenclator: QFr. 1.2.9.  
56 Hence Cicero’s attack on Cato for betraying his ‘Stoic’ ideals by using a nomenclator focuses on the 
‘deceptive’ nature of the practice: Mur. 77. 
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representative of Deiotarus) that Caesar remember the events that had transpired in Galatia, 
where the king had allegedly attempted to assassinate him: ‘he [Hieras] appeals,’ says Cicero, 
‘to your memoria, which is exceptionally strong’.57 Cicero then recites a carefully edited 
version of events to try and establish Deiotarus’ innocence. Thus, the praise of the strength of 
Caesar’s memory, while superficially flattering, is rhetorically designed to prime Caesar for 
the ensuing narrative, to increase the likelihood that he will be persuaded by it: since Caesar’s 
powers of recall are so very impressive, he will of course remember that events transpired just 
as Hieras claims they transpired. Cicero dismisses any concerns Caesar might have about the 
fallibility of his memory and then immediately tries to exploit that fallibility by reinforcing 
the desired narrative with a repeated retelling.58 While Cicero’s apparently implicit grasp of 
the potential effect of post factum narrative on eyewitness experience is certainly interesting, 
it hardly contributes to a portrayal of Caesar as mnemonically gifted. His memories, like the 
memories of everyone else, are potentially subject to external influence.  
Cicero makes another reference to Caesar’s memoria in the second Philippic, building 
Caesar up at Marcus Antonius’ expense: Cicero says that Caesar was an exemplary 
intellectual, leader, and general; Marcus Antonius, on the other hand, possesses none of 
Caesar’s qualities, except lust for despotism (Phil. 2.116-7). Among other traits, Cicero states 
that Caesar possessed ingenium, ratio, memoria, and litterae, before moving directly on to his 
ability to wage successful wars (which were, Cicero admits, bad for the res publica). As 
mentioned previously, Plato had included a retentive memory among the other generic 
intellectual virtues of the good leader. In the rhetorical tradition, ‘good memory’ was 
sometimes listed among the ‘goods of the mind’, the virtuous hallmarks of wisdom to which 
upstanding individuals should aspire: Aristotle, for instance, includes μνήμη alongside other 
praiseworthy natural intellectual capacities, while Cicero himself lists memoria similarly in 
De inventione.59 Likewise, in De finibus, Cicero cites memoria as one of the virtues that 
define someone as ingeniosus, ‘innately talented’.60 In the second Philippic, Cicero bestows 
the virtuous aspects of wisdom upon Caesar not so much to praise or defend him, as to set up 
a character assassination of Antonius. In this instance, therefore, the attribution of strong 
 
57 Deiot. 42: memoriam tuam implorat, qua vales plurimum. Latin text: Gotoff (1993). 
58 Memories produced in eyewitness accounts have a strong tendency to be influenced by subsequent retellings 
of events: this ‘misinformation effect’ has been well-documented in studies since the 1980s, see e.g. Loftus and 
Hoffman (1989) 100-4 and, for a more up-to-date survey, Weingardt, Toland, and Loftus (2010) 3-26. 
59 Arist. Rh. 1.6.15, Cic. Inv. rhet. 2.160. 
60 Fin. 5.36. 
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memoria to Caesar is part of a carefully planned rhetorical construct – a contrast of characters 
(dissimilitudo animorum, if we want to assign it a label), designed to denigrate Antonius. 
Good memory only contributes indirectly to Caesar’s leadership, as one component of his 
sharp intelligence.  
In stark contrast, in the preface to the Lucullus, Cicero takes the notion of superior 
memoria as an attribute of a strong leader and general to the absolute extreme: Lucullus, he 
says, used his impressive memory, which had been enhanced by training in memoria 
artificiosa, to turn himself into the ideal imperator, simply by reading and memorising 
information.61 Earlier, I referenced how Cicero, in a jocular letter to Paetus, had entertained 
the idea that reading might have the power to improve a man’s leadership skills. The relevant 
sentences are worth quoting in full: 
Summum me ducem litterae tuae reddiderunt. plane nesciebam te tam peritum esse rei 
militaris […] sed quid ludimus? nescis quo cum imperatore tibi negotium sit. IIαιδείαν 
Kύρoυ, quam contrieram legendo, totam in hoc imperio explicavi. 
Cic. Fam. 9.25.1.62 
Your letters have turned me into a supreme leader. I was wholly unaware that you were so 
experienced in military affairs […] But why are we clowning around? You don’t know which 
imperator you’re dealing with: in this command, I have put into practice the entire 
Cyropaedia, which I’ve worn out with reading.  
Here, Cicero treats the idea that reading could turn a tiro into an imperator as a conceit for 
his joke. Paetus has evidently included some discussion of military matters in his letters to 
Cicero, perhaps congratulating him on his victories as proconsul of Cilicia; now Cicero 
responds that he has no need of additional input from Paetus (thank you very much) because 
he has already learnt everything there is to know about leadership from his close reading of 
the Cyropaedia.63 Moreover, he has put that close reading into practice to achieve his 
victories and be hailed imperator by his troops.64 
In reality, of course, no self-respecting Roman imperator would have attributed his 
military prowess to book-learning – rather, he would point to prior experience, successes, and 
 
61 Luc. 1-4. For the philosophical content of Luc. that relates to memory, see Ch. II, p. 93-6. 
62 Latin text: Shackleton Bailey (1977). 
63 For the jocularity of Cicero’s epistolary relationship with Paetus, see Leach (1999) 169-77. 
64 After laying waste to hostile encampments in the Amanus range: see Att. 5.20.3-4, where Cicero writes in 
cheerful tones to Atticus, referring to the title bestowed upon him as an appellatio inanis.  
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victories. We see this approach in Cicero’s more serious dispatches from Cilicia, which 
magnify the gravity of his victorious military operations in a bid to launch his (ultimately 
unsuccessful) campaign for a triumph.65 Much earlier in his career, and long before any 
personal triumphal aspirations, Cicero had likewise highlighted experience and success as 
hallmarks of the great general. In Pro lege Manilia, when explaining why Pompey should 
replace Lucullus in command of the war against Mithridates, Cicero lauds Pompey for 
joining his father’s army when he was barely more than a boy; for becoming a teenage 
imperator; for waging more wars than most men have read about; and for learning scientia 
rei militaris (‘knowledge of military matters’) not from the instruction of other men but from 
his own successful campaigns and commands.66 Conversely, in Pro Fonteio, Cicero criticises 
the Roman youth at large because they no longer desire to gain military experience on the 
front line. By contrast, men like Pompey and Fonteius were, he says, educated in scientia rei 
militaris during successful campaigns, not from books. Cicero argues that the safety of the 
people depends upon such military men and, for that reason, Fonteius must not be exiled.67 
Scientia rei militaris is itself one of Cicero’s four prerequisites for the summus imperator.68 
Ideally, it is knowledge acquired on campaign and in the line of battle, not (as Cicero jokes 
with Paetus) from reading. Campbell believes that Cicero’s stance on the acquisition of 
scientia rei militaris suggests that ‘senators of conventional mediocrity’ did indeed learn how 
to command troops from handbooks and exempla.69 Such texts cannot have been their only 
source of knowledge, however, and practical experience remained the gold standard.  
When attempting to persuade the public, then, Cicero fully subscribed to the primacy 
of military experience over and above theoretical instruction, even if in his personal 
correspondence he joked about his own tendency to reach for the scrinium before the gladius. 
In the opening to the Lucullus, however, he overturns this paradigm completely. Cicero wrote 
the letter to Paetus quoted above in 50 BCE. In 45, when he was composing the Lucullus, he 
took his ‘joke’ (that he had been transformed into an imperator by reading) and made it 
integral to a sincere portrayal of Lucullus’ military prowess. Lucullus’ natural talent 
(ingenium) was so great, says Cicero, that he did not require the ‘unteachable lessons of 
 
65 See e.g. Cicero’s exchange with Cato, Fam. 15.4-6. Discussion, Leach (2016) 503-23. 
66 Leg. Man. 28. For the speech and its context, see Steel (2001) 113-35. 
67 Font. 42-3. 
68 Leg. Man. 28. 
69 Campbell (1987) 21, and 13-8 on military manuals. 
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experience’ (indocilis usus disciplina). Instead he spent the voyage to Asia interrogating 
experienced military men and reading military accounts, with the result that ‘he arrived a 
ready-made imperator, though he had set out from Rome ignorant of military matters’.70 
According to this conceit, Lucullus’ conversations and the accounts that he read brought 
about the same transformation in him as Paetus’ letters and the Cyropaedia had in Cicero. 
The conceit implies that even though experience cannot be taught, a deficit of experience can 
be overcome by the power of the intellect – and Lucullus overcame it, thanks, as Cicero goes 
on to say, to his divina memoria rerum.  
The conceit that opens the Lucullus is both remarkably imaginative and fairly 
absurd.71 In reality, Lucullus had acquired plenty of military experience before he was 
appointed to lead the fight against Mithridates, serving under Sulla and later during 
campaigns in Africa.72 He did not need to use a mnemonic technique – and moreover, 
memoria rerum, a technique that was the speciality of orators – to memorise facts as if he 
were about to make a speech in the forum. Yet Cicero would have us believe that Mithridates 
was awed by Lucullus’ hastily-acquired military expertise and recognised him as the greatest 
leader in history.73 So why did Cicero attribute Lucullus’ practical military proficiency to his 
ostensibly superhuman memoria and, specifically, to memoria rerum? Scholarly explanations 
generally (and quite rightly) focus on the role of Lucullus in the ensuing philosophical 
dialogue. Cappello, for instance, argues that Lucullus’ extraordinary memoria readies him for 
his role as a faithful reproducer of the conversations he had with Antiochus about 
philosophy.74 Listening, reading, and the same mnemonic technique that turned Lucullus into 
an imperator will, in the context of the dialogue, transform him into a philosopher of sorts. 
Yet he remains, in Cappello’s words, an ‘uncritical memorizer’, and this ‘Lucullan’ approach 
is at odds with the one that Cicero advocates through his own persona, as he refutes the 
uncritical acceptance of doctrine and holds that debate is a necessary part of philosophical 
 
70 Luc. 2: in Asiam factus imperator venit, cum esset Roma profectus rei militaris rudis. 
71 Cicero himself seems to have recognised the absurdity of using Lucullus in a philosophical dialogue, since he 
reassigned Lucullus’ speeches (notably to Varro) in his revised versions of the Academici libri. See Cic. Att. 
13.19.3-5 and Hatzimichali (2012) 18. 
72 For an outline of Lucullus’ life and career, see Brittain (2006) 129. 
73 Luc. 3. 
74 Cappello (2019) 229-33. Luc. 10 makes it clear that Lucullus is simply rehearsing Antiochus’ arguments. 
Antiochus (a student of Philo) attempted to reintroduce Stoicism into Scepticism: Polito (2012) 31-54. For 
Lucullus’ involvement with Antiochus, see Hatzimichali (2012) 16-24. 
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development.75 For Cicero, as in rhetoric, so also in philosophy: verbatim reproduction of 
ideas is not enough. Strong memoria is necessary to retain a firm grasp on the fundamentals, 
but what must accompany memoria is an ability to think critically, to adapt arguments to 
circumstance; not dissimilarly, in oratory, the ultimate benefit of strong memoria is not that it 
enables the speaker to unthinkingly reproduce a speech but that it allows him the freedom to 
improvise according to circumstance.76 
The opening of the Lucullus is necessarily at odds with the subsequent content: in 
establishing Lucullus’ philosophical credentials, Cicero engages not with the abstract modes 
of argument that follow, but with the much more concrete modes of Roman exemplarity. He 
invites us to consider Lucullus’ merits by invoking contrasts – with Hortensius, Themistocles, 
and Mithridates – and by referencing various exemplary attributes, such as intellectual ability 
and leadership skills. Most interestingly for this study, the attribute Cicero chooses to 
foreground is memoria, natural and artificial. To this end, he first contrasts the mnemonic 
prowess of Lucullus with that of Hortensius, an expedient comparison, since Hortensius was 
another principal interlocutor in the Academici libri and, in reality, he enjoyed a reputation 
for impressive memoria.77 Cicero explains that both men, Hortensius and Lucullus, were 
extremely proficient practitioners of memoria artificiosa (the MOL), but while Hortensius 
possessed unrivalled memoria verborum, Lucullus excelled in memoria rerum. Cicero 
explains the importance of the distinction on the grounds that res are more important than 
verba ‘for getting business done’ (in negotiis gerendis).78 Lucullus’ memoria consequently 
helped him attain expertise in practical military matters.  
We need not give any credence to Cicero’s estimation of the two men’s mnemonic 
abilities to see the significance of the underlying comparison. Memoria rerum is (as Cicero 
stressed at De or. 2.359) the special skill of the orator. Cicero’s Lucullus relied solely on his 
superior memoria rerum to become a formidable imperator, skilled enough to tackle 
Mithridates and to rival men with years of front-line experience. The conceit thus begs the 
question: if Lucullus utilised this specialist oratorical technique to achieve his military 
greatness, what was to stop another specialist orator from doing the same? Cicero’s focus on 
 
75 Cappello (2019) 231. 
76 See Ch. I, p. 34-6. 
77 Luc. 2. For Hortensius’ reputation, see Ch. III, p. 138-44. 
78 Cf. the Auctor ad Herennium, who emphasises that memoria rerum assists with negotium: Rhet. Her. 3.40. 
For the division of the MOL into memoria rerum and memoria verborum, see Ch. I, p. 22-4. 
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artificial memory allows him to subtly conflate the attributes of the orator and the imperator: 
if we push the Lucullan conceit to the extreme, Cicero is even suggesting that latent within 
the ideal orator, who possesses superhuman memoria rerum, there lies a mighty imperator, if 
only the orator should choose to apply himself to military affairs. I would not want to attach 
too much weight to this reading – I am not suggesting that Cicero seriously believed expertise 
in the MOL qualified an orator to command legions – but Cicero’s desire to conflate the 
attributes of the ideal orator and imperator, at a point in Roman history when powerful 
military generals dominated the political stage, helps explain why he attributed strong 
memoria to exemplary individuals from both professions.  
Themistocles, whom Cicero also invokes in the opening of the Lucullus, is another 
case in point. As mentioned at the start of this chapter, Themistocles is one of Cicero’s 
favourite exempla, often cited for his ingenium, his consilium, and especially his memoria.79 
As in the case of Simonides, Cicero is the earliest (although surely not the original) source for 
many of our stories concerning Themistocles’ incredible mnemonic ability. In De senectute, 
for instance, when addressing memory impairment in old age, Cicero introduces 
Themistocles as a counter-example, because, according to Cicero’s reasoning, Themistocles 
had secured the names of all the Athenian citizens in his memory so well, he would not have 
started greeting them incorrectly as he aged.80 Regardless of the probative strength of this 
anecdote within the context of De senectute, Themistocles’ ostensibly superior memory for 
names is significant because it demonstrates he possessed a capacity that, as discussed above, 
Cicero deemed an important attribute of the ideal statesman. Like Cyrus, and like the expert 
craftsman who knows the names and details of all his tools, Themistocles had no need of 
external assistance to remember the names and details of the citizens he led.  
Cicero does not invoke Themistocles’ memory for names in the opening to the 
Lucullus. Rather, he revives an anecdote he first introduced in De oratore, which involves 
Themistocles, another ‘certain learned man’ (quidam doctus homo), and their differing 
attitudes towards the ars memoriae.81 Cicero begins by reporting that, like Lucullus, 
 
79 For Cicero’s other uses of Themistocles as a (personal) exemplum (notably as another unjustly exiled 
statesman), see van der Blom (2010) 213-6. 
80 Sen. 21 (cf. Val. Max. 7.ext.15; Plut. Them. 5.4). Putting a figure on the number of names Themistocles 
supposedly memorised seems a pointless endeavour (pace Falconer (1923) 29, n. 2). 
81 De or. 2.299. It has been assumed that quidam doctus homo refers to Simonides, though the story is evidently 
distinct from the Simonidean origin myth. Cicero remains purposefully vague: see Leeman, Pinkster, and Wisse 
(1996) 7, ad loc.  
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Themistocles (whom Cicero calls the princeps Graeciae) also possessed remarkable memoria 
rerum, which makes him more useful for comparative purposes than Hortensius.82 Lucullus 
and Themistocles were both great intellectuals, generals, and leaders. When a ‘certain learned 
man’ offered Themistocles the opportunity to learn the precepts of the ars memoriae, 
however, he turned it down, responding that he would rather learn how to forget – he would 
prefer, as it were, an ars oblivionis. In De oratore, Cicero’s Antonius invokes this same 
anecdote to illustrate the sheer magnitude of Themistocles’ natural talent. In the Lucullus, 
Cicero spins the story in another direction: 
tali ingenio praeditus Lucullus adiunxerat etiam illam quam Themistocles spreverat 
disciplinam; itaque ut litteris consignamus quae monimentis mandare volumus sic ille in 
animo res insculptas habebat. 
Cic. Luc. 2. 
Though gifted with such great natural talent, Lucullus also added the discipline that 
Themistocles rejected and, consequently, just as we write out in letters that which we wish to 
commit to permanent record, so he would hold res imprinted in his mind. 
According to Cicero, then, Lucullus one-upped the exemplary orator, statesman, and general 
Themistocles, the princeps Graeciae, by embracing contemporaneous mnemonic theory – 
and specifically (as the brief allusion to the wax tablet metaphor makes clear) by embracing 
the oratorical MOL. In the very next sentence, Cicero introduces Mithridates, the ‘greatest 
king since Alexander’ (rex post Alexandrum maxumus), citing his opinion that Lucullus was 
the most impressive imperator in history, in every type of warfare, both on land and at sea.83 
The implication is the same as in the comparison with Hortensius: mastery of memoria rerum 
led to Lucullus’ military expertise. But by invoking Themistocles, Mithridates, and even 
Alexander – all exemplary leaders from the East – Cicero now goes one step further. In the 
pursuit of military excellence, Lucullus the model Roman imperator has assimilated a 
technique drawn originally from Greek rhetorical theory, the ars memoriae¸ into his own ars 
militaris, which he then uses to dominate Greece and Asia. In De oratore, Cicero’s Antonius 
disregarded Themistocles’ rejection of the ars memoriae on the grounds that mnemonic 
theory can be useful in the practical business of oratory. Cicero’s Lucullus does likewise, 
embracing the mnemonic techniques that Themistocles spurned and utilising them in the 
 
82 Luc. 2. 
83 Luc. 3. 
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practical business of military campaigning. Cicero thus portrays an approach to the ars 
memoriae that sees exemplary Romans enhance their innate talents by means of Greek τέχνη 
put to practical use. 
Cicero’s attribution of superior memoria to both exemplary orators and military 
generals must be contextualised on two fronts. The first is the developmental history of 
memoria artificiosa as a subdiscipline of Greek rhetoric. Rome’s military dominance of the 
Greek East was, in Cicero’s era, well-established; its intellectual dominance was not.84 For 
Cicero in particular, the allegedly inferior quality of Roman oratory in comparison to the 
oratory of a (somewhat nebulously-defined) Athenian golden age – which seems to span the 
era from Themistocles (or even several generations earlier) to Demosthenes – is a subject that 
arises repeatedly in De oratore and the Brutus, when Cicero searches to identify the traits of 
the ideal Roman orator who will rival and supersede the titans of the Greek past. In his view, 
it was only with the advent of Crassus and Antonius that Roman orators first equalled the 
renown of the Greeks in eloquence.85 The pair belonged to the generation before Cicero and, 
at the very end of De oratore, which is set in 91 BCE, Cicero has his interlocutors posit that 
the new up-and-coming generation of orators might finally surpass the Greeks, singling out 
Hortensius for his ability to combine his many natural gifts with skilled application of 
theory.86 Likewise, in the Brutus, Cicero portrays Hortensius as a fine oratorical innovator, 
comparing him with the greats, Crassus and Antonius – but here, Hortensius is carefully 
positioned so that he can be followed (and eventually surpassed) by Cicero himself.87 As in 
the case of the exemplary Lucullus, who surpassed Themistocles, Alexander, and Mithridates 
in military skill thanks to his ability to combine natural talent with applied mnemonic theory, 
Cicero’s exemplary orators eventually become superior to past generations of Greeks thanks 
to a combination of innate Roman mores and ingenium, enhanced by the application of Greek 
theory and training – and not just in the discipline of memoria, but across the rhetorical 
spectrum. This same approach to Greek learning will, Cicero seems to suggest, see future 
 
84 For the increasing influence of Greek learning on Rome in this period, see Introduction, p. 13-6. 
85 Brut. 138. 
86 De or. 3.228-30. 
87 Hortensius is introduced at Brut. 301; he and Cicero meet at 319; Cicero ‘surpasses’ him at 323. For Cicero’s 
teleological approach to oratory, see van den Berg, who makes an interesting argument that Cicero, while 
implicitly establishing an important place for himself at a high point in the oratorical teleology of the Brutus, 
nevertheless leaves the possibility of further stages of oratorical development open, in order to secure a legacy 
for his own speeches as works that should be praised and studied, even if aesthetic values in oratory change (as 
he believes they inevitably will): van den Berg (2019) 583-90, 598-601. Kaster raises some key questions 
regarding our interpretation of Cicero’s oratorical ‘history’ in the Brutus: Kaster (2020) 14-7. 
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generations of Romans attain and maintain pre-eminence over the Greeks in the disciplines of 
peace, such as oratory, as well as in the disciplines of war. 
The other necessary contextual front is Cicero’s broader discourse on the roles of (and 
relationship between) the orator and the military general on the late-republican political stage. 
A trend emerges across his works, whereby Cicero to an extent conflates the activities of the 
orator and those of the imperator. This conflation is apparent in, for instance, the martial 
themes that run throughout De oratore. Time and again, oratorical arguments and techniques 
are referred to in terms of attack and defence: orators are trained to wage wars with words 
just as soldiers are taught to wield weapons; the forum itself becomes the front line; while the 
orator fights a battle, assaulting the opposition or providing protection for his cliens.88 The 
role of memoria in the orator’s arsenal is primarily defensive. Hence we see the standard 
rhetorical metaphors of memoria as custos, praesidium, or thesaurus.89 As custos, memoria 
could secure lines of defence and attack in the orator’s mind; as praesidium or thesaurus, it 
acted as an impenetrable store of resources, a stronghold or strongbox. 
In De oratore, Cicero was drawing on a long Roman tradition of applying martial 
imagery to speech (words as weapons, and so forth).90 The extent to which he developed the 
military theme is manifest in the persona of Antonius, who initially envisions speech itself as 
an imperator bonus ac fortis, a commander who can marshal troops to do his bidding and 
stop aggressors in their tracks.91 Subsequently, Cicero has Antonius sum up his personal 
approach to inventio in a series of battle motifs. Antonius explains how he prepares to speak 
by first identifying whether the optimal strategy lies in using his oratorical weaponry against 
his opponent’s case or in protecting his own arguments by fortifying his strongest lines of 
defence (De or. 2.292-3). If he is obliged to retreat from his opponent’s attacks, Antonius 
makes it look like he has deliberately decided to relocate to a stronger defensive position and 
not like he has been forced to flee in panic with his shield abandoned or slung over his back 
(2.294-5). As mentioned in Chapter III, in the Brutus, Cicero continues to embellish the 
 
88 For comparisons between oratorical and military training, see e.g. De or. 1.32, 1.157, 2.84, 3.55, 3.129, 3.206; 
and, for the defensive and offensive capacities of the orator, couched in military terminology, De or. 1.172, 
1.184, 1.202. 
89 E.g. Rhet. Her. 3.28, 3.34. For analysis of memoria as praesidium, see Ch. I, p. 43; for memoria as thesaurus, 
Ch. II, p. 92. Instances of Cicero invoking memoria as custos include De or. 1.18, custos inventis cogitatisque 
rebus et verbis; De or. 1.127, memoriā custodire; Part. or. 3, rerum omnium custos est memoria; Brut. 219, 
[memoria] custos est ceterarum ingeni partium. 
90 For military imagery in republican Latin, see Fantham (1972) 26-33 and, for De or. specifically, 155-8. 
91 De or. 2.187. 
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portrait of Antonius the oratorical imperator, stating that he would arrange his arguments and 
talking points just as an imperator arranges his cavalry, infantry, and light-armoured troops, 
before immediately adding that ‘his memoria was supreme’.92 Here, Antonius’ infallible 
memory allows him to grasp his subject matter and yet appear unprepared, thereby taking the 
iudices off-guard. Once more, Xenophon’s Cyrus springs to mind (although I am certainly 
not suggesting an intentional parallel): just as Cyrus surprised everyone by retaining the units 
of his army in his memory and then arranging them in optimal formation, so Antonius took 
his audience unawares by memorising and arranging each unit of his speech.  
Beyond the intellectual works, in speeches such as Pro Murena (which Cicero 
delivered as consul) we witness a sustained effort on Cicero’s part to equate the prestige of 
the Roman orator with that of the imperator. Cicero chooses to defend Murena by 
magnifying the societal importance of military leaders at the expense of his opponent, 
Sulpicius, who was a legal expert (iurisconsultus) – a profession to which Cicero was himself 
closely allied.93 Consequently, Cicero takes great care to distinguish the true orator from the 
iurisconsultus, whom he portrays as a mundane forensic consultant. Oratory is, he suggests, a 
perfectly valid alternative to the military route to the consulship, especially for novi homines 
(Mur. 24). By contrast, iurisconsulti are would-be orators who drop out when they realise 
they are not up to the labor dicendi (29). Cicero concludes that there are ultimately only two 
professions worthy of the highest level of praise, the military imperator and the good orator 
(30). In the context of the trial, Cicero’s forceful reassertion of the ‘equal’ importance of the 
orator and the imperator does little to aid Murena, who was (according to Cicero) qualified 
for the consulship by virtue of the renown he had achieved in the military, not because of his 
oratory. Cicero’s argument does, however, defend his own oratorical career, his role as 
consul-cum-advocate, and his self-portrayal in the peroratio as a dux togatus, ready to go to 
war with Catiline.94 Cicero goes even further in the Catilinarians themselves, attempting to 
reshape his role as a preeminent orator into that of an imperator togatus – a hybrid, almost 
paradoxical, ‘civilian imperator’.95 To what extent Cicero succeeded in effecting this 
 
92 Brut. 1.139: ut ab imperatore equites pedites levis armatura, sic ab illo in maxime opportunis orationis 
partibus collocabantur. Erat memoria summa… For continuation of this passage, see Ch. III, p. 134. 
93 Mur. 19-30. For historical context and analysis of this passage, see May (1988) 58-64 and Steel (2001) 170-3. 
94 Mur. 84-5. 
95 E.g. Cat. 2.28, 3.23-6, 4.20-4. Dyck notes the implicit contrast of togatus with the military paludatus, Dyck 
(2008) 163, ad loc. 2.28. For discussion see e.g. Nicolet (1960) 244-52, May (1988) 56-8, Steel (2001) 168-70. 
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transformation is debatable; he was certainly heavily invested in broadcasting a refashioned 
self-image to the public.96 
The examples above illustrate Cicero’s contention that, in his case at least, a great 
orator might also possess the leadership qualities of a great military leader. Even though the 
orator fights on the civilian battlefield of the forum, he should nevertheless be considered 
equally indispensable and equally worthy of recognition. Ultimately, however, Cicero’s most 
honest assessment of the roles of orator and imperator is perhaps to be found at Brut. 256, 
where he admits that although the magnus orator is by far superior to the minutus imperator, 
nevertheless, the imperator is of more practical utility to the state. This admission reflects the 
late-republican reality. An orator, however perfect, could garner neither the power nor the 
glory of the strongest military generals. Towards the end of the Brutus, after reviewing all the 
greatest speakers in history, Cicero virtually recognised as much. 
According to the Ciceronian paradigms of the ideal orator and imperator, then, while 
the two professions share certain character traits and attributes – certain virtues, certain 
capacities for leadership, a certain strategic grasp of attack and defence – they remain 
distinct. Likewise, according to the Ciceronian model, there is some overlap between the 
roles of orator and civilian rector, but expertise in one profession does not qualify an 
individual as an expert in the other.97 To generalise, while the ideal statesman and the ideal 
speaker may share attributes and virtues, these are often coincidental – the attributes and 
virtues that define, as it were, the vir bonus in Cato’s vir bonus dicendi peritus.98 Based on 
the evidence discussed above, the question I pose here is whether Cicero was doing 
something genuinely distinctive by introducing memoria into the mix. On the one hand, 
Cicero’s formulation of superior memoria as an exemplary attribute is far from universal 
across his works. Oratory, for instance, plays little part in Cicero’s conceptualisation of the 
ideal rector in De re publica and, unsurprisingly, there is no role at all for superior 
 
96 As Berry points out, as well as accusations in Catilinam, the Catilinarians contain many arguments pro 
Cicerone. Cicero needed to persuade the public that his actions as imperator togatus were those of a proper 
Roman leader, a consul, not a rex: Berry (2020) Ch. 5, esp. 190-2.  
97 At De or. 1.214-6, Cicero’s Antonius implies that it is only an orator with truly limitless ability (such as 
Crassus) who extends the facultas oratoris to encompass governance of the state; he provides a list of exempla 
to illustrate the point, including Pericles, Scipio Africanus, and the elder Cato, who were leading statesmen and 
leading orators, but did not use the same methods in speaking as in governing.  
98 Cato’s maxim is preserved in Sen. Contr. 1.pr.9; Gunderson argues that auctoritas, the power or authority that 
designates the right to influence and lead, is integral to the conceptualisation of the vir bonus dicendi peritus. 
See Gunderson (2000) 6-9, plus 231, nt. 10 for bibliography on the vir bonus. 
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memoria.99 Further, we might point out that the vast majority of Cicero’s ‘memory men’ are 
orators, while the military leaders to whom he attributes superior memoria remain, by 
comparison, relatively few.  
In my view, however, Cicero’s powerful men with powerful memories are not so few 
as to be inconsequential. As this section has explored, Cicero seems to have singled out 
superior memoria as a capacity that could benefit orators and leaders (military or civilian) 
alike, perhaps basing this view, which has scant surviving precedent, on his affinity for the 
exemplary attributes of Xenophon’s Cyrus. Within oratory, superior mnemonic ability played 
an important defensive role in the speaker’s arsenal. Beyond the forum, for statesmen and 
generals, a strong memory for details (of all kinds, personal, technical, geographical, and so 
on) might inspire great loyalty and trust in the competence of a leader, helping him to effect 
successful political or military outcomes. That, at least, was Cicero’s vision of how memory 
contributed to leadership. He frequently invoked Themistocles as an exemplary proof, as a 
leader who utilised his vast ingenium, consilium, and memoria during both peace and war. 
Cicero went one step further, however, in his character sketch of Lucullus, effectively adding 
the memoria artificiosa of the orator Hortensius to the memoria naturalis of the leader 
Themistocles to create Lucullus’ divina memoria – superhuman mnemonic ability that could 
facilitate mastery of any profession, including that of the imperator, without the need for 
prior experience. With this fusion, Cicero tested not only the bounds of plausibility but even 
the bounds of exemplary fiction and, if the idea of superior memoria as a leadership attribute 
was a distinctively Ciceronian innovation, then Cicero’s Lucullus takes that innovation to the 
extreme. Collecting and reviewing Cicero’s many and various memory men in a series of 
separate cases allows us to see that Cicero was exploiting a fundamental feature of 
exemplarity, namely the establishment of norms through the accumulation and reassertion of 
exemplary virtues, to bolster his own philosophy of the importance of superior memoria as a 
leadership trait.100 As the subsequent section will suggest, it seems that Cicero’s efforts to 
establish those norms were effective, inasmuch as superior memoria came to be recognised as 
a trait worthy of the most laudable Roman emperor. 
 
 
99 Conversely, state governance does not feature in Cicero’s formulation of the summus orator in the Orator. 
For the ideal rector of De re publica in relation to Cicero’s perfectus orator, see Zarecki (2014) 62-8. 
100 For the establishment of norms via exempla, see Roller (2018) 13-7. 
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3. Superior memoria as a topos of imperial praise 
While Cicero’s exemplary ideal of the powerful leader with the equally powerful memory 
may not have reflected reality, the precedents he established retained lasting appeal. In this 
concluding section, I present a few examples that suggest superior mnemonic ability became 
an established hallmark of good leadership during the imperial period, quite possibly thanks 
to Cicero’s overwhelming influence on the rhetorical tradition. Just as Cicero’s version of the 
legend of Simonides and the MOL propagated rapidly and was adopted by later authors, so 
too were some of his references to powerful leaders with powerful memories noticed and 
reiterated. Sometimes, an imperial author simply repurposes one of Cicero’s anecdotes: 
Valerius Maximus, for instance, reproduces Cicero’s story about Themistocles’ infallible 
memory for the names of Athenian citizens to illustrate Themistocles’ diligence.101 At other 
times, Cicero’s memory men are invoked as part of a more sophisticated rhetorical conceit, as 
is the case in the passages discussed below. 
The attribution of superior memoria to prominent and powerful men took on a new 
dimension during the imperial period with the instigation of autocratic rule at Rome and the 
consequent rise of encomiastic literature designed to praise the virtues of the emperor. We 
may even go so far as to argue that superior memoria became an established, if still relatively 
unusual, ‘topos of imperial praise’ – that is, an intellectual attribute for which the emperor, 
specifically, might be praised.102 One relatively early example comes from Suetonius’ life of 
Titus, where Titus’ superior memoria is highlighted in a passage praising his overall 
intellectual acumen: Suetonius states that even in boyhood Titus had great gifts of mind and 
body, that ‘his memoria was exceptional, and he had a readiness to be taught in almost all the 
artes, both of war and of peace’.103 Suetonius includes Titus’ superior memoria in a list 
alongside other intellectual virtues, drawing on a tradition that already had a long history in 
rhetoric, though adapting it to fit the personage of the emperor: Titus had all the intellectual 
skills that would equip him for leadership and imperial rule.104 Cicero had been perhaps the 
first to praise a Caesar in this way, with his list of Julius Caesar’s intellectual virtues in the 
 
101 Val. Max. 8.7.ext.16; cf. Quint. Inst. 11.3.50 and Plin. HN 7.88 (with comment in n. 52 above). 
102 For definition, development, and classification of ‘topoi of praise’, see Pernot (2015) 29-50. 
103 Suet. Tit. 3.1: memoria singularis, docilitas ad omnis fere tum belli tum pacis artes. Latin text: Kaster 
(2016). 
104 On intellectual virtues as a rhetorical commonplace, see above, p. 167. 
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second Philippic – although Cicero’s praise there came with major caveats and 
qualifications.105  
At some point in the final decades of the fourth century CE, the model of the powerful 
emperor with an equally powerful memory was reiterated and developed by the author of the 
life of Hadrian in the SHA.106 The passage runs as follows:  
fuit memoriae ingentis, facultatis inmensae; nam ipse orationes et dictavit et ad omnia 
respondit. […] nomina plurimis sine nomenclatore reddidit, quae semel et congesta simul 
audiverat, ut nomenclatores saepius errantes emendarit. dixit et veteranorum nomina, quos 
aliquando dimiserat. 
SHA Hadr. 20.7-10.107 
He [Hadrian] was a man of vast memoria and immeasurable ability; for instance, he dictated 
his own speeches and personally responded to everything. […] He greeted many people by 
name – names that he had only heard once and all together at the same time – without a 
nomenclator, such that he would correct the nomenclatores when they all too often made 
mistakes. He also recounted the names of the veterans he had discharged at any point in the 
past. 
The opening of the passage is reminiscent of Suetonius’ Titus, and of the Ciceronian ideal of 
the great statesman whose superior mnemonic ability and natural talent assist him in both his 
oratory and his leadership of the state. The ensuing focus on Hadrian’s memory for names 
develops this portrayal, invoking Cicero’s philosophy that the good leader must always keep 
a record in his memory of his citizens’ names to govern most effectively. In short, Hadrian 
has the memory for names and the leadership skills of Cicero’s exemplary Themistocles. The 
mention of nomina veteranorum is moreover reminiscent of Xenophon’s Cyrus, and should 
be read as a symbolic indicator of Hadrian’s mastery of the army and his understanding of 
what it took to be the ideal imperator (we might also be reminded of Cicero’s mnemonically-
superior imperator Lucullus). Whereas the rest of the elite relies upon nomenclatores to keep 
track of names and details, Hadrian, by shunning the assistance of his underlings, asserts 
unfeigned social dominance.108 He thus conforms to the paradigm of the powerful leader with 
 
105 Cic. Phil. 2.116. 
106 On the debated dating of the SHA, see Birley (2003) 132-46. The author of Hadrian purports to be one 
Aelius Spartianus, but see below, n. 113. 
107 Latin text: Hohl (1971). 
108 The reality of Hadrian’s use of nomenclatores was no doubt quite different: the emperor’s household was so 
large that nomenclatores were employed to keep track of other imperial slaves. See Vogt (1978) 366-75. 
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a powerful memory, which in turn contributes to his portrayal as the paragon of his 
generation.109 He is the sole ruler in every sense – above the rest of the elite intellectually as 
well as hierarchically, and capable of governing without aid, almost omnipotent in the 
breadth and depth of his knowledge.  
It is difficult (and perhaps ultimately unnecessary) to determine whether the portrayal 
of Hadrian’s superior memoria in the SHA was drawing on Suetonius’ portrayal of Titus’ 
intellectual abilities, or the Ciceronian paradigm, or other stories repeated by other authors, 
lauding leaders for their ability to remember names sine nomenclatore.110 The main model for 
the SHA was of course Suetonius, and Hadrian’s general intellectual aptitude is certainly akin 
to Suetonius’ portrayal of Titus.111 On the other hand, Cicero is imitated frequently 
throughout the SHA: as well as the many explicit mentions of Cicero’s name, Fündling 
identifies about forty slightly altered Ciceronian quotations.112 Additionally, the modern 
hypothesis that the author of the SHA was some kind of grammaticus situates the lives firmly 
within the rhetorical tradition, even if they were not a direct product of the ludus.113 Cicero’s 
works were hugely influential upon this tradition and the exemplary characteristics that 
Cicero lauded when describing great men established precedents that were imitated by later 
generations who scrutinised his technique.114 The author of the SHA’s Hadrian may well 
have been drawing on those precedents. 
Another imperial attribution of superior memoria appears in the life of Severus 
Alexander, the second emperor in the SHA to be praised for mnemonic prowess. The author 
of this life lists rerum memoria singularis alongside the other qualities that marked Severus 
out from a young age as a future emperor (he in fact became emperor around the age of 
fourteen).115 There is even an unverified claim that Severus used a mnemonic technique to 
aid his memoria rerum. In this portrayal we can again detect the model of Suetonius’ Titus, 
 
109 For discussion of Hadrian’s overall portrayal in the SHA, see Meckler (1996) 366-75. 
110 E.g. Valerius Maximus and Pliny on Cyrus – see p. 159-60 above. 
111 For Suetonian influence, see Fündling (2006) 167-71. 
112 Fündling (2006) 161. See also Bergersdijk (2010) 38-40. 
113 The SHA is presented as the work of six authors. Syme, a proponent of Dessau’s theory concerning unified 
authorship, famously dubbed the lone author a ‘rogue grammaticus’: see Dessau (1889) 337-92 and Syme 
(1968) 207. The grammaticus hypothesis was developed by Honoré (1987) 156-76. For an intriguing and more 
recent computer-aided study concerning the possibility of multiple authorship, see Stover and Kestemont (2016) 
140-57. 
114 See MacCormack (2013) esp. 262-6. 
115 SHA Alex. Sev. 14.6. The author purports to be Aelius Lampridius. 
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whose superior memoria was one of the qualities that distinguished his suitability for imperial 
rule from boyhood. Cicero, however, also looms large in the life of Severus – he was 
apparently the emperor’s favourite Latin writer.116 The claims regarding Severus’ memoria 
rerum are especially redolent of Cicero’s Lucullus, who is the only precedent for the notion 
that an absolute novice might transform himself into a powerful leader by utilising mnemonic 
techniques. Cicero’s Lucullus set out for the war in Asia rei militaris rudis and arrived a 
fully-fledged imperator. If the author of the life of Severus wanted us to believe that the 
future emperor would follow the Lucullan mould, then we must imagine that even though 
Severus acquired imperial power while still a teenager, thanks to his rerum memoria 
singularis, he would have been able to rapidly assimilate the skills necessary to assume 
supreme command of the Roman empire. 
From the end of the Republic onwards, in the emerging genre of imperial epideictic 
encomium, certain attributes became to be considered particularly praiseworthy when 
attached to the emperor.117 Even if Cicero’s memory men did not influence the author(s) of 
the SHA directly, therefore, it is possible that superlative mnemonic skill was attributed to 
various emperors because memoria had itself become a commonplace topos of praise. If we 
accept a date of the late fourth century CE as plausible for the SHA, then it was written at a 
time when panegyric composed for the emperor was a well-established rhetorical genre, with 
distinct divisions and subdivisions of praiseworthy topoi. One of the subdivisions in imperial 
panegyric concerned praise of the emperor’s ‘personal attributes’ (Latin, personis attributae 
res).118 Menander Rhetor, who wrote a rhetorical treatise on encomium in Greek, provides us 
with lists of possible topoi that might be deployed in an imperial panegyric (βασιλικὸς 
λόγος).119 Specifically, under the rubric of ‘intelligence’ (φρόνησις), he lists intellectual 
virtues such as mental agility and foresight, while advising that the emperor should be lauded 
for excelling everyone else on earth in intellectual skills, without which his many 
achievements as a ruler would not have been possible.120 It is conceivable that superior 
mnemonic ability might have been included by other rhetoricians or orators under the rubric 
 
116 SHA Alex Sev. 30.2, also 8.5, 31.4, 57.4.  
117 For the emergence of these praiseworthy attributes, see Morton Braund (1998) esp. 55-8. 
118 See Pernot (2015) 40-2. 
119 This is the second of two Menandrean treatises: see Russell (1998) 28-33. 
120 Men. Rhet. 2.1.33-4. 
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of intelligence as a praiseworthy personal attribute, to be deployed in encomium when 
suitable. 
My final example in this section illustrates this possibility put into practice. It is 
drawn directly from the genre described above, namely the imperial panegyrics of the late 
fourth century CE, in an oration apparently delivered before the senate in Rome, composed by 
Pacatus Drepanius in praise of Theodosius I.121 In the relevant passage, Pacatus celebrates 
how much trust everyone has in Theodosius, how he always remembers the men to whom he 
has pledged benefactions, and how he never forgets to deliver on his promises.122 It is 
Theodosius’ superlative mnemonic capacity that inspires this trust – so once again, we 
encounter the idea that superior memoria contributes to a leader’s ability to inspire faith and 
loyalty in those he leads. Pacatus then marvels at the power of Theodosius’ memoria, before 
asking, in an elaborate rhetorical question, whether Hortensius, or Lucullus, or Caesar ever 
possessed powers of recollection strong enough to rival the emperor’s ability to retrieve 
everything he has committed to memory, wherever and whenever he wants.123 The correct 
answer is, evidently, “No”. 
Here, we have direct evidence of Pacatus invoking several of Cicero’s powerful men 
with powerful memories. Lucullus’ supposed superior mnemonic ability is an entirely 
Ciceronian conceit and can have only come from the opening of the Lucullus. From the 
additional reference to Hortensius, it seems probable that Pacatus was thinking of the passage 
at Luc. 2, since Cicero there praises them both in the same breath. The choice of Caesar is 
perhaps more surprising, given that both surviving instances where Cicero attributes superior 
memoria to him are overtly rhetorical (Deiot. 42, Phil. 2.116). But take Pro rege Deiotaro, a 
speech that has been called ‘proto-panegyric’.124 If Pacatus had read the speech looking for 
examples of how to flatter a Caesar, he might well have noted Cicero’s praise of superior 
memoria and have chosen to follow the precedent. It also seems a prudent move on Pacatus’ 
part, to compare his own emperor to a Caesar as well as to the less famous Hortensius and 
 
121 For historical context and text, see Nixon and Rodgers (1994) 437-47, 647-74. The oration is the second of 
the Panegyrici Latini XII. 
122 Pacatus Panegyricus Pacati Theodosio Augusto 18. 
123 Pacatus, 18.3: At ego miror etiam memoriam; nam cui Hortensio Lucullove vel Caesari tam parata umquam 
adfuit recordatio quam tibi sacra mens tua loco momentoque quo iusseris reddit omne depositum? Text: 
Mynors (1964).  
124 Morton Braund (1998) 55, in reference to the three Caesarian speeches; also p. 68-71 for Ciceronian 
influence on imperial panegyric. 
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Lucullus, whether that Caesar was renowned for memoria or not. Hortensius was merely an 
orator, however impressive; Lucullus had a reputation as a powerful imperator, certainly, but 
also as the imperator who failed to beat Mithridates and was replaced by Pompey. In Julius 
Caesar, however, Pacatus found a leader worthy of being outshone by Theodosius in any 
field, no matter whether either man had a reputation for superior mnemonic skill. 
The above survey of emperors who were attributed superior mnemonic prowess is but 
a brief study of a relatively rare topos over the longue durée. Nevertheless, it is indicative of 
how legends about powerful men with powerful memories possessed an enduring appeal for 
multiple generations. The stories demonstrate that significance was attached to superior 
memoria outside of pedagogic rhetoric and oratory, and even outside of ‘intellectual’ 
professions such as that of the poet or the legal expert. Superior memoria naturalis (and even 
occasionally superior memoria rerum) was viewed, alongside other natural gifts of 
intelligence, as a praiseworthy attribute for a Roman leader from at least the Ciceronian era 
onwards, indicative of his capacity to learn, retain, and take care of the interests, skills, and 
needs of those he governed. Cicero’s portraits of individuals with superlative mnemonic 
skills persisted in the rhetorical tradition and superior memoria was invoked variously as a 
topos of praise by authors and orators seeking ever more inventive reasons to laud the 
leadership of the most powerful men in the Empire.  
  
Concluding remarks 
At the start of this thesis, I suggested that for rhetoricians of the first century BCE, the answer 
to the question of how much artifice there can be in memory was, prima facie, “As much as 
you like”. The subsequent analysis has, I hope, demonstrated not only the rather more 
nuanced role that memoria played in rhetorical theory, but also how discipline-specific the 
utilisation of artificial mnemonic techniques was. Even in educational settings, where 
personal mnemonic capacity was valued and cultivated, younger students relied on memoria 
naturalis when learning by heart; memoria artificiosa remained the province of more 
advanced rhetorical pedagogy. As for the practical business of oratory, the MOL was an 
important part of the skillset of some but by no means all professional orators. When Cicero 
attributed superior memoria to an exemplary individual, more often than not he was referring 
to memoria naturalis. 
Arguing for the limited reach of a major theme of one’s work (in my case, the MOL) 
may seem an odd thing for any researcher to do. I do not want to downplay the remarkable 
fact of the MOL’s existence: Roman rhetoricians and orators recognised and lauded the 
specific importance of memory to their disciplines in a way that modern professions do not. 
In short, there was a place for the MOL in the Roman world but, as scholars, we must keep 
the MOL in its place. Doing so frees us to focus on other mnemonic practices that did not 
involve the ars memoriae, such as the socialising function of pedagogic memorisation 
exercises, or the importance of a strong memory for names in Roman politics. Accordingly, 
my Concluding Remarks address three fronts: the relationship between the MOL and 
oratorical expertise; the wider (mis)application of the MOL in Classics; and some exciting 
possibilities for future research into Roman mnemonic practices. 
 
1. On the MOL and oratorical expertise 
What does it mean to speak about the trained memory of the Roman orator? I have talked a 
great deal about Cicero’s ‘ideal’ orator in this thesis, but I have gradually come to the 
conclusion that, if we are interested in the typical Roman professional, it might be more 
productive to talk about the ‘expert’ orator instead. To this end, I observe that memory plays 
a crucial role in the acquisition of expertise in any discipline and, consequently, it may be 
useful to consider modern research into the relationship between mnemonic skill and 
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expertise. Ericsson and Chase have proposed a theory of ‘skilled memory’ to describe and 
explain the apparently superior mnemonic ability of a wide range of experts, from musicians 
to translators: in Ericsson’s words, ‘In most types of expertise, the expert does not practice to 
improve their memory directly, but rather the superior working memory is a unintentional 
consequence of efforts to improve the selection and execution of superior actions’.1 It is 
important to note that Ericsson here refers to superior working memory, a term that 
encompasses the processing and manipulation of information as well as its retention and 
recall. We might take the example of the expert doctor, who has many long years of practical 
experience, and who is apparently able to digest information concerning a given medical 
case, isolate the relevant details, order them, retain them, and act on them, all with little 
effort, while the junior doctor struggles to do the same.2 In such cases, the expert’s apparently 
superior memory for key pieces of information related to the field is extremely discipline-
specific, since their working memory has adapted over many years of practical experience to 
meet the specialised demands of the profession.  
The modern concept of skilled memory is, of course, simply a theoretical framework 
– there was no notion of ‘working memory’ in the ancient world and we cannot conduct 
studies on expert Roman orators. Yet I see no reason why their mnemonic capabilities should 
not have followed what are apparently universal paradigms of expertise. Consider a story told 
by Quintilian about Scaevola, an experienced player of duodecim scripta, a game based 
partly on luck but also on strategy and correct decision-making.3 Scaevola was, says 
Quintilian, able to recall every move he had made while playing to pinpoint exactly where he 
had gone wrong.4 Much like an expert chess player, it seems Scaevola was adept at retaining 
information pertinent to the game.5 Quintilian then draws an analogy between duodecim 
scripta and oratory, arguing that it is even more important for the orator to arrange the topics 
of his speech in the correct order than it is for the player to execute his moves strategically. 
 
1 Quote from p. 700 of the comprehensive research review provided by Ericsson (2018) 696-713. See also Chase 
and Ericsson (1981) 141-189. 
2 The extent to which experienced doctors’ memories adapt to isolate and encode information selectively has 
been illustrated in studies showing that even when advanced medical students retain more information about a 
given medical case, their diagnoses are inferior to those of experienced doctors who retain fewer (but more 
pertinent) details: see Wimmers et al. (2005) 949-57 and Ericsson, Patel, and Kintsch (2000) esp. 586-8. 
3 Duodecim scripta is generally compared to backgammon – more chance-based than chess, but still reliant on 
the player’s skill. See Austin (1934) 30-4 and Toner (1995) 91, 95-6. 
4 Quint. Inst. 11.2.38. 
5 For modern chess experts, see Ericsson (2018) 701-3. 
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Quintilian’s vision of the expert orator is that he should be able, like the expert player of 
duodecim scripta, to perceive the pieces and the patterns on the forensic playing board and to 
execute the most appropriate moves – but to do this instinctively presumably required many 
years of practical experience. If the development of the notional Roman orator’s expertise 
conformed to the paradigm of skilled memory theory, then we would expect that during those 
years of practical experience, the orator’s working memory gradually adapted to meet the 
specific demands of his discipline.  
The ‘specific demands of his discipline’, namely forensic speechmaking, included the 
isolation, ordering, retention, and retrieval of the facts (res) most relevant to a given case. 
The remarkable thing about the existence of the ancient MOL is that whereas in modern 
professions (such as medicine), superior discipline-specific mnemonic performance is 
generally taken for granted as a by-product of many years on the job, professional 
rhetoricians and orators recognised and lauded the importance of memory to their specific 
domain of expertise, to the point that memoria became a distinct subdiscipline of the field. 
The ars memoriae was designed to isolate, order, retain, and retrieve the facts (res) of a given 
case – that is to say, it was designed to simulate the mental processes that expert orators with 
many years’ experience undertook to meet the demands of their profession. This observation 
highlights both the discipline-specific qualities of the MOL and the complexity of the 
enmeshed relationship between artifice and the natural development of oratorical expertise: 
memoria artificiosa was designed to imitate the processes of an expert orator’s memoria 
naturalis, processes that had, in turn, adapted to meet the (artificially imposed) constraints of 
ancient oratory. The goal of memoria artificiosa was thus to train the working memory of the 
Roman orator to execute the mental processes that needed to become second nature if he 
were to achieve expertise. The MOL provided a codified set of instructions to guide the 
orator through those mental processes; practised enough and internalised, the MOL allowed 
the orator to prepare and perform speeches and refutations in the forum sine scripto, with 
apparent ease. 
 
2. On the application of the MOL in Classics 
I have reasoned throughout this thesis that the ancient MOL was relatively limited in scope 
and seldom applied in contexts outside of oratory. My findings have relatively clear, 
cautionary implications for scholarship that relies on the application of rhetorical mnemonic 
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theory to draw conclusions, notably in the field of Memory Studies.6 Artificial mnemonics 
and cultural memory do not tend to mix, yet mixed they have been.  
The problems that arise from the conflation of different concepts of memoria are 
encapsulated in general terms by what Beiner has appropriately called ‘the first sin of 
Memory Studies’: laxity.7 Although Beiner is actually discussing Memory Studies as applied 
to the Troubles in Northern Ireland, his observation that ‘the pedantry required to pin down 
such a slippery subject [as memory] poses a formidable challenge’ applies equally to 
memoria in the Roman world. As the theory of modern Memory Studies is applied to ever 
more diverse realms of ancient life, there is a real risk that the application becomes forced, 
resulting in statements that originate less in the realms of hard evidence and more in those of 
some progressively fantastic Glasperlenspiel.8 While undertaking this research, I have 
noticed that the conceptualisation of memoria as memoria artificiosa seems particularly 
prone to misuse, with scholars embarking upon journeys that connect apparently unrelated 
topics to the MOL via increasingly ingenious routes. Below, without wanting to criticise to 
no good purpose, I provide examples that illustrate how, when it comes to memoria, laxity 
can lead us down an increasingly slippery slope. 
A relatively innocuous instance of potential conceptual laxity features in Bergmann’s 
influential essay on ‘The Roman House as Memory Theater’, which examines the pictorial 
ensembles in the House of the Tragic Poet in Pompeii to argue that memory played a crucial 
role in their creation and reception. 9 Bergmann begins by outlining the rules of the MOL, 
before arguing that ancient mnemonic systems incorporated spatial and material elements 
because, ‘for a largely illiterate society, the visual process played a powerful role in receiving 
and retaining information’ (p. 225). This assertion is untenable on two counts: first, the MOL 
was designed and used, probably exclusively, by highly literate rhetoricians and orators; 
second, even in today’s comprehensively literate society, mnemonics incorporating space, 
objects, and architecture are used by expert mnemonists for no other reason than they work.10 
There was nothing special about Roman society that made it particularly suited to the 
 
6 Modern approaches to communicative and cultural memory are outlined succinctly by Assmann (2008) 109-
18. 
7 Beiner (2017). 
8 An analogy inspired by Hölkeskamp (2014) 65; pace Hesse. 
9 Bergmann (1994) 225-56. 
10 As neuroscientist Becchetti concludes: ‘[the MOL] must be deeply rooted in neurology because it seems to be 
applied unawares even by mnemonists who have never heard of its existence’, Becchetti (2010) E104. 
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adoption of a mnemonic system with spatial or material elements such as the MOL. Having 
established the special status of the ars memoriae in Roman society, Bergmann then treats the 
process of mentally reviewing imagines in the MOL as analogous to the physical viewing of 
various scenes depicted throughout a Roman domus, stated thus: ‘Elevated to metaphor and 
internalized as private memory loci, the Roman house offers insight into a formative mental 
model’ (p. 226). There is nothing fundamentally wrong, I suppose, with reading pictorial 
ensembles in the domus as a set of imagines placed in mnemonic loci, although I do not think 
there is much enlightenment to be gained, since we must remain always aware that such a 
reading is a metaphorical framework of our own making – there is little evidence that any 
Roman would have viewed a house metaphorically as if it were the physical manifestation of 
an individual’s MOL. Even the (low) percentage of the population who received training in 
memoria artificiosa were taught to apply the analogy the other way around, likening 
mnemonic loci to architectural spaces at one moment and to wax tablets the next. Certainly, 
the imagines contained within mnemonic loci were designed to trigger associative recall in 
the same way that paintings might conjure memories, but we hardly need to invoke the MOL 
to tell us that images, like words, can trigger recollections. What the MOL does tell us is that 
the same image will trigger different memories in different individuals, depending on 
disposition and experience.11 The inclusion of memoria artificiosa in the rhetorical 
curriculum cannot therefore support Bergmann’s contention (whether valid or not) that 
educated Romans were taught to ‘read’ images in a standardised fashion.12 
Moving on, the risks of conflating ancient mnemonic loci with the modern concept of 
lieux de mémoire are demonstrated in Jaeger’s monograph Livy’s Written Rome (an example I 
have selected not because it is particularly heinous, but because it is typical).13 Jaeger 
combines the conceptualisation of memoria as monumentum with the ars memoriae, likening 
Livy’s schematised topography of Rome to mnemonic loci and the monuments highlighted 
therein to mnemonic imagines to argue that ‘several features of the ars memoriae suggest it 
as a likely model for Livy’s conception of Rome’s past’ (p. 20). Jaeger’s link between the 
‘remembered landscape’ and the ‘trained memory’ (p. 21-4) imprecisely confuses practices of 
memorialisation in wider Roman society with the memorisation techniques used by some 
individuals. There are certainly superficial parallels between Livy’s authorial technique and 
 
11 The Auctor takes pains to point this out at Rhet. Her. 3.38 and elsewhere: see Ch. I, p. 44.  
12 Bergmann (1994) 226. 
13 Jaeger (1997) 19-24. 
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the rules of the MOL – but the fact that both utilise vivid depiction, to name one similarity, 
might be explained quite straightforwardly by the observation that vivid depiction is 
inherently memorable, rather than by the hypothesis that Livy was using the MOL as a 
model. The same reasoning can be applied to other similarities. In short, correlation does not 
necessarily equal causation. 
Bergmann’s and Jaeger’s invocations of the MOL are at least grounded on genuine 
features of the technique; others are entirely hypothetical. Take Favro’s link between the 
moderate spacing of mnemonic loci and Roman modes of walking and dancing, which 
appears in her study of triumphal processions.14 As in the case of Jaeger’s study of Livy, 
there is conceptual conflation, this time between collective acts of remembrance via ritual 
performance and the ars memoriae. After stating that the MOL is known as ‘the Memory 
Walk System’ (by whom?), Favro explains that Roman rhetoricians ‘recommended loci be 
placed at regular intervals, a modulation that echoed the slow walking associated with upper-
class ambulation and the measured rhythms of ritual dancers’ (p. 86). This abstract (and at 
best circumstantial) connection adds little, seems forced, and detracts from the merits of the 
study, which contains some otherwise strong points concerning the desires of triumphal 
‘curators’ to create memorable kinetic spectacles.  
At the bottom of the aforementioned slippery slope lie wildly speculative links 
between the MOL and settings divorced from the Greco-Roman rhetorical scene in both 
space and time. I call to witness Kelly’s belief that Stonehenge was arranged in accordance 
with the principles of the MOL, which is used to underpin an argument regarding prehistoric 
henges as follows: ‘All the factors advised for optimising a set of sequenced loci are met. It is 
therefore logical to argue that stone circles were a mnemonic technology’.15 To ground a 
thesis concerning the function of a third-millennium-BCE monument directly on a Greco-
Roman rhetorical technique constitutes a monolithic miscalculation.  
In sum, just because the MOL may have been treated as a party trick in past 
scholarship does not mean that we should now aim to redress the balance by seeing it 
everywhere, from art history to stone circles: in so doing, we turn it into a trite cliché all over 
 
14 Favro (2014) 85-102. 
15 Kelly (2015) 223-4; see also p. 69-71, where Kelly argues (with little analysis of relevant evidence) that the 
MOL was used in non-literate cultures, and by ‘pre-literate Greek orators’. 
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again. Likewise, to generalise this principle, we should take a similarly rigorous approach to 
the application of findings from modern cognitive science to the study of Classics at large.16 
 
3. On future research into Roman mnemonic practices 
I shall now highlight several areas, both inside and outside of the forum, where further 
sustained focus on mnemonic practices (as opposed to theories) may prove productive. The 
first remains within the realm of oratory and concerns the transformation of oratorical 
performance into text – a natural extension of my discussion in Chapter III, from the 
‘preparation’ and ‘trial’ phases of the forensic process to the ‘publication’ phase. As noted, a 
large amount of work has already been conducted in this area, especially regarding the nature 
of surviving Ciceronian orations and whether they are fair representations of what was said at 
trial.17 Focussing on the orator’s utilisation of his memory presents an alternative perspective 
on these debates. As I have discussed, although some orators in the late Republic utilised the 
MOL to assist in the delivery of their orations, they did not use it to retain entire speeches 
word-for-word. In the absence of verbatim transcripts, therefore, it seems likely that orators 
would have relied on external mnemonic aids such as commentarii to reproduce the structure 
and arguments of a delivered speech – especially if some time had elapsed between delivery 
and composition.18 The orator’s memory, by which I mean his personal episodic recollections 
of the trial, would have also exerted considerable influence on the text.  
The Ciceronian corpus provides direct evidence for the influence of memory on the 
composition process. It seems that Cicero was selective in his recreation of a delivered 
speech, both on a micro scale (altering phrasing or introducing additional material) and 
occasionally on a macro scale (leaving parts of a speech unelaborated as tituli or capita).19 
Occasionally, he succumbed to the periculum memoriae, the fallibility of memory, by 
 
16 A methodological point highlighted in the Introduction: see p. 12. 
17 See p. 118. 
18 For a summary of the issues surrounding differences between delivered and ‘published’ orations, see 
Alexander (2002) 15-26, esp. 17-8 for the absence of verbatim transcripts (although the relevant case of Pro 
Milone is not discussed – for which, see Marshall (1987) 730-6). The date of the invention of shorthand, 
required for verbatim transcripts, is debated. On balance, the evidence suggests that forensic speeches in the late 
Republic were not typically documented by any means that could produce verbatim (or near-verbatim) records. 
19 See Ch. III, n. 30. 
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misrepresenting trial proceedings unintentionally.20 The questions prompted by these 
instances of ‘selective’ and ‘fallible’ memory reach beyond the issue of whether Cicero’s 
texts matched his original words. We might, for instance, ask whether disparity between an 
audience member’s memory of a delivered speech and the circulated text of that speech was 
routinely noticed or even considered problematic. Further, bearing Cicero’s various motives 
for composition in mind, we might move away from the trial itself to consider different 
readerships, viewing oratorical composition as an act of communicative memory with 
pedagogic memorisation exercises as one of the mechanisms of transmission. 
On this topic, Cicero poses a particularly interesting case study because of his evident 
awareness that his orations were, in some instances, going to be used for pedagogic purposes, 
to be studied in detail and perhaps memorised by future cohorts of aspiring Roman orators, 
eager to imitate and emulate his achievements.21 This opens the possibility for further 
examination of the pedagogic practices of memorisation that became so widespread in 
Roman ludi from the late Republic onwards. Along with the growing popularity of the 
declamatory scene, we see a culture of quotation emerge – works such as the elder Seneca’s 
declamatory bricolage of Controversiae and Suasoriae bearing testimony to a competitive 
striving for essential verbal elegance, for novelty, and for memorability. It is thus possible 
that pedagogic practices of memorising snippets, sententiae rather than full orationes, had a 
direct effect upon modes of literary composition. 
My final suggestion for future study leaves behind the worlds of rhetoric and oratory 
to focus on a Roman mnemonic practice that often slips beneath our radar, if only because its 
practitioners were enslaved. I refer to the nomenclatores, whose job it was to retain names 
and details on behalf of their masters. As discussed briefly in Chapter IV, the importance in 
Roman electioneering of nomenclatio (the practice of greeting potential voters by name) led 
in the later Republic to a scenario in which candidates were obliged to utilise nomenclatores 
while canvassing; it also helps explain why Cineas’ fantastic feat of name-memorisation held 
such exemplary appeal; and it may even be the reason why Cicero repeated stories about men 
such as Themistocles, who reportedly possessed a superior memory for names.22 For any 
Roman with a public presence and a degree of power, remembering and being remembered 
 
20 E.g. Cic. Att. 1.13.4 and 13.44.3. 
21 See Cicero’s claims at e.g. QFr. 3.1.11, Att. 2.1.3 and 4.2.2. 
22 See p. 164-6. 
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by other influential men helped to maintain that presence and power. Consequently, we see 
nomenclatores retained permanently as part of a household and utilised outside of electoral 
contexts – a convention that seems to have only increased in popularity during the imperial 
period. The practice of nomenclatio and the utilisation of enslaved nomenclatores should 
therefore be set alongside other social practices that were integral to the institutionally 
hierarchical nature of Roman society, such as the salutatio. The subject is itself a book-length 
study and there remains a great deal of analysis to be done – we currently only have 
Kolendo’s slim monograph, half of which is a collection of epigraphic evidence dated largely 
to the imperial period.23 For now, I observe only the unique ‘Romanness’ of these mnemonic 
practices. It is, for instance, revealing that Greek equivalents of the term nomenclator did not 
exist and had to be invented, appearing in texts only in the first century CE.24 A full study of 
nomenclatio and the use of nomenclatores would therefore provide a beneficial antidote to 
the perception that might otherwise be drawn from this thesis, whereby the majority of 
mnemonic practices originate in the Greek rhetorical, pedagogic, and philosophical traditions, 
before being ‘translated’ into the Roman world. 
 
This thesis has focussed on the function of individual mnemonic skill in Roman rhetoric and 
oratory, in the ludus and in the forum; it has reappraised the technical evolution of the MOL; 
and it has explored how our perceptions of memoria may have been influenced by Cicero. I 
conclude by returning to the ‘big’ questions that motivated my initial engagement with 
ancient conceptualisations of memory.25 First, there is the advent of writing and the issue of 
its potential effect on individuals’ experiences of memory and remembering – an intrinsically 
inscrutable question. As numerous comparative anthropological studies have shown, the 
concept of strict verbatim memorisation becomes almost meaningless in societies where no 
full written records exist.26 The contention that the ars memoriae was created in response to 
the advent and spread of written texts is, however, misleading: as this study has 
demonstrated, the MOL was not developed to aid verbatim memorisation. Rather, the 
codification of the MOL was driven by the demands of professional oratory, which required 
 
23 Kolendo (1989). 
24 E.g. Plutarch’s ὀνοματολόγοι, Cat. Min. 8.2, which Geiger suggests represents an ad hoc Plutarchian 
translation of nomenclatores: Geiger (1971) 165-6. 
25 See Introduction, p. 9-10. 
26 For an introduction to such studies, see Ong (1982) 56-66. 
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speakers to rapidly memorise the outline of what remained largely improvised speeches. 
Oratory was a highly literate profession, dominated by oral performance. As a performative 
technique, the MOL helped orators to emulate the structure and precision of a written 
composition while retaining the fluency of speech. In this discipline-specific sense, then, my 
findings offer a new perspective on the changing relationship between memory and writing in 
Greek and Roman societies. 
Second, I raised the question of whether esoteric ancient theories of memory bore any 
relation to quotidian practice. The answer is a succinct “yes and no”: yes, students of rhetoric 
and some orators utilised the MOL as part of their everyday practice; and no, the MOL was 
rarely employed outside of the ludus or the forum, while debates over the nature of memory 
seem to have been confined to philosophy, at least in the first century BCE.  
Third and finally, I asked whether we, today, engage with the act of remembering in a 
fundamentally different way to the mnemonically-trained Roman orator. For the large part, I 
suspect not. Mnemonic training contributed to and reinforced oratorical expertise but was 
highly specialised – so the mnemonic ability of the expert Roman orator would be superior to 
anyone, modern or ancient, who had not experienced the same training and long years of 
practice, but only in the realm of speechmaking. There are isolated examples of Greek and 
Roman mnemonists, such as Metrodorus and Hortensius, who adapted their mnemonic skills 
to other fields, just as expert mnemonists adapt their skills today. I am sure, however, that 
even the most expert of these legendary ‘memory men’ would sometimes misremember a 
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